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WhatsApp's Signal Protocol integration is now complete

whispersystems.org

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Re: WhatsApp's Signal Protocol integration is now complete

#131
post #34
post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> They seem to have replaced TLS/SSL between client and server with "Noise Pipes". WhatsApp was already using a custom protocol instead of TLS. We worked with them to transition over to Noise Pipes, which has some advantages over what they were doing before. Also, we've renamed Axolotl to Signal Protocol: https://whispersystems.org/blog/signal-inside-and-out/

It is killing me that you didn't rename Signal to Axolotl.

Why?

"Axolotl" at least has seriously pronunciation issues so I am glad it is not used "user-side".

Re: WhatsApp's Signal Protocol integration is now complete

#132
post #87

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think this is a reasonable analysis. I would refine it this way (examples are only for illustrative purposes): Tier 1 secure messengers: all possible tradeoffs in favor of security made; use for worst-case adversaries: - Signal/TextSecure - Pond - PGP† - OTR Tier 2 secure messengers: serious secure messaging protocols that make some tradeoffs in favor of adoption and usability; use for normal messages of low sensit…

Don't forget Ricochet†, it only does synchronous communication but it does solve the problem of leaking meta-data. All the other clients except Pond leak meta-data. † https://ricochet.im/

Ricochet appears to rely on Tor's encryption, with an additional custom RSA handshake. That's two added levels of "nope" for me, but other people might feel differently.

Re: WhatsApp's Signal Protocol integration is now complete

#133
post #118
post #112

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> From that perspective, I'm still inclined to trust apple's iMessage a bit more especially after recent events. I'm surprised by this statement. After recent events I'd say the imessage protocoll is a weird ad-hoc construction that failed to follow basic modern crypto constructions like authenticated encryption and forward secrecy. I don't expect anything alike from the signal protocol.

The one thing iMessage and WhatsApp have in common is that they both end-to-end encrypt without giving the user control over the keys being used. So ignoring actual protocol and implementation flaws (I agree with you that WhisperSystems will probably be ahead of Apple there), both rely on the key management being done in a thrustworthy manner. And this is where I trust Apple more than Facebook, especially in light of…

WhatsApp allows you to verify keys. Apple doesn't. This makes a pretty big difference.

Also, iMessage's crypto protocol is cryptographically broken. It's been patched together in ways that prevent the obvious attack, but don't actually fix the underlying issue. Doing so involves replacing the protocol. In the mean time, those patches are not fool proof and someone may get around them.

Re: WhatsApp's Signal Protocol integration is now complete

#134
post #102

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Correct. The only people who can read a message (or hear a voice call) are their intended recipients.

Would it be possible for Facebook to introduce a backdoor later without breaking the Signal protocol, or alternatively "forking" it while keeping compatibility between their clients?

The client has access messages in clear text. A backdoor could easily deliver those messages to a third-party, yes.

This is not something E2E protocols can protect you from. You'd have to audit every piece of firmware and software on your device to verify that's not happening.

Re: WhatsApp's Signal Protocol integration is now complete

#135

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Please read the articles. It already says that those are encrypted, as well as voice calls. Apparently once everyone is upgraded, nothing will be unencrypted. Their white paper also describes the protocols used in quite a lot of detail.

no proof without open source

Matrix uses the Signal protocol for encryption as well, if you want a fully free implementation of the same tech.

https://matrix.org/git/olm/

Re: WhatsApp's Signal Protocol integration is now complete

#136
post #114

Is it still the case that verifying a user's text identity does not verify their voice identity and vice versa? IMO it would be very nice if calling someone and verifying the short code would confirm their text identity as well and if, once someone's text identity is verified, if voice calls to that person were protected by the verified text identity. (IIRC the reason that Signal does not work this way is that texts…

WhatsApp uses a shared identity across text and voice, so Signal Protocol is used to secure both connections.

We've long planned to do the same thing in Signal, but WhatsApp is ahead of Signal here. Axolotl is now called Signal Protocol, btw.

Re: WhatsApp's Signal Protocol integration is now complete

#137
post #118

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The one thing iMessage and WhatsApp have in common is that they both end-to-end encrypt without giving the user control over the keys being used. So ignoring actual protocol and implementation flaws (I agree with you that WhisperSystems will probably be ahead of Apple there), both rely on the key management being done in a thrustworthy manner. And this is where I trust Apple more than Facebook, especially in light of…

WhatsApp allows you to verify keys. Apple doesn't. This makes a pretty big difference. Also, iMessage's crypto protocol is cryptographically broken. It's been patched together in ways that prevent the obvious attack, but don't actually fix the underlying issue. Doing so involves replacing the protocol. In the mean time, those patches are not fool proof and someone may get around them.

> Whats App allows you to verify keys. Apple doesn't. This makes a pretty big difference.

Does it? It allows me to verify a key. It doesn't give me any ability to control what other keys it's working with.

This only helps me to make sure that the message I just got, I actually got from the person it's claiming to be. It doesn't give me any other protection though.

I agree about the broken iMessage crypto and I hope to see Apple upgrade the protocol in a future OS release. With their quick uptake of new OSes, a fix could propagate relatively quickly.

Re: WhatsApp's Signal Protocol integration is now complete

#139

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Don't forget Ricochet†, it only does synchronous communication but it does solve the problem of leaking meta-data. All the other clients except Pond leak meta-data. † https://ricochet.im/

Ricochet appears to rely on Tor's encryption, with an additional custom RSA handshake. That's two added levels of "nope" for me, but other people might feel differently.

I can see that but I think the self authenticating nature of Tor Onion Services and therefore bypassing bgp, dns and CA weaknesses is worth something†.

Maybe in the future when prop224†† is implemented the encryption will be more solid.

https://media.ccc.de/v/32c3-7322-tor_onion_services_more_use...

†† https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/asn/torspec.git/tree/prop...

Re: WhatsApp's Signal Protocol integration is now complete

#140

How does this compare with Telegram?

By default, Telegram stores a plaintext copy of every message you've ever sent or received on their servers. WhatsApp does end to end encryption using the Signal Protocol by default, and doesn't store anything server side.
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