Earlier quoted context omitted.
The main point of Tor is that nobody knows where the traffic comes from. Realize you're asking them to break their own service. Your premise seems to be that you can't be bothered to protect your networks so you want to put that responsibility on someone else. It's called intermediary liability and it's terrible because the intermediary has all the wrong incentives. You demand that the intermediary eliminate maliciou…
Google does this with Linode servers. I route my HTTP traffic through a proxy on a Linode server. Google blocks me all the time for no reason other than that some other IPs in my range are doing bad things. I've tried to contact Google about this but they could care less about a handful of users.
The Trouble with CloudFlare
181–190 of 361 posts
Re: The Trouble with CloudFlare
#182Earlier quoted context omitted.
> But, if we've seen your browser behave elsewhere on the Internet acting like a regular web surfer and not a hacker, then we can use your browser’s good reputation to override the bad reputation of the hacker coffee shop's IP. Look, please correct me if I'm misunderstanding or taking your words out of context. But what I hear you saying is that CloudFlare is fundamentally opposed to user privacy at a business and an…
Yes, reputation is a form of tracking. And if you show up to a site with no reputation of your own, from an IP that has a known-bad reputation, it is in the best interest of the site to challenge (not block) you. You are 97% likely to be malicious traffic. Edit: 97% is a real number, not an exaggeration, based on numbers from the report linked in the article.
Similarly, if you block cookies/supercookies/etc to avoid being tracked ... you'll be challenged every view.
Re: The Trouble with CloudFlare
#183Earlier quoted context omitted.
Absolutely not. I believe in privacy and have zero tolerance for big businesses who throw their weight around at the expense of minority communities (Tor users in this case). I understand CloudFlare's need to make a profit. That is why we need to turn treating Tor traffic like normal traffic into a good business decision.
You misunderstand the problem. The issue is that CloudFlare is treating Tor traffic like any other traffic. What you want is special treatment for Tor above and beyond the whitelisting feature CloudFlare already offers to site owners.
I don't see this in any practical fashion. I can visit a CloudFlare hosted site from the regular internet for hours (even scrape automatically) with no problems; the first time I hit the same site through Tor, it gets a double or triple capchca.
Perhaps it should be a blacklist instead of a whitelist. Defaults matter.
Re: The Trouble with CloudFlare
#184It is also worrying that CloudFlare has this much power. One of the greatest things about the internet is the openness of the platform and the non existence of gate keepers.
Also, here is an annotated version of the TOR paper for those who want to read more about it http://fermatslibrary.com/s/tor-the-second-generation-onion-...
Re: The Trouble with CloudFlare
#185Earlier quoted context omitted.
When every .html resource requested is met with a captcha, access is effectively banned.
Well that's another problem. When you fill out the captcha you are given a cookie that can allow cloudflare to let you through next time. If you are blocking that cookie for privacy reasons (which is not a bad thing!), then cloudflare has no way to verify you again (short of doing nefarious things). It's a bit of a self inflicted problem at that point. That's not to say that the answer is "deal with it", but that we…
Re: The Trouble with CloudFlare
#186"Attackers might be trying to steal your information from blog.torproject.org (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards). NET::ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID"
When trying to visit this blog post.
Re: The Trouble with CloudFlare
#187The main problem with CloudFlare is how dumb their "protection" is. It doesn't make sense at all to block Tor users from just accessing read-only content, like CloudFlare does today. Forms/login pages/comment boxes etc should be protected of course, and most people wouldn't have anything against solving a captcha for logging in, but preventing people from just reading stuff anonymously/securely is borderline evil fro…
This was addressed in CloudFlare's blog post: > One suggestion has been that we treat GET requests for static content differently than we do more risky requests like POSTs. We actually already do treat more dangerous requests differently than less risky requests. The problem is Tor exit nodes often have very bad reputations due to all the malicious requests they send, and you can do a lot of harm just with GETs. Cont…
* GET requests have to be idempotent.
* Security by Obscurity is not Security.
* Content Scraping is nothing you have to protect against, or should protect against – DRM just does not work.
Re: The Trouble with CloudFlare
#188My plan is to continue to do so through that ticket as I've made various commitments there (some of which, like whitelisting, we've already rolled out). It's worth reading the entire ticket to get a sense of the conversation. We are in no way finished improving the situation.
Re: The Trouble with CloudFlare
#189Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yes, reputation is a form of tracking. And if you show up to a site with no reputation of your own, from an IP that has a known-bad reputation, it is in the best interest of the site to challenge (not block) you. You are 97% likely to be malicious traffic. Edit: 97% is a real number, not an exaggeration, based on numbers from the report linked in the article.
Yes, but Tor flips through IP addresses regularly so you'd get challenged every few minutes. Similarly, if you block cookies/supercookies/etc to avoid being tracked ... you'll be challenged every view.