From recent polls most people think this debate is about: "Should Apple be forced to give the Terrorist's phone data to the FBI" When what it's really about: "Should the FBI be able to compel technology companies to use their resources against their own and their Customers right to Security." In order for the public to be properly informed about what's really at stake this case needs to be about the "Technology Indus…
We can put the case into an even larger context and ask: should the FBI be able to compel [banks, accounting firms, insurance companies] to use their resources against their own and their Customers right to financial privacy? The answer to date, has been "yes." The right of the justice system to "every man's evidence",[1] has so far been thought to trump the interests of the customer relationship.
For decades, government has had the power to compel accounting firms and banks to search through their records (often at significant expense) to deliver information relevant to an investigation. I imagine those companies would love to be able to advertise that they won't cooperate with a government investigation of your taxes or financial transactions.
In my view, there are two different questions:
1) can the government ask Apple to unlock one iPhone; 2) can the government ask Apple to weaken security for all iPhones?[2]
The first question, at issue in this case, is something companies deal with all the time in many different contexts. The second question, on the other hand, may well be sui generis. I understand why Apple taking a stand on this particular hill--in their shoes I'd do it too. Better to "fight them over there so you don't have to fight them over here" so to speak.
I'm a little worried about the potential for blowback, though. The tech community is forced, in a way, to spread FUD to justify their argument as to (1). There are a lot of people who are confused by the reporting and think that this case involves the FBI requesting Apple to put backdoors in all of their phones, rather than leveraging an existing security weakness. That's not necessarily a great place to be in if you're found out.
[1] United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
[2] I don't think it's technically justifiable to say that (2) is implied by (1). Apple apparently already has the capability to subvert anyone's phones by using their signing keys to load weakened software. At a purely technical level, signing an "evil build of iOS" using an existing "backdoor" is different than introducing a backdoor into everyone's phone.