ECDLP Can Be Solved in 24-th Root Time

Is this like prior work against the ECDLP which only applied to binary curves? The blog post talks about all crypto systems, but prior index calculus attacks always seem to have not applied to prime curves.

If it really applies to all curves and is not an April Fools joke, then this will hurt the usability of Bitcoin, Keybase and other systems that assume EC keys can be easily encoded as text.

edit: It is confirmed as an April Fools: https://twitter.com/EllipticKiwi/status/715711942531264512 ...

> O(q^(1/24)) ... While still exponential complexity,

I call April's fools!

Lol there are probably less than a dozen people on the planet the fully understand elliptic curves to the point where they could make real progress on the ECDLP problem. This is clearly April Fools

I hope for April 1st prank as this is after I adopted ed25516 ssh keys with the public part consisting of only 80 chars plus comments and the private key taking only 254 characters in base64 so it can realistically be typed manually from a backup printout.