Question for HN in general: Is it possible in principle (for Apple or someone else) to construct a smartphone that can accept software/firmware updates, but that Apple cannot push malware to at some later time? E.g. can we implement all security functionality in hardware/burn it into the silicon? Or accomplish the same ends by some other means? Intuition says "no," because "security functionality" is sort of nebulous…
Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones
11–20 of 101 posts
Re: Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones
#12Question for HN in general: Is it possible in principle (for Apple or someone else) to construct a smartphone that can accept software/firmware updates, but that Apple cannot push malware to at some later time? E.g. can we implement all security functionality in hardware/burn it into the silicon? Or accomplish the same ends by some other means? Intuition says "no," because "security functionality" is sort of nebulous…
Re: Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones
#13Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's not a justified fear. Requiring Apple to backdoor all phones is not similar at all to requiring Apple to help hack particular phones, that they have the capability to hack, in response to court orders.
You're telling me you would trust that software to remain in the hands of trusted actors? In 2015, alone, the IRS was breached, LastPass, the director of the CIA, Hacking Team, even Kaspersky Labs was breached! There can be no absolute guarantee that this backdoor would remain safe indefinitely. That is just the most blatant problem, not to mention the overt displays of cynicism and misuse of authority by the NSA as…
Re: Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones
#14Question for HN in general: Is it possible in principle (for Apple or someone else) to construct a smartphone that can accept software/firmware updates, but that Apple cannot push malware to at some later time? E.g. can we implement all security functionality in hardware/burn it into the silicon? Or accomplish the same ends by some other means? Intuition says "no," because "security functionality" is sort of nebulous…
Re: Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones
#15Question for HN in general: Is it possible in principle (for Apple or someone else) to construct a smartphone that can accept software/firmware updates, but that Apple cannot push malware to at some later time? E.g. can we implement all security functionality in hardware/burn it into the silicon? Or accomplish the same ends by some other means? Intuition says "no," because "security functionality" is sort of nebulous…
This could be possible if at setup time the user was asked to create their own key, which any update would have to be signed with. This would then unburden Apple of having the "master key" needed to sign software updates, but would create an extra hoop for users to jump through to update their phone. I'm sure we've all experienced putting off a necessary update to software because of the inconvenience it would cause.…
Re: Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones
#16Question for HN in general: Is it possible in principle (for Apple or someone else) to construct a smartphone that can accept software/firmware updates, but that Apple cannot push malware to at some later time? E.g. can we implement all security functionality in hardware/burn it into the silicon? Or accomplish the same ends by some other means? Intuition says "no," because "security functionality" is sort of nebulous…
They could involve third parties in signing updates and if a device receives an update that isn't disseminated to all third parties it doesn't accept it. That way apple couldn't dispatch custom/backdoored updates to individual devices without revealing that they did it.
For example, they could be forced to first publish an update to all devices (through the third parties) which disables the third-party-checks. Then, they could be forced to put the backdoor on individual devices.
Re: Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones
#17Question for HN in general: Is it possible in principle (for Apple or someone else) to construct a smartphone that can accept software/firmware updates, but that Apple cannot push malware to at some later time? E.g. can we implement all security functionality in hardware/burn it into the silicon? Or accomplish the same ends by some other means? Intuition says "no," because "security functionality" is sort of nebulous…
Yes. The software could be burnt into PROM (which is unchangeable) or one could even create a custom ROM chip, and if necessary contain hardware or code that checksums the ROM.
However, a company doing that must be willing to run the risk that there is a bug in that unchangeable software/hardware and then either tell their customers that they are screwed, or that they can get a free replacement phone. It also may lengthen development cycles, as you cannot, at last minute, order your factory to open a million boxes and update that part of the firmware anymore.
Alternatively, a fully open phone would allow customers to inspect updates and reject them or perhaps even to partially reject them (partial rejection would prevent the case where users want a feature, but only can get it by accepting weaker security). That requires a 100% open phone (hard- and software) and enough knowledgeable people willing to invest time in looking at the code.
Re: Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones
#18Question for HN in general: Is it possible in principle (for Apple or someone else) to construct a smartphone that can accept software/firmware updates, but that Apple cannot push malware to at some later time? E.g. can we implement all security functionality in hardware/burn it into the silicon? Or accomplish the same ends by some other means? Intuition says "no," because "security functionality" is sort of nebulous…
Even in the San Bernadino case, if the FBI hadn't changed the user's iCloud password, just bringing the phone to a trusted WiFi network would have caused it to automatically back itself up to the cloud. Even assuming the phone were completely 100% locked down perfectly, as long as you're sending backups to Apple that aren't encrypted, you're putting the data one subpoena away from the FBI (or from a hacker who breaks into Apple).
So say you don't use iCloud, or Apple starts a service where the backup is encrypted by your password. Your password needs to be really strong for this to work, and Apple needs to use something like bcrypt or better to hash it, but say they do that as well, and you have an long random password.
Then you can put a chip on the phone that refuses to ever be updated, and that implements the password lockout logic (try 10 bad PINs and it wipes the key). What they're asking Apple to do now would simple be impossible.
But you're allowing iOS itself to be updated, right? So if, for instance, you're discovered to be a terrorist, Apple could push a patch to the main OS that simply grabs the key after you've unlocked the phone and sends it to them. No more need for the secure chip; just decrypt the flash directly.
Or easier, the patched OS could just slowly upload all the data on the phone to a backup server whether or not the user opted in to such a backup plan.
If there's a lot of data (tons of photographs, for instance), they could even have the phone wait until it detects a known wireless access point to trigger the backup. The FBI could then arrange for that access point to be active near you and your device, and it could connect and upload to a server sitting in the FBI van nearby.
Also keep in mind that just about every release of iOS was designed to be impossible to jailbreak. And it seems that iOS 9 can still be jailbroken. This is typically done using an OS vulnerability that's exploited; the FBI/NSA could easily use those approaches to hack your phone (though all would require an already unlocked device, so they'd probably need to get you to run something via social engineering, but some of the hacks only require you to click on a specially crafted link on a web site...).
Finally, remember what I said about security and usability? Yeah, now if you forget your password and need it to be reset, you no only lose the data on your phone, but all of your backups. Oops. All of that and you're still not protected from a coordinated attack.
It's great for Apple to do whatever they can to resist giving the government the keys to everyone's privacy, because that can be abused. But it's safest to consider anything you typed into a computer or phone to be something that might get posted publicly.
Re: Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones
#19Question for HN in general: Is it possible in principle (for Apple or someone else) to construct a smartphone that can accept software/firmware updates, but that Apple cannot push malware to at some later time? E.g. can we implement all security functionality in hardware/burn it into the silicon? Or accomplish the same ends by some other means? Intuition says "no," because "security functionality" is sort of nebulous…
This could be possible if at setup time the user was asked to create their own key, which any update would have to be signed with. This would then unburden Apple of having the "master key" needed to sign software updates, but would create an extra hoop for users to jump through to update their phone. I'm sure we've all experienced putting off a necessary update to software because of the inconvenience it would cause.…
Re: Justice Department Wants Data from About 12 Other iPhones
#20Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's not a justified fear. Requiring Apple to backdoor all phones is not similar at all to requiring Apple to help hack particular phones, that they have the capability to hack, in response to court orders.
You're telling me you would trust that software to remain in the hands of trusted actors? In 2015, alone, the IRS was breached, LastPass, the director of the CIA, Hacking Team, even Kaspersky Labs was breached! There can be no absolute guarantee that this backdoor would remain safe indefinitely. That is just the most blatant problem, not to mention the overt displays of cynicism and misuse of authority by the NSA as…