A Message to Our Customers
611–620 of 1001 posts
Re: A Message to Our Customers
#612By publicly committing Apple to this cause, Cook makes it more likely that internal teams at Apple as well as future versions of the company will adhere to this position. By defining a set of actions which, if made public, would ruin the company's brand, Cook makes it less likely Apple will take those actions.
Re: A Message to Our Customers
#613Re: A Message to Our Customers
#614Earlier quoted context omitted.
"From what I understand Tim is doing, and I greatly admire, is trying to avoid a judicial requirement that they be able to do this on demand. The so called "back door" requirement, because he knows, as others do, that such a feature would be used by more than the intended audience, and for more than the intended uses, to the detriment of Apple's users." To be fair - the only reason he's doing it is because it would c…
"To be fair - the only reason he's doing it is because it would cause a significant drop in sales for Apple devices." That's not being fair at all. To say the only reason he is doing it is to protect iPhone sales doesn't speak to Tim's character. Of course he cares about sales, but he also cares about privacy.
Re: A Message to Our Customers
#615Huge props to Apple - here's hoping against hope that Google, Facebook, and Amazon get behind this. One thing I was wondering is how Apple is even able to create a backdoor. It is explained toward the end: "The government would have us remove security features and add new capabilities to the operating system, allowing a passcode to be input electronically. This would make it easier to unlock an iPhone by “brute force…
".. what this means is that even Apple can't break into an iPhone with a secure passphrase (10+ characters) and disabled Touch ID - which is hackable with a bit of effort to get your fingerprint." That is not exactly true. They wrote the OS, they designed the phone, they know where the JTAG connectors are. Cracking the phone apart and putting is logic board up on a debugger would likely enable them to bypass security…
I would not be surprised at all that Apple's internal 'backdoor' (if you can call it that) is just resetting the security enclave, essentially erasing everything on the NAND. That'd be fine for refurb/manufacturing, desirable even as that guarantees that full system wipes happen before a refurb goes to a new customer.
Re: A Message to Our Customers
#616Earlier quoted context omitted.
What do you want thone other companies to get behind? They don't manufacture phones like Apple does, right...? Note that this letter says: "When the FBI has requested data that’s in our possession, we have provided it." Seels like that detail is getting very little attention in this announcement. Really? If the FYI requests any data, they hand it over...?
Would you complain about Apple handing in information to solve the murder of a loved one? Why is it always the "bad government" argument? It's not that it doesn't happen, but usually those requests are aimed towards more "mundane" cases. For example, I have friends who work in law (though not in the US), and the number 1 data request -which is revised by a judge, and only then given by companies- are call logs from t…
But I was mainly pointing out that quote because it wasn't clear what lesson the parent commenter wanted Google, Facebook, and Amazon to be learning from Apple. I would have guessed it'd have something to do with protection of user data, but the letter says they turn over any user data they have!
Re: A Message to Our Customers
#617Earlier quoted context omitted.
What do you want thone other companies to get behind? They don't manufacture phones like Apple does, right...? Note that this letter says: "When the FBI has requested data that’s in our possession, we have provided it." Seels like that detail is getting very little attention in this announcement. Really? If the FYI requests any data, they hand it over...?
Would you complain about Apple handing in information to solve the murder of a loved one? Why is it always the "bad government" argument? It's not that it doesn't happen, but usually those requests are aimed towards more "mundane" cases. For example, I have friends who work in law (though not in the US), and the number 1 data request -which is revised by a judge, and only then given by companies- are call logs from t…
Re: A Message to Our Customers
#618Earlier quoted context omitted.
What do you want thone other companies to get behind? They don't manufacture phones like Apple does, right...? Note that this letter says: "When the FBI has requested data that’s in our possession, we have provided it." Seels like that detail is getting very little attention in this announcement. Really? If the FYI requests any data, they hand it over...?
Would you complain about Apple handing in information to solve the murder of a loved one? Why is it always the "bad government" argument? It's not that it doesn't happen, but usually those requests are aimed towards more "mundane" cases. For example, I have friends who work in law (though not in the US), and the number 1 data request -which is revised by a judge, and only then given by companies- are call logs from t…
Re: A Message to Our Customers
#619Earlier quoted context omitted.
".. what this means is that even Apple can't break into an iPhone with a secure passphrase (10+ characters) and disabled Touch ID - which is hackable with a bit of effort to get your fingerprint." That is not exactly true. They wrote the OS, they designed the phone, they know where the JTAG connectors are. Cracking the phone apart and putting is logic board up on a debugger would likely enable them to bypass security…
They don't even have to do that. They wrote the OS, they have the signing key for OS updates. All they need to do is push an update to the device with a backdoor that allows reading off the unencrypted contents post-boot (possibly with the addition of a judicially compelled fingerprint scan or PIN brute force to get the encryption key out of whatever on-device escrow it's stored in). The only way to secure the device…
> possibly with the addition of a judicially compelled fingerprint scan or PIN brute force to get the encryption key out of whatever on-device escrow it's stored in
This is the whole problem. The keys are in the SE. You can't brute force the PIN because the SE rate-limits attempts (and that rate limiting cannot be overridden by an OS update because the SE is not run by the OS).
If you can get a fingerprint scan then all bets are obviously off, but then you don't need Apple at all.
Re: A Message to Our Customers
#620Earlier quoted context omitted.
What it sounds like is they've been asked to prepare a new OS release that allows an unlimited number of attempts to enter the passphrase via some network link. The press release is written to sound like without a software release, it wouldn't be possible to mount this kind of attack, however attacks like this are generally possible regardless of having some specially modified and signed OS image: for example, by cut…
Did you read the release? They are up front that its entirely an issue about setting a bad precedent. Its completely and totally about the fact that it would be used over and over again, and nothing to do with the fact that is it possible. Your overly cynical stance on this is misguided, as you seem to not have grasped the information in the letter.