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I'd definitely run a virus scan to be sure... If you don't have one just install a Trial version and remove it again after a week.
Noted: I've gone with BitDefender from the Map App Store. Will report back results. EDIT: welp, BitDefender found nothing, all clear.
While we're here, can anyone recommend a good antivirus for OSX? I've just been looking at BitDefender, which looks promising, but would rather get this right than faff around with potentially crappy AV tools.
Common Sense 2016, see https://github.com/drduh/OS-X-Security-and-Privacy-Guide
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According to this article it's ransomware. http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/06/reuters-america-apple-users-t...
Thanks! Guess my search was too specific. The important bit: > The malware is programmed to encrypt files on an infected personal computer three days after the original infection, according to Olson. Anyone who may have been hit, update your backups NOW so you can restore the files.
Ironically I decided to use the good, ol', trusted open source alternative transmission because I just read on HN that Transmission gets updated again...
When you can't (be bothered to) vet the source code, stick it in a vm. On a sensible machine with an ssd it's only 10 seconds away. Why risk it. Especially if the software you want/need to run only works under windows.
VirusTotal has some more info, including the files it writes: https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/d1ac55a4e610380f0ab239fcc... (Look under the "Behavioural information" tab) Written Files and Created Processes are interesting: [Transmission] /Users/user1/Library/kernel_service (successful) [unknown] /Users/user1/Library/.kernel_pid (successful) [unknown] /Users/user1/Library/Saved Application State/org.m0k.transmissio…
Maybe take a look around https://build.transmissionbt.com/ - but then again maybe the svn repo wasn't compromised? I tried a "svn diff svn://svn.transmissionbt.com/Transmission/tags/2.90 svn://svn.transmissionbt.com/Transmission/tags/2.91" and didn't see anything suspicious on a fast scroll-through
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'd definitely run a virus scan to be sure... If you don't have one just install a Trial version and remove it again after a week.
Noted: I've gone with BitDefender from the Map App Store. Will report back results. EDIT: welp, BitDefender found nothing, all clear.
I've become increasingly paranoid lately, given that things like these happen and major bugs are uncovered in software that I use almost every day. It's good that the Transmission developer reacted quickly and made waves so that people can at least be aware that they might have been exposed.. But I wonder how many more applications from the hundreds that I have installed on my machines contain weird stuff - either in…
> "Open source software is especially vulnerable to this kind of stuff." I am sorry, what? Why would open source contain more bugs/hacks than closed source specifically? It is more often in the news for few reasons, including that many projects are widely used. However it's against any PR from companies to have their security issues disclosed like they are in open source so they try to minimize the exposure. See [1]…
SourceForge has been linked to bundled malware and hijacked projects like GIMP and FileZilla.
Along with the recent Linux Mint hijack, this really illustrates the need for people to verify programs they download. Though I think most people can't be bothered to verify the checksum on a file every time they download it. On the other hand, the Windows and OS X App Stores are awful. Linux package managers are looking like one of the only straightforward ways to distribute applications securely.
> Along with the recent Linux Mint hijack, this really illustrates the need for people to verify programs they download. Though I think most people can't be bothered to verify the checksum on a file every time they download it. Barring a situation where a CDN hosting the download is compromised but the main site is not hosted on the CDN, it's extremely unlikely that someone would have the ability to inject malware in…
Given trust in the protection of the private key used to sign the hash list file the integrity of the executable content can be proved (assuming useful SHA1 collision creation is prohibitively expensive).
Coincidentally I was writing a Bash script this weekend to auto-install (Ubuntu) releases into LVM volumes and it includes the following code to verify the download:
set -e
# ...
ISO="${NEW_DIST}-desktop-${ARCH}.iso"
for F in SHA1SUMS SHA1SUMS.gpg ${ISO}; do
if [ ! -r $F ]; then
wget http://cdimage.ubuntu.com/${FLAVOUR}/daily-live/current/$F
fi
done
if ! gpg --verify --keyring /etc/apt/trusted.gpg SHA1SUMS.gpg SHA1SUMS; then
echo "Error: failed to verify the hash file list signature; files may have been tampered with"
exit 2
fi
if ! grep ${ISO} SHA1SUMS | sha1sum -c; then
echo "${ISO} is corrupted; please try again"
exit 1
fi