These people are either being intentionally deceitful or are simply incompetent in understanding the full implications of what they're asking. Either possibility is disturbing.
I think the amount of unnecessary emotional appeals makes it fairly clear that they're being intentionally deceitful.
FBI Director Comments on San Bernardino Matter
21–30 of 142 posts
Re: FBI Director Comments on San Bernardino Matter
#22It should be resolved by the American people deciding how we want to govern ourselves in a world we have never seen before. We shouldn’t drift to a place—or be pushed to a place by the loudest voices—because finding the right place, the right balance, will matter to every American for a very long time. So why are they asking the courts to stretch the 1789 All Writs Act beyond its breaking point, instead of going to C…
"a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a court which has jurisdiction."
This law is basically "The courts can enable discovery and describe implementation of rulings." Setting up the rules of the game.
Could you share why you think that this is a stretch of the AWA? Is it because of the amount of work asked ?
Re: FBI Director Comments on San Bernardino Matter
#23> We don’t want to break anyone’s encryption or set a master key loose on the land. This directly contradicts Tim Cook's statement, in fact he used the same term "master key": > In the physical world, it would be the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of locks — from restaurants and banks to stores and homes. It either is a master key or it isn't.
Re: FBI Director Comments on San Bernardino Matter
#24> We don’t want to break anyone’s encryption or set a master key loose on the land. This directly contradicts Tim Cook's statement, in fact he used the same term "master key": > In the physical world, it would be the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of locks — from restaurants and banks to stores and homes. It either is a master key or it isn't.
the FBI asked for a specialised OS image that would have a check so that it could only work on this specific phone. Combined with Apple's encryption/signing of the update, this image could not be applied to any other device.
So the "work" asked of Apple would produce something that would only work on the phone with the warrant
Re: FBI Director Comments on San Bernardino Matter
#25> We don’t want to break anyone’s encryption or set a master key loose on the land. This directly contradicts Tim Cook's statement, in fact he used the same term "master key": > In the physical world, it would be the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of locks — from restaurants and banks to stores and homes. It either is a master key or it isn't.
It isn't. the FBI asked for a specialised OS image that would have a check so that it could only work on this specific phone. Combined with Apple's encryption/signing of the update, this image could not be applied to any other device. So the "work" asked of Apple would produce something that would only work on the phone with the warrant
"Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation. In the wrong hands, this software — which does not exist today — would have the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession. The FBI may use different words to describe this tool, but make no mistake: Building a version of iOS that bypasses security in this way would undeniably create a backdoor. And while the government may argue that its use would be limited to this case, there is no way to guarantee such control."
Re: FBI Director Comments on San Bernardino Matter
#26I'll go ahead and say that it sounds extremely sincere and straight-forward, much unlike most official statements I've seen from the FBI. He does suggest that his view is right, but he does the right thing, as apple did, in supporting a public discourse about the so-called balance between privacy and safety. I know many people seem to gravitate to the extremes on every issue, but both Cook and Comey are right in sayi…
Sounds extremely straight forward and sincere(many bad decisions are also taken with utmost sincerity) but I would think it would be a bad idea to provide FBI this ability. For one, it is forever weakening the security and privacy of your iphone. Bad guys who want to evade the policy officers will do it anyway with encryption systems/software available from any of the non US territories. Considering that FBI can get…
Re: FBI Director Comments on San Bernardino Matter
#27> We don’t want to break anyone’s encryption or set a master key loose on the land. This directly contradicts Tim Cook's statement, in fact he used the same term "master key": > In the physical world, it would be the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of locks — from restaurants and banks to stores and homes. It either is a master key or it isn't.
It isn't. the FBI asked for a specialised OS image that would have a check so that it could only work on this specific phone. Combined with Apple's encryption/signing of the update, this image could not be applied to any other device. So the "work" asked of Apple would produce something that would only work on the phone with the warrant
Re: FBI Director Comments on San Bernardino Matter
#28> We don’t want to break anyone’s encryption or set a master key loose on the land. This directly contradicts Tim Cook's statement, in fact he used the same term "master key": > In the physical world, it would be the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of locks — from restaurants and banks to stores and homes. It either is a master key or it isn't.
It isn't. the FBI asked for a specialised OS image that would have a check so that it could only work on this specific phone. Combined with Apple's encryption/signing of the update, this image could not be applied to any other device. So the "work" asked of Apple would produce something that would only work on the phone with the warrant
At this point, the only valid answer from Apple is that any future devices (if they aren't this way already) should either require the password to do a software update, or wipe the phone.
Re: FBI Director Comments on San Bernardino Matter
#29> We don’t want to break anyone’s encryption or set a master key loose on the land. This directly contradicts Tim Cook's statement, in fact he used the same term "master key": > In the physical world, it would be the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of locks — from restaurants and banks to stores and homes. It either is a master key or it isn't.
Re: FBI Director Comments on San Bernardino Matter
#30I wonder if they did or what would have happened if they had approached Apple in a non-compulsory manner regarding this. He is right on the fact that the specific task they're seeking Apple to perform is more or less obsolete and will be entirely so shortly so I'm inclined to believe that they're not really going through all this to abuse that specific tool (though the precedent would be worth the fight in order to a…
[0] http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/technology/how-tim-cook-be...
Edit: I'm not trying to suggest that Apple is suddenly being arbitrarily obstreperous in cases where they may have once been compliant. Apple made a decision to change course and it wouldn't make any sense for them to go back on it just because the FBI asked "Pretty please?".