21–30 of 114 posts
Twitter doesn't seem like an appropriate medium for a response to this issue from a CEO of a major tech company. Hello! This isn't a picture of the burger you had for lunch or a pithy remark fest, it's the most important thing affecting your users today. Take some time and write a god damn letter with your company's stance.
https://lawfareblog.com/not-slippery-slope-jump-cliff
Quotation from, Not a Slippery Slope, but a Jump off the Cliff By Nicholas Weaver.
The request to Apple is accurately paraphrased as "Create malcode designed to subvert security protections, with additional forensic protections, customized for a particular target's phone, cryptographically sign that malcode so the target's phone accepts it as legitimate, and run that customized version through the update mechanism". (I speak of malcode in the technical sense of "code designed to subvert a security protection or compromise the device", not in intent.)
The same logic behind what the FBI seeks could just as easily apply to a mandate forcing Microsoft, Google, Apple, and others to push malicious code to a device through automatic updates when the device isn't yet in law enforcement's hand. So the precedent the FBI seeks doesn't represent just "create and install malcode for this device in Law Enforcement possession" but rather "create and install malcode for this device".
Let us assume that the FBI wins in court and gains this precedent. This does indeed solve the "going dark" problem as now the FBI can go to Apple, Cisco, Microsoft, or Google with a warrant and say "push out an update to this target". Once the target's device starts running the FBI's update then encryption no longer matters, even the much stronger security present in the latest Apple devices. So as long as the FBI identifies the target's devices before arrest there is no problem with any encryption. But at what cost?
This is the most concise summary I have found on the legal issues/possible ramifications concerning this case. The worry in this case is the troubling precedent it would set. https://lawfareblog.com/not-slippery-slope-jump-cliff Quotation from, Not a Slippery Slope, but a Jump off the Cliff By Nicholas Weaver. The request to Apple is accurately paraphrased as "Create malcode designed to subvert security protections,…
Twitter doesn't seem like an appropriate medium for a response to this issue from a CEO of a major tech company. Hello! This isn't a picture of the burger you had for lunch or a pithy remark fest, it's the most important thing affecting your users today. Take some time and write a god damn letter with your company's stance.
This is the most concise summary I have found on the legal issues/possible ramifications concerning this case. The worry in this case is the troubling precedent it would set. https://lawfareblog.com/not-slippery-slope-jump-cliff Quotation from, Not a Slippery Slope, but a Jump off the Cliff By Nicholas Weaver. The request to Apple is accurately paraphrased as "Create malcode designed to subvert security protections,…
This is the most concise summary I have found on the legal issues/possible ramifications concerning this case. The worry in this case is the troubling precedent it would set. https://lawfareblog.com/not-slippery-slope-jump-cliff Quotation from, Not a Slippery Slope, but a Jump off the Cliff By Nicholas Weaver. The request to Apple is accurately paraphrased as "Create malcode designed to subvert security protections,…
This is precisely why I think the San Bernardino case is ideal for the FBI to establish this precedent. If they actually wanted access to the device they could have served Apple a National Security Letter and had it done on the sly. But they're taking the public route on this one because of how bad Apple would look if they refused to unlock the phone of a known terrorist. That's probably why Apple had to go out of th…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't think Apple has been asked to build a tool, just to help unlock a single device. I think Pichai is making a distinction between handing over data they already own (eg. a Gmail account) and data stored on user-controlled devices, which must be hacked to access. Which is interesting, since he's essentially admitting that their push to send everything to "the cloud" makes their users less safe from governmental…
> I think Pichai is making a distinction between handing over data they already own (eg. a Gmail account) and data stored on user-controlled devices, which must be hacked to access. No, Pichai is making a distinction between giving the information after a correct process and developing a backdoor to slurp the data. It has nothing to do with cloud/device differences
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't think Apple has been asked to build a tool, just to help unlock a single device. I think Pichai is making a distinction between handing over data they already own (eg. a Gmail account) and data stored on user-controlled devices, which must be hacked to access. Which is interesting, since he's essentially admitting that their push to send everything to "the cloud" makes their users less safe from governmental…
I don't think Apple has been asked to build a tool, just to help unlock a single device Aside from the non-sequitur, what Apple has been asked for is a custom build of iOS.
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2714001/SB-Shoote...
This is the most concise summary I have found on the legal issues/possible ramifications concerning this case. The worry in this case is the troubling precedent it would set. https://lawfareblog.com/not-slippery-slope-jump-cliff Quotation from, Not a Slippery Slope, but a Jump off the Cliff By Nicholas Weaver. The request to Apple is accurately paraphrased as "Create malcode designed to subvert security protections,…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't think Apple has been asked to build a tool, just to help unlock a single device Aside from the non-sequitur, what Apple has been asked for is a custom build of iOS.
Fine, but it's custom build locked to that particular device and which Apple can install itself, without providing it to the FBI. It's certainly not "a tool for the FBI that will allow them to look at any user's data". https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2714001/SB-Shoote...