...and it's an entirely reasonable position to say that they should get it, if they have a warrant. Especially if the case as cut-and-dried as the San Bernardino one. The public debate on this has reached truly sad, nigh-Trumpian levels of hysteria and uninformed commentary. There is no "back-door" here. Encryption is not being compromised. This has very little to do with encryption at all, really: if the criminals i…
But I do believe that calling this a backdoor is proper framing. Apple provided a weak password knowing that convenience often beats security, but Apple also provided a mechanism by which one can have weak passwords and still have strong security via a max-attempt mechanism. It is a circumvention of security features, and "backdoors" are about security, not encryption (which is merely a subset of security).
I also think the legal fight is not circumscribed around narrow parameters with predictably narrow legal outcomes. The FBI cites a law from 1789 that says that the court may issue "...all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law". It does not sound easy to predict what case law shall determine to be "necessary or appropriate" 5-10 years from now.