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I uninstalled the app, but is there a way I can check if i've been affected?
[1] - http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-ransomware-idUSKCN0W...
VirusTotal has some more info, including the files it writes: https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/d1ac55a4e610380f0ab239fcc... (Look under the "Behavioural information" tab) Written Files and Created Processes are interesting: [Transmission] /Users/user1/Library/kernel_service (successful) [unknown] /Users/user1/Library/.kernel_pid (successful) [unknown] /Users/user1/Library/Saved Application State/org.m0k.transmissio…
Here's an analysis of the malware - http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/03/new-os-x-...
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Most people download software from websites using GUI browsers, while performing a checksum generally requires opening a terminal, changing directories to where the file was downloaded, and running the checksum program there. Maybe the web browser should provide a UI for doing checksums directly in the download manager. For example, each download entry could have a blank "checksum" text box where you can paste in the…
That would be a useful extension/plugin for browsers actually. Maybe like pointed out in another reply, not for checksums but for signatures. So you just copy/paste the signature after selecting a file, and then it can verify it's validity. Is there no such extension yet? it seems like there should be one already.
You could pay for it with some sort of sponsorship from apps themselves, who have an interest in not getting compromised like this (it's terrible publicity).
Along with the recent Linux Mint hijack, this really illustrates the need for people to verify programs they download. Though I think most people can't be bothered to verify the checksum on a file every time they download it. On the other hand, the Windows and OS X App Stores are awful. Linux package managers are looking like one of the only straightforward ways to distribute applications securely.
Linux package managers are looking like one of the only straightforward ways to distribute applications securely. Unless you are a small independent app developer. Virtually no distribution wants to take proprietary software. And you have to package for a wide variety of different distributions. On the other hand, the Windows and OS X App Stores are awful. The Mac App store works pretty much effortless for me. It's s…
Along with the recent Linux Mint hijack, this really illustrates the need for people to verify programs they download. Though I think most people can't be bothered to verify the checksum on a file every time they download it. On the other hand, the Windows and OS X App Stores are awful. Linux package managers are looking like one of the only straightforward ways to distribute applications securely.
I'm game, but I need a little help. What are your favorite techniques for verifying downloaded programs?
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Thanks! Guess my search was too specific. The important bit: > The malware is programmed to encrypt files on an infected personal computer three days after the original infection, according to Olson. Anyone who may have been hit, update your backups NOW so you can restore the files.
Careful not to backup the malware infection though...
Safer option would be to create a write-only network share on another computer and copy files to that.
Can anyone tell me if this also applies to brew's cask's builds? I needed to download CentOS the other day and wanted to go with a torrent. I got pretty pissed after I realized that BitTorrent installed some adware called Spigot. I tried to remove it as good as possible (I mainly killed the process, removed `Library/Application Support/Spigot` and ran a `sudo find / | grep -i Spigot`). Ironically I decided to use the…
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This doesn't solve the problem. At all. A checksum is NOT a substitute for a digital signature. https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/08/you-wouldnt-base64-a-pass...
Right. All I have to do is distribute the correct hash for my binary as a malicious software distributor because there's no authenticity verification at all, only that the bits in my binary blob match a certain pattern.