31–40 of 118 posts
I've never used this type of key, and I don't known if I would have noticed the flaw. But, um, nineteen different manufacturers gave drivers devices that try their best to unlock the car every minute of every day, and not one engineer asked what could possibly go wrong?
Every x milliseconds, probably ;)
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How would you prevent this type of attack while retaining the keyless start and entry feature? (just curious)
Lots of ways. The ECU only goes into pairing mode if it gets a valid challenge-response from the manufacturer. If put into that mode, it provides a nonce encrypted with its own pairing mode public key that only the manufacturer knows (could even base-64 encode it and show it on screen to let people do this over the phone). You could make it two-phase where it requires the first response within 5 minutes of starting,…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
How would you prevent this type of attack while retaining the keyless start and entry feature? (just curious)
Lots of ways. The ECU only goes into pairing mode if it gets a valid challenge-response from the manufacturer. If put into that mode, it provides a nonce encrypted with its own pairing mode public key that only the manufacturer knows (could even base-64 encode it and show it on screen to let people do this over the phone). You could make it two-phase where it requires the first response within 5 minutes of starting,…
The only way to secure against the described exploit is to measure round-trip-time from the car -> key -> car and ensure it's under, say 5 light-meters: aka 16 nanoseconds, plus the carefully calibrated time it takes the key to compute its response.
16 nanos is a very short amount of time, and it'll be tricky to measure that reasonably accurately.
The real solution is to require the user to interact with the key in some way, like pressing a button, or perhaps moving it around (as would happen as you walked with it in your pocket).
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Harsh reality : cable locks below 4cm diameters are useless (only useful for young kids I guess). Even fat 2kg cable lock are useless, anyone can rob a bike in a street, the bolder the easier. I'm still waiting for a cheap bike gps 'self powered' tagger so I can use a bike again.
I've always wanted to build a spring loaded 30cm titanium spike that would shoot from the seat pole through the seat if not disarmed. Obviously completely illegal, but a satisfying mental exercise.
https://farm4.static.flickr.com/3277/3011586006_42403e0788.j...
It was a folkie punk band ;) With that promotional sticker. I had one, but didn't put it on my bike.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I've always wanted to build a spring loaded 30cm titanium spike that would shoot from the seat pole through the seat if not disarmed. Obviously completely illegal, but a satisfying mental exercise.
"this bike is a pipe bomb" https://farm4.static.flickr.com/3277/3011586006_42403e0788.j... It was a folkie punk band ;) With that promotional sticker. I had one, but didn't put it on my bike.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Harsh reality : cable locks below 4cm diameters are useless (only useful for young kids I guess). Even fat 2kg cable lock are useless, anyone can rob a bike in a street, the bolder the easier. I'm still waiting for a cheap bike gps 'self powered' tagger so I can use a bike again.
I've always wanted to build a spring loaded 30cm titanium spike that would shoot from the seat pole through the seat if not disarmed. Obviously completely illegal, but a satisfying mental exercise.
The auto manufacturers (and for that matter all the "IoT" creators) couldn't give two shits about protecting consumers. Building security into this stuff is trivial and a responsibility.
How would you prevent this type of attack while retaining the keyless start and entry feature? (just curious)
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I've always wanted to build a spring loaded 30cm titanium spike that would shoot from the seat pole through the seat if not disarmed. Obviously completely illegal, but a satisfying mental exercise.
When I was in college, like many struggling students, I didn't have much money, my means of transportation was a 3 speed Stermy-Archer 3 speed bike that had the best security system ever, I never locked it. It had something wrong with the 3 speed and if you stood up on the pedals it would slip and the rider would end up with their taint on the center bar, ouch. It was fine if you were not in a hurry and took your tim…
To be secure against this type of attack, such a device has to be designed assuming the adversary controls the nearby radio spectrum and can do relaying and MITM.
To control for distance, a speed of light based latency limit might work, though I don't know how cheaply it could be implemented. Laser based distance meters are cheap now, and light travels just 30cm per 1 GHz clock cycle...
