Huge props to Apple - here's hoping against hope that Google, Facebook, and Amazon get behind this. One thing I was wondering is how Apple is even able to create a backdoor. It is explained toward the end: "The government would have us remove security features and add new capabilities to the operating system, allowing a passcode to be input electronically. This would make it easier to unlock an iPhone by “brute force…
I don't see how this "reassuring"; to me it's rather very confusing (as mentioned in many other comments). If Apple could in fact write a software backdoor, doesn't it mean that the backdoor exists, at least potentially? And how can one be sure that Apple is the only company able to build that door? At the very least, couldn't the right Apple engineer be either bribed or forced (by terrorists or the government) to bu…
A Message to Our Customers
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Re: A Message to Our Customers
#222FBI: "You've built a device that makes it nation-state-difficult to install custom software without DRM keys. We'd like you to assist us in deploying software signed with your keys."
Apple: "That feels way too much like asking a CA to sign a cert for you, so fuck off."
I'm honestly not sure which side I'm on here.
Re: A Message to Our Customers
#223Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm afraid I'm too skeptical to get the same assurances as you. Apple accuses the FBI of playing language games with the term "backdoor", but I think Apple has done the same. The fact that they can push weak OS updates to a locked phone is the backdoor . This means that they can already comply with the court order, and they likely will. This letter covers them from PR damage.
This is not apparent from the article. Where could I find out about this ability?
(article) > But that’s simply not true. Once created, the technique could be used over and over again, on any number of devices.
I am also missing a key part of the technical details involved in this this situation.
Re: A Message to Our Customers
#224Question: is it possible to design a cryptographic system that, whenever it is accessed by a third party (government), this is made publically visible in a log? Can blockchain technology help here?
Re: A Message to Our Customers
#225Earlier quoted context omitted.
> According to them, there are unfortunately no baseband modems on the market that can legally have their firmware distributed as free software. What is the legal restriction here? (It sounds like you're referring to some restriction beyond simple copyright protection on some of their components - are there FCC regulations regarding the firmware?) EDIT : Ah, of course, the FCC needs to certify devices before they can…
From their FAQ: https://neo900.org/faq#peripherals >We unfortunately cannot provide free baseband modem firmware, as there is no option available on the market which would be able to fulfil this requirement. Even if it existed, it would bring very little value to the users, as operating a radio device with modified firmware on public networks without recertification is prohibited in most jurisdictions of the world an…
Not entirely true, publishing the code isn't the same as allowing its modification. Code signing can be used to limit which versions are allowed to run.
Reproducible builds of the source would allow one to ensure that the binary, certified version of the code their baseband processor is running is legit (i.e. not backdoored). It would also help audit the code and spot security holes.
Re: A Message to Our Customers
#226Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't see how this "reassuring"; to me it's rather very confusing (as mentioned in many other comments). If Apple could in fact write a software backdoor, doesn't it mean that the backdoor exists, at least potentially? And how can one be sure that Apple is the only company able to build that door? At the very least, couldn't the right Apple engineer be either bribed or forced (by terrorists or the government) to bu…
I agree. I was under the impression that Apple's security was such that even they didn't have the power to decrypt a device because the crypto made it impossible without the password/pin/key. I'm interested to understand the reasons that it was not done this way.
The right password can be obtained by either knowing it, or by guessing it.
As an additional security measure, the software shipped with the phone prevents brute force attacks by wiping the device after a given number of failed attempts.
Apple has been asked to modify the software so that it won't wipe the phone, thus allowing the authorities to try many passwords.
If anybody could circumvent this additional security measure, actual security would be lower. The authorities are not asking Apple to ship this change to all users: they only want to install it on the device in their possession.
However, Apple is concerned that once they provide the authorities such a modified software, it could be leaked and thus be used by third parties to breach the security of any Apple device.
It should be noted that currently all data encrypted for example on your laptop's hard drive is already subject to this kind of brute force attacks. It's a well known fact that authorities or malicious users can already attempt brute force attacks on encrypted data if they can access the data on a passive device such as a hard-drive.
It's important to understand that Apple (at least not in this case) is not being asked to implement a backdoor in the encryption software. It's also important to understand that even if Apple was forced to install a backdoor, it would affect only the ability to access future data and not help the investigation of the San Bernardino case.
This very request by the Authorities suggests that Apple does not currently install any backdoor on stock phones.
However there is a logical possibility that the Authorities are either not aware of any such backdoor or in the worst case they are publicly requesting this feature just to hide the real reason of a possible future success at decrypting the phone: they can claim that Apple didn't have any backdoor, and they were just lucky at bruteforcing the device; in fact Apple wasn't even cooperating with them at relaxing the brute force prevention limit, so they could claim they did it in house.
(I'm personally not inclined to believe in such improbably well coordinated smoke and mirrors strategies, but they are a logical possibility nevertheless).
Re: A Message to Our Customers
#227I see a lot of people saying they're impressed, admired, etc. at Apple for doing this. It's not about giving props: Apple is not doing this out of goodwill, or because they believe in protecting privacy. Apple has a competitive advantage against Google/Facebook in that its business model does not depend on violating their customer's privacy. They are just exploiting that competitive advantage. Cfr. https://ar.al/note…
You are right. What you say about Facebook is true, but Google's Android is open source, so there is no way they can plant a privacy-invading code and get away with that.
Compare and contrast with today's "Typo in PHP's Mersenne Twister" story - https://twitter.com/i0n1c/status/699860681487708160
Seems to have been broken since 2007 (the 'broken' line appears in the 2007-01-01 commit "Bump year" but not in the 2006-10-06 commit "Mark rand.c functions with U.")
Re: A Message to Our Customers
#228Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't see how this "reassuring"; to me it's rather very confusing (as mentioned in many other comments). If Apple could in fact write a software backdoor, doesn't it mean that the backdoor exists, at least potentially? And how can one be sure that Apple is the only company able to build that door? At the very least, couldn't the right Apple engineer be either bribed or forced (by terrorists or the government) to bu…
I agree. I was under the impression that Apple's security was such that even they didn't have the power to decrypt a device because the crypto made it impossible without the password/pin/key. I'm interested to understand the reasons that it was not done this way.
The iPhone prevents this by locking up (and potentially erasing the phone) after 10 failed attempts, but this a restriction created in iOS. If they provision a new backdoored version of iOS to the phone, that restriction wouldn't apply any more, and they could brute-force away.