A Message to Our Customers • Hacker News Board

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#471

Post by imroot » Wed, Feb 17, 2016, 3:11 PM UTC

If you look at past cases where the All Writs Act has been invoked, the Courts have rejected this type of government conscription.

Effectively, the government is forcing Apple to take receipt of a device that it does not own or posses, then perform potentially destructive services on a device, and then perform services that could potentially require Apple to testify at a trial under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.

I really think that Apple's in the clear here, and the AUSA's in the case are pulling all the stops to get Apple ordered to break the encryption.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#472

Post by FussyZeus » Wed, Feb 17, 2016, 3:12 PM UTC

ck2 wrote: post #464

coderjames wrote: post #403

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not sure you can draw the conclusion that Apple can push OS updates to a locked phone. What Tim Cook wrote is that > "install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation." > "the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession." So the FBI has the physical phone already. They can deliver to Apple who can disassemble it and either use a JTAG/Flash programmer on an internal connector to manua…

Pretty sure you can upgrade the OS on a locked phone if you have physical access to it.

Negative. You need the passcode.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#473

Post by knodi123 » Wed, Feb 17, 2016, 3:13 PM UTC

mehrdada wrote: post #462

coderjames wrote: post #403

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not sure you can draw the conclusion that Apple can push OS updates to a locked phone. What Tim Cook wrote is that > "install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation." > "the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession." So the FBI has the physical phone already. They can deliver to Apple who can disassemble it and either use a JTAG/Flash programmer on an internal connector to manua…

They need to break the boot trust chain to load unsigned code. Simply rewriting the flash isn't enough.

why load unsigned code? can't apple sign it?

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#474

Post by rootusrootus » Wed, Feb 17, 2016, 3:13 PM UTC

sjwright wrote: post #238

djkslgjeklas wrote: post #162

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Talk is cheap and these internet posts - from Tim Cooke, you, and me - are just talk. The security of this nation depends on Apple (and Google et. seq.) supporting us with its dollars as much as possible. And I'm not optimistic that the stockholders care about anything more than doing the opposite.

Talk is not cheap when you have to back up such talk with a substantial legal defence. And any stockholder with an ounce of intelligence will understand that Apple's choices here are both morally right and effective marketing. As the information age matures, privacy is becoming a valuable asset, and Apple is starting to gain a positive reputation in this space.

Totally agree. As someone who is currently an Android fan, I find that Apple's apparent commitment to privacy is appealing, and it could eventually mean I buy an iPhone. Assuming I'm not the only consumer who has made this connection, then Apple has very legitimate business reasons for continuing to trumpet their commitment to privacy.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#475

Post by DSingularity » Wed, Feb 17, 2016, 3:13 PM UTC

mehrdada wrote: post #462

coderjames wrote: post #403

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not sure you can draw the conclusion that Apple can push OS updates to a locked phone. What Tim Cook wrote is that > "install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation." > "the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession." So the FBI has the physical phone already. They can deliver to Apple who can disassemble it and either use a JTAG/Flash programmer on an internal connector to manua…

They need to break the boot trust chain to load unsigned code. Simply rewriting the flash isn't enough.

Hence the need for a validbOS from Apple.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#476

Post by konradb » Wed, Feb 17, 2016, 3:14 PM UTC

Oletros wrote: post #143

konradb wrote: post #120

Earlier quoted context omitted.

From the link that was posted in reply to you, 'hope against hope' means 'to have hope even when the situation appears to be hopeless'. Which means he does have hope, even though the situation appears to be hopeless.

Yeees, I'm asking why he thinks there is little hope that they will stand

Sorry, misinterpreted you, in over-literal mind mode right now!

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#477

Post by dhvanilp » Wed, Feb 17, 2016, 3:16 PM UTC

Ntrails wrote: post #167

ghshephard wrote: post #93

I'm surprised that nobody on this thread has commented on the real substance of this response. It has nothing to do with Apple brute forcing iPhones for the police (which it has done for years, with a simple court order) - but instead, is Apple making it abundantly clear, that if they comply (or are forced to comply) with the All Writs Act of 1789 to create this particular back door, then that opens the floodgate mov…

But how do you get the firmware updated on a locked phone? My understanding is all updates (historically) have required the phone to be unlocked and connected to the internet?

The FBI asked Apple to install a firmware update in the RAM of the iPhone, by booting the iPhone in the DFU mode.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#478

Post by rahoulb » Wed, Feb 17, 2016, 3:17 PM UTC

tibbon wrote: post #454

I heard this morning on the (semi-conservative FM radio) that this was a national security issue, and that Apple is helping terrorists in not bypassing this. I don't get it- the shooters are dead. How is what is on their phone a matter of national security? We probably have 99% of the information we'll ever have on them. There is no larger plot. Not having what's on this device I cannot imagine puts anyone at risk.

> Rather than asking for legislative action through Congress, the FBI is proposing an unprecedented use of the All Writs Act of 1789 to justify an expansion of its authority.

It's all about precedent.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#479

Post by err4nt » Wed, Feb 17, 2016, 3:17 PM UTC

Fiahil wrote: post #415

I like the position apple is taking, However, after reading the letter, I noticed it misses a point I consider even more important than just "a dangerous precedent". Apple is selling devices on the whole planet, not just in the USA. So, what's the FBI (an American agency) is requesting is not dangerous for only American citizen, but also for iPhones' owners in Europe, Asia, Africa, Oceania. Hell, these people are not…

I wouldn't worry too much about non-American apple users. Those of us outside the US know how tangled law and tech can be - and so people guarding information tend to use non-American cloud services for example.

If this goes through I just expect more people internationally to choose something else. Not a big loss to them, but the loss of business to Apple (a US company) might be felt.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#480

Post by fixermark » Wed, Feb 17, 2016, 3:17 PM UTC

andreyvit wrote: post #427

germanier wrote: post #366

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not if the check and wiping is done in hardware as claimed by Apple for newer devices than the one in question here.

Secure Enclave is not really ‘hardware’; despite being isolated from the main OS and CPU, it is still software-based and accepts software updates signed by Apple.

If those software updates force it to erase its private key store, though, then it's functionally isolated from that attack vector. An updated enclave that no longer contains the data of interest has no value.