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A Message to Our Customers

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Re: A Message to Our Customers

#621
post #601

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The problem is that once created, it would be easier for future warrants to ask Apple to simply re-perform the same trick it's done in the past. Apple's core argument is that allow this once opens the door to doing it repeatedly because right now Apple doesn't have the toolchain to do this. Once the toolchain exists, its deployment is trivial.

> The problem is that once created, it would be easier for future warrants to ask Apple to simply re-perform the same trick it's done in the past. That's not a problem at all. The issue is how the existence of the tool affects warrantless access. Where did we get the idea that it's bad in itself for law enforcement agencies to be able to break crypto when they have a warrant?

Because breakable crypto isn't crypto?

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#622
The FBI's intentions are not good. They have abused the data, tech, power they already have at every turn. They fabricate terror and crime, then use it as an excuse to violate our human and constitutional rights. Stopping crime and terror is secondary to undermining our security and maintaining a culture of fear.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#623

I'm clearly in the minority here, but I don't really understand Apple's position here, nor do I understand why everyone is rallying behind them. Apple built hardware which was not particularly secure. The software defaults to a four-digit PIN. They attempt to mitigate this by adding an escalating interval between entries, and by optionally wiping the phone after too many failed tries, but this is not set in stone and…

They address this at the end of the letter. They say it's "an unprecedented use of the All Writs Act of 1789 to justify an expansion of its authority." They go on to talk about what that precedent would mean. It's at the very bottom.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#624

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Did you read the release? They are up front that its entirely an issue about setting a bad precedent. Its completely and totally about the fact that it would be used over and over again, and nothing to do with the fact that is it possible. Your overly cynical stance on this is misguided, as you seem to not have grasped the information in the letter.

The court order says that the software must only work for the specific device in custody. Apple is not supposed to create a general tool.

If you believe that the FBI wouldn't abuse a tool like that after the past few years of coverage of the Security sector there is really very little hope for you.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#625
I'm no security expert, but how would Apple access previously encrypted data with a different version of iOS? Doesn't having that ability imply they already have a "back-door"? Could someone explain what I'm missing here or is it more that that would be a one-off solution and the FBI is asking for a global, remote, no apple needed solution...

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#626
I'm no security expert, but how would Apple access previously encrypted data with a different version of iOS? Doesn't having that ability imply they already have a "back-door"? Could someone explain what I'm missing here or is it more that that would be a one-off solution and the FBI is asking for a global, remote, no apple needed solution...

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#627

Earlier quoted context omitted.

".. what this means is that even Apple can't break into an iPhone with a secure passphrase (10+ characters) and disabled Touch ID - which is hackable with a bit of effort to get your fingerprint." That is not exactly true. They wrote the OS, they designed the phone, they know where the JTAG connectors are. Cracking the phone apart and putting is logic board up on a debugger would likely enable them to bypass security…

> They wrote the OS, they designed the phone, they know where the JTAG connectors are. Cracking the phone apart and putting is logic board up on a debugger would likely enable them to bypass security. When a passcode is entered, the SoC queries the Secure Enclave with the passcode. If the passcode is correct, the Secure Enclave responds with the decryption key for the flash storage. The best Apple could do is sign a…

Where have you heard about the erase-on-update feature?

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#628

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think the missing information here is how the phone is encrypted. If it's done with the 4-digit numeric PIN, then the software could be built; it would take 10000 tries, but at less than .1 seconds per try, it would be able to crack the code in about 15 minutes. The current iPhone has a protection for this; after some number of tries, it will lock you out for increasing time intervals. This is the only way that the…

I mean this sincerely: has the government used one of its 10 tries on the attacker's birth year? I hope the government has burned a couple tries on low-hanging guesses before going through this legal hassle.

Is there a way to know how many attempts remain before trying a key?

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#629
post #597

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They state that they can push an update that makes brute-forcing possible by disabling software-enforced delays between attempts. Apple's security PDF says that the iteration count is calibrated so that one attempt takes 80ms in hardware, so that's the hard limit on the brute forcing speed, regardless of any updates Apple releases. This means that a long alphanumeric passphrase is secure, but a 6-digit passcode could…

It's so weird how hard it is for the brain to handle exponential growth. I was amazed that a 4-digit password can be cracked so quickly at 80ms a pop, but you're right. Just for the hell of it, here's how long it would take for different length passcodes for digits, digits plus letters (case insensitive), and digits plus letters (case sensitive): # characters [0-9] [0-9a-z] [0-9a-zA-Z] 1 0.8 seconds 2.9 seconds 5 sec…

Does this consider the "too many incorrect attempts" lockout that iOS imposes though?

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#630

Earlier quoted context omitted.

With a sensibly-built phone, that SIM card does not have the ability to access anything of value on the device.

Is there a list of sensibly built phones available? I'd like to buy a phone where the modem and SIM do not have access to main memory (AIUI most phones use a single-chip SoC with a built-in modem).

What's the point of accessing main memory in a locked and encrypted phone?
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