Re: Obama on Fetishizing Our Phones

But if companies were to implement the same sorts of impenetrable encryption, on every device, all the way down to the corporate desktop, in a way that not even the company executives themselves can read the email of their own employees, then lots of regulations the government applies to companies would be mooted.

Taken to the extreme, if all communication is digital, and 100% impregnable, and people maintain good OpSec, then it will be hard to impossible to execute lawsuits or regulatory investigations into malfeasance because they'll be no paper trail.

The end result of going full tilt on crypto is cryptoanarchy. This was pretty much well argued in the 90s among the cypherpunks community. Most of the libertarians and Objectivists were salivating over how strong crypto protocols would end fiat currency, end taxation, end regulation, and so on.

So how far as a society are we willing to take this? Does it just extend to private data? Does it extend to transactions? To payments you make for things? To transfers of money? To business transactions? Will Democracy be able to audit nothing of the interactions of citizens or our institutions in the future?

You don't have to agree with Obama's position to see that cryptoanarchy and Democracy are on a collision course, and it makes sense to discuss the possibilities openly without just plugging your ears and taking an absolutist position that demonizes anyone who disagrees.

Everything he does involves telling people what to do.

Isn't the point of discussing this that you actually don't have anything that defines that contract? In terms of the fourth amendment, it seems like there is quite the opposite contract in place already. Also, as an Apple product user outside the U.S., this supposed contract is not something that I ever agreed to.

> And besides, the existence of a contract or not isn't really my point. My point was that encryption isn't an all or nothing situation. You don't either have completely ironclad security where you and only you can access your data or nothing at all.

It is an all or nothing situation. That there is only one unauthorized party able to intercept my data using a back door doesn't change the fact that there is an unauthorized party able to intercept my data using a back door. Whether that is practical for you or not, again, depends on whether you consider the third back-dooring third party authorized.

> There are degrees of technical protection.

I think that maybe the discussion here comes from the fact that you are indeed talking about "technical protection" in general and not encryption specifically. The point of encryption is that only eligible parties can decode the data. If others can decode the data it's not really encrypted, as a matter of definition.

For example, using Google as a mail provider may prove to be poor "technical protection", but the data is encrypted and the authorized parties are part of the terms of service. That the U.S. government can decode my encrypted data without permission may prove to be practical "technical protection", but in terms of encryption it really is a boolean situation.