What kind of a democracy do we live in where we rely on corporations to protect the people from an overreaching government?
An oligarchy?
Mark Zuckerberg Backs Apple in Its Refusal to Unlock iPhone
181–190 of 293 posts
Re: Mark Zuckerberg Backs Apple in Its Refusal to Unlock iPhone
#182What kind of a democracy do we live in where we rely on corporations to protect the people from an overreaching government?
> rely on corporations to protect the people from an overreaching government? Corporations aren't fundamentally different from the government. Both are just groups of people, at an abstract level. It's actually not uncommon for local governments to literally exist as incorporated entities. Or for corporations to serve as the de facto government for a region. It's a relatively recent phenomenon that we view these as c…
> Corporations aren't fundamentally different from the government.
Yes, and that is the problem. Both are enormous institutions with tremendous wealth, resources, and power over individuals. A democracy is supposed to check this kind of power, but instead we're relying on it, only from a different source. The corporations' interests are currently aligned with the people's only by good fortune. When they're not, who will check them? Who will check the government?
Corporate interests are not a sustainable, effective, or remotely wise defense of liberty. The fact that Cook and Zuckerberg are doing our fighting for us is evidence that the correct methods are not functioning properly.
Re: Mark Zuckerberg Backs Apple in Its Refusal to Unlock iPhone
#183What kind of a democracy do we live in where we rely on corporations to protect the people from an overreaching government?
Before you get too breathless over this, know that Apple has been unlocking phones for the government, in nearly this exact situation, for a long time now: http://www.npr.org/2016/02/22/467602161/the-seeds-of-apples-... This is an entirely new stance from Apple. Historically, they've been on the other side.
Not at all, this time would require Apple to literally sign a lie.
Also, before had zero risk of going wrong. This is difficult and already fucked up by the FBI.
Re: Mark Zuckerberg Backs Apple in Its Refusal to Unlock iPhone
#184Earlier quoted context omitted.
>> because I don't want to. Well, he also doesn't HAVE to. If you don't HAVE to do something, especially if it's beneficial to not do that thing, why would you?
Because you're a good person, perhaps?
That's not how taxes work. Why don't you donate extra money to the government that there is no law saying you have to pay?
Re: Mark Zuckerberg Backs Apple in Its Refusal to Unlock iPhone
#185Earlier quoted context omitted.
Did you miss the part where the government said they were fine with Apple keeping the custom iOS software version in their possession, and not giving it to the government? http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2016/02/20/us/politics/ap-us... "Apple may maintain custody of the software, destroy it after its purpose under the order has been served, refuse to disseminate it outside of Apple and make clear to the world that it…
The problem is, Apple designs the software, loads it onto the device, and gives it to the government so they can do their brute force on it. What's preventing the government from just copying the software off the device and keeping it for themselves? Obviously they'd have to do some work to make it universal, but do we really think an agency with pretty much unlimited budget, and brilliant mathematicians, couldn't ge…
The warrant allows that the phone could be entirely in Apple's possession with the FBI having only programmatic access to the PIN input. Imagine, say, an isolated SSH server with serial access to a PIN input API.
Re: Mark Zuckerberg Backs Apple in Its Refusal to Unlock iPhone
#186Don't forget, one of the issues is: on which legal basis is Apple requested to help:
The question is, is this act (the whole text follows):
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All_Writs_Act
"(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a court which has jurisdiction."
a reasonable legal ground in this case to demand from a company to change their products, in this case make a special version of the operating system? Is this act good to mean "we can order anything to anybody"? Especially when there is "the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1992" (CALEA).
"All Writs" appears to be too dangerous to be used for precedents like this one, "change your products to help us." What is the next requested change going to be? Give us the change you've made ("obviously not an "unnecessary burden" anymore"). Make more changes, permanently. ("you've agreed already before!").
Re: Mark Zuckerberg Backs Apple in Its Refusal to Unlock iPhone
#187Earlier quoted context omitted.
Hardware chips with tamper protection can hold encryption keys which Apple wouldn't be able to modify. It is technically feasible and I'm pretty sure this is why people are saying Secure Enclave protects against this in newer iPhone models. This is also the idea behind TPM chips which are in almost every phone/laptop these days, so consumers couldn't tamper with DRM and other similar crypto systems.
I guess that assumes that the phone's drive is encrypted with the hardware key? Otherwise the software could just ignore the hardware. I find it ironic that this argument in support of TPM, etc. is being made for phones (not necessarily by you), but this same site has vigorously opposed it for PCs, especially Linux.
The TPM is basically another processor with a small amount of on-chip storage. It exposes two fundamental operations: seal(plaintext) returns a secret, and and unseal(secret) returns the original plaintext. If you tamper with the device, the internal storage (i.e. the keys it uses to seal and unseal) is wiped. Unseal attempts are rate limited (at the hardware level) to prevent brute force attacks.
You can also seal against some other value. So you'd have seal(plaintext, pin) and unseal(secret, pin). Unseal only returns the plaintext if the PIN is the same that was used to seal.
This is where it gets really fancy. The TPM has a bunch of built-in registers called PCRs (Platform Configuration Registers). You set a PCR by calling extend(newmeasurement). At boot, the firmware hashes the bootloader and sticks the hash in the first PCR by calling extend(hash). Then the bootloader measures the next boot component (probably a second stage bootloader, or perhaps the BIOS settings), and stores that hash in a PCR, and so forth. The resulting value of each PCR is based on both the measurement passed to extend() and the previous measurements, so the whole chain is verified. The cool thing is that seal() and unseal() can use these PCRs the the same way as, and in addition to, a PIN. Now your disk will only be decrypted if you boot the OS that you used to encrypt it. If you're willing to trust the firmware and OS makers, you don't even need a PIN anymore. The OS's built-in authentication could be enough.
Windows PCs tend to have TPMs, but iOS devices have their own hardware encryption solution.
I've glossed over and simplified away important details, but that's the gist of it.
Re: Mark Zuckerberg Backs Apple in Its Refusal to Unlock iPhone
#188Prediction: within 2 years Apple will have iPhone 7s, on which no one can bypass the encryption no matter what. All they'd have to do is put secure enclave software into ROM burned at the factory, and make it self-destruct if it's tampered with. "Sorry officer, not even we can bypass exponential back-off on this CPU."
Re: Mark Zuckerberg Backs Apple in Its Refusal to Unlock iPhone
#189Can somebody explain to me why Apple couldn't create this exploited OS and restrict it to only run on the specific device in question? If that's the case, then they could post the source code on Github and it wouldn't make any difference. Modifying the code to remove the device restrictions would invalidate the signature and any iPhone would refuse to run it. Isn't that the whole point of code signing? I'm finding it…
There is a way in but it's a lot of work. They have to create a new weird custom build of an OS with modifications and try to ensure it only works on a specific device (and that the code that makes it work on one specific device and not others can't be circumvented). To do it once? Sure. For San Bernadino terroists? Sure. But there are hordes of prosecutors across the country who have already reported in that they have stacks of warrants for iPhones ready to go, requesting a special build, engineer time, and a complicated procedure for every single one the moment the precedent is established.
So the real question is: Can the FBI compel apple to create a "department of helping the FBI hack into iPhones?"
Re: Mark Zuckerberg Backs Apple in Its Refusal to Unlock iPhone
#190Earlier quoted context omitted.
[deleted]
Did you miss the part where the government said they were fine with Apple keeping the custom iOS software version in their possession, and not giving it to the government? http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2016/02/20/us/politics/ap-us... "Apple may maintain custody of the software, destroy it after its purpose under the order has been served, refuse to disseminate it outside of Apple and make clear to the world that it…
did you miss the part where the government said they would never do this ever again?
once the precedent is set, the floodgates will open.