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Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones

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Re: Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones

#61

Post by timr »

threatofrain wrote: post #51
timr wrote: post #34

...and it's an entirely reasonable position to say that they should get it, if they have a warrant. Especially if the case as cut-and-dried as the San Bernardino one. The public debate on this has reached truly sad, nigh-Trumpian levels of hysteria and uninformed commentary. There is no "back-door" here. Encryption is not being compromised. This has very little to do with encryption at all, really: if the criminals i…

I agree with you that people capitalize on events to fit into their political narratives, and I also agree that privacy is not an absolute value, and that tensions between values calls for tradeoffs to be made. But I do believe that calling this a backdoor is proper framing. Apple provided a weak password knowing that convenience often beats security, but Apple also provided a mechanism by which one can have weak pas…

"Apple also provided a mechanism by which one can have weak passwords and still have strong security via a max-attempt mechanism. It is a circumvention of security features, and "backdoors" are about security, not encryption (which is merely a subset of security)."

I don't deny any of that, but there's still a bright-line distinction between "circumventing security features" for a single, badly protected phone, given a warrant, and weakening security across-the-board for everyone. This is a case of the former, not the latter.

"I also think the legal fight is not circumscribed around narrow parameters with predictably narrow legal outcomes."

The legal fight is, factually, centered on the question I stated. It doesn't involve any of the other technical stuff that's being tossed around this debate. That was my point. But like I said: I think it's a legitimate question, so I'm not sure who you're arguing with right now?

Re: Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones

#62

Post by kabdib »

wildmusings wrote: post #4
nefitty wrote: post #2

I think the fear is that those 12 will lead to the other 700 million iPhones.

That's not a justified fear. Requiring Apple to backdoor all phones is not similar at all to requiring Apple to help hack particular phones, that they have the capability to hack, in response to court orders.

Why? It's a crystal clear agenda. The FBI has called for an end to effective crypto in the hands of US citizens.

Re: Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones

#63

Post by rhizome »

amatix wrote: post #48
microtonal wrote: post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Don't you see the slippery slope here? Next, the German or French police will knock on Apple's door. When they get access, China, Russia, and others will line up next. Moreover, who says that the FBI or some other agency will stop after this iPhone, or the next 12 iPhones. Why not push to get their own signing key after they succeed in this case? They will try to get as far as possible. We live in 2016. many of our d…

worse. If this becomes "normal", then rather than the CTO or CSO or VP iOS Engineering having to unlock the code-signing keys to sign releases (presumably via N of M), it'll have to be automated so that "oh, the FBI needs another custom build for the 4th time this week, just do the build and click here to sign it". At that point the security of the master code-signing keys has evaporated to nothing and we're all sunk…

I think the precedent that emerges could be that law enforcement can force companies to sign specific functionality. This access-to-data power would be in line with their access to telephone and telegraph copper in centuries past.

Re: Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones

#64

Post by csandreasen »

nefitty wrote: post #7
wildmusings wrote: post #4

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's not a justified fear. Requiring Apple to backdoor all phones is not similar at all to requiring Apple to help hack particular phones, that they have the capability to hack, in response to court orders.

You're telling me you would trust that software to remain in the hands of trusted actors? In 2015, alone, the IRS was breached, LastPass, the director of the CIA, Hacking Team, even Kaspersky Labs was breached! There can be no absolute guarantee that this backdoor would remain safe indefinitely. That is just the most blatant problem, not to mention the overt displays of cynicism and misuse of authority by the NSA as…

A gaping "backdoor" already exists in the form of the software update mechanism. By the same logic you're using, Apple can't keep their source code and signing key secure forever, which would be a much worse leak than them losing control of a modified iOS that would let someone brute force a PIN for a phone in their physical possession without the phone being wiped.

Re: Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones

#65

Post by cesarb »

avn2109 wrote: post #8

Question for HN in general: Is it possible in principle (for Apple or someone else) to construct a smartphone that can accept software/firmware updates, but that Apple cannot push malware to at some later time? E.g. can we implement all security functionality in hardware/burn it into the silicon? Or accomplish the same ends by some other means? Intuition says "no," because "security functionality" is sort of nebulous…

> Question for HN in general: Is it possible in principle (for Apple or someone else) to construct a smartphone that can accept software/firmware updates, but that Apple cannot push malware to at some later time?

I've been thinking about a related question: how to construct an update system so the updater cannot push malware to a specific phone, without making it visible and available to everyone else?

My answer would be something like Certificate Transparency (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_Transparency). The update system would only accept an update if it's signed by several independent entities, spread all over the world (in many independent jurisdictions), and the signing system in these entities would be designed in such a way that every signature is written to an append-only log which is published to everyone to see, and these entities would also publish a copy of every update they signed.

That way, Apple could still push malware to a phone, but they couldn't push malware to a phone without making that fact public, at least to security researchers who can reverse-engineer firmware updates.

Re: Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones

#66

Post by coldnebo »

I'm not sure I understand this. Apple seems to be limiting all discussion to in-situ mechanisms of cracking, but no one is talking about external means. For example ICE-level debuggers require sophisticated hardware that is not easily available to everyone. Likewise, the XBOX encryption was very difficult to crack without Ghz hardware.

Just put the critical path in the prom and then bypass the prom with your own hardware-level circuit. The device itself can be keyed so that only Apple hardware bypass is allowed to connect in this way. Now you have a physical bypass that is difficult if not impossible to get around, but enables warranted access by agencies that own the limited hardware. This also has the advantage of human cost. You can't easily apply this method to millions of phones without a huge cost in time and effort. Even if the device is stolen, it limits exposure to phones in the physical possession of the hardware bypass which is surely better than compromising millions of phones. And so what that the critical path patch exists out in the open? Knock yourself out and make an emulator that will unlock hw emulated phones (which is a difficult task, not even the IOS emulator is a true hw emulator), but it won't work on the actual hardware unless the prom is swapped which is hardly trivial.

The key signing argument has little weight by the way. DVD manufacturers had the same stance and the root key was leaked to the public. How can Apple guarantee the same won't happen with their keys?

It seems both Apple and the FBI are withholding something, but on face value the technical requirements should allow warranted access. The fact that they don't is a flaw in the technology design.

Case law surely has precedents in this area? Can safe manufacturers be required to make bypass mechanisms for bank vaults? What about non-criminal property law? Say a family member dies and the legal estate needs access?

Re: Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones

#67

Post by cesarb »

nindalf wrote: post #19
nefitty wrote: post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This could be possible if at setup time the user was asked to create their own key, which any update would have to be signed with. This would then unburden Apple of having the "master key" needed to sign software updates, but would create an extra hoop for users to jump through to update their phone. I'm sure we've all experienced putting off a necessary update to software because of the inconvenience it would cause.…

How about a simpler rule like "no updates will install unless the phone is unlocked"? Such a rule would make discussion in the San Bernardino case moot. In response, the government would have to outlaw this practice and force device makers to retain the ability to push updates to a locked phone.

From what I understand, the discussion is about an update being installed through the low-level bootloader, while the phone being locked is a function of the higher-level operating system (which probably already has the "no updates will install unless the phone is unlocked" rule).

The relevant rule would instead be something like "installing any update through the low-level bootloader always wipes the encryption keys and the data partition". Normal updates wouldn't be through the low-level bootloader, so this rule isn't too restrictive.

Not that it makes any difference. The attackers in this case don't have to install the update in any normal way, be it through the normal operating system or the bootloader; they can instead desolder the NAND chips and write the update directly to them.

What I believe the attackers actually need is a signature from Apple. If the bootloader chain checks the operating system's signature, it won't boot unless it's signed by Apple.

Re: Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones

#68

Post by tempodox »

froo wrote: post #58
bobwaycott wrote: post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's been a few years, and my recollection is hazy. Sorry. Were these statements political statements of a sort that opposes the US government in a clearly defined way? Did they state some kind of ideological agreement and allegiance to ideas considered anti-US or anti-US-govt? It's late, and I guess I wasn't as clear as I needed to be. I was making a pretty obvious and clear distinction on what kind of political sta…

Well I have to admit, my understanding of what constitutes terrorism was not solid, so I googled it. It seems the statements don't necessarily need to be political in nature. The FBI defines domestic terrorism[1] as: > "Domestic terrorism" means activities with the following three characteristics: > - Involve acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law; > - Appear intended (i) to intimidate or coer…

By that definition, the U.S. government and military are terrorist organisations.

Re: Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones

#69

Post by ikeboy »

froo wrote: post #38

"the FBI said they are not seeking to set a precedent in the case, but to get the company to help them open a single phone that may hold crucial evidence to help explain the most deadly terrorist attack on U.S. soil since Sept. 11, 2001." What qualifies this as being a terrorist attack? Is it because the colour of the perpetrator's skin wasn't white? Sandy Hook had double the number of resulting deaths and so is tech…

http://time.com/4136457/terrorism-definition/ tries to give an answer, which doesn't make much sense to me. That's the "official" answer, though.

Re: Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones

#70

Post by jacquesm »

cesarb wrote: post #65
avn2109 wrote: post #8

Question for HN in general: Is it possible in principle (for Apple or someone else) to construct a smartphone that can accept software/firmware updates, but that Apple cannot push malware to at some later time? E.g. can we implement all security functionality in hardware/burn it into the silicon? Or accomplish the same ends by some other means? Intuition says "no," because "security functionality" is sort of nebulous…

> Question for HN in general: Is it possible in principle (for Apple or someone else) to construct a smartphone that can accept software/firmware updates, but that Apple cannot push malware to at some later time? I've been thinking about a related question: how to construct an update system so the updater cannot push malware to a specific phone, without making it visible and available to everyone else? My answer woul…

If the US can get a presidential plane diverted and forced to land where it did not want to I don't think it is beyond imagination to see that 'independent entities spread out all over the world in many independent jurisdictions' could be coerced as well.
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