Your arguments does not make sense as a coherent whole. Any one may not be wrong in itself, but the problems described are either not inherent to secure DNS, or are something that is much worse with every other proposal (including keeping today's system).
1. Your main argument is that the NSA and its cohorts have control over a handful of many top level domains available. But the same control that would allow them to take control over domains and generate valid DNS signatures for them does allow them to generate valid certificates in every proposed global PKI system, including today's. There is literally zero difference in attack space here.
2. Several of the current CA institutions are under government control. Any one can generate a valid certificate for any domain. It can be done without a trace of evidence. The same active attack against a DNSSEC signed TLD would by necessity be much more visible.
3. Given that DV PKI is what TLS relies on, any adversary that can modify DNS packets in-flight can also create a valid TLS certificate today. We know these attacks are taking place from the Snowden documents.
4. An attacker can choose which CA to attack, and pick the one that is easiest to fool, does not participate in Certificate Transparency etc. There are literally hundreds to choose from. You can mount an attack in advance. Stuxnet suggests this is routine.
5. There are no alternatives that solves what secure DNS does. Key pinning and HSTS is important, but offer a trust-of-first-use model that can at best be complementary to a PKI. It is also important to note that HSTS shares the same deployment problems DNSSEC does. One mistake and your web server and domain is inaccessible. That is the reason none of the banks offer neither HSTS nor DANE. At least my bank sign their domain, so their step should be small.
The smoke-and-mirrors argument that DNSSEC gives governments control over "their" top level domains, when in fact it makes the scope of their control much smaller and more well defined, would be expected from someone who wants to maintain status quo as long as possible.