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Apple ordered to bypass auto-erase on San Bernadino shooter's iPhone

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Re: Apple ordered to bypass auto-erase on San Bernadino shooter's iPhone

#51

Post by savoytruffle »

superuser2 wrote: post #34
ggreer wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No. From Apple's iOS security guide[1]: > The device’s unique ID (UID) and a device group ID (GID) are AES 256-bit keys fused (UID) or compiled (GID) into the application processor and Secure Enclave during manufacturing. No software or firmware can read them directly; they can see only the results of encryption or decryption operations performed by dedicated AES engines implemented in silicon using the UID or GID as…

It sounds like since the UID is fused it cannot be erased; it's probably the GID that's erased, and it sounds like the GID is known to Apple.

None of the local passwords within passwords are known to Apple. They say.

The FBI is hoping they do know something secret.

In most cases it would be easier to subpoena online accounts, but of course Apple says iMessage is also unreadable for different reasons.

Re: Apple ordered to bypass auto-erase on San Bernadino shooter's iPhone

#52

Post by X-Istence »

superuser2 wrote: post #34
ggreer wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No. From Apple's iOS security guide[1]: > The device’s unique ID (UID) and a device group ID (GID) are AES 256-bit keys fused (UID) or compiled (GID) into the application processor and Secure Enclave during manufacturing. No software or firmware can read them directly; they can see only the results of encryption or decryption operations performed by dedicated AES engines implemented in silicon using the UID or GID as…

It sounds like since the UID is fused it cannot be erased; it's probably the GID that's erased, and it sounds like the GID is known to Apple.

but fuses can be blown. Simply by blowing one of the fuses the key will change. Even a single bit change means it's useless to authorities.

Re: Apple ordered to bypass auto-erase on San Bernadino shooter's iPhone

#53

Post by Zigurd »

gst wrote: post #38
ggreer wrote: post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

After five failed fingerprint attempts, your password is required to unlock the phone. That seems pretty safe to me. If you're ever ordered to unlock the phone, just touch an unregistered finger to it. Fingerprint sensors aren't foolproof. It'd be hard to prove you deliberately sabotaged the effort. Though, one feature I'd like would be to register a distress fingerprint. Then I could touch say... my left index finge…

If you do this on purpose after asked to unlock your phone you will probably be charged with destruction of evidence or something like that. However, while a court is (afaik) able to ask you to put your finger on the fingerprint reader, you do not need to tell them which of the fingers the correct one is. So instead of purposely using a wrong finger, I'd ask the court to explicitly tell me which of my fingers I shoul…

Use your middle finger to actually unlock and use your index finger to fail. Unless the phone retains the biometric data after erasing itself, it's deniable.

Re: Apple ordered to bypass auto-erase on San Bernadino shooter's iPhone

#55

Post by spdustin »

garrettgrimsley wrote: post #28
stephentmcm wrote: post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't know about that but I'd be fairly certain a court would just order you to unlock the phone regardless of whether it's your finger locking it or a password.

In the USA the courts treat passwords as testimony, and in most cases you can invoke your 5th amendment right and refuse to provide passwords or encryption keys, given the state does not already know the contents of the device. This same protection does not extend to physical keys, which I think fingerprints would fall under. http://www.uclalawreview.org/the-fifth-amendment-encryption-...

It would seem to me that the "fingerprint = key" analogy is flawed. Physical keys can be trivially copied, and even reverse engineered from the locking mechanism. A key is a physical object that is required to disengage a lock.

A fingerprint, when used on an electronic lock of this kind, is not a key. It's attributable to one person only, not trivially duplicated, and not able to be reverse engineered from a locking mechanism. It requires an action by a single person who cannot be forcibly relieved of their possession of their fingerprint.

Additionally, a key is specified during the manufacturing or assembly of a lock, and comes with the lock, since they are "paired" when the lock is made. However, a fingerprint or password are specified by the user at will after they've assumed ownership of the device. They "testified" their identity to their phone with a fingerprint, just like they did with their password.

If compelled to imprint a finger, it is the same sort of personal interaction that a password entails: the credential holder utters/presents their personal information - not a physical object, but a repeated testimony of the same content they previously and uniquely presented to their device. It should be protected as other self-incriminating testimony under the fifth amendment.

Re: Apple ordered to bypass auto-erase on San Bernadino shooter's iPhone

#56

Post by X-Istence »

scottcanoni wrote: post #41
Myrmornis wrote: post #36

Why the worry about auto-wiping? Is it not possible to make a copy of the encrypted data and then play around with it as much as you want?

Can someone answer this? Raw read the memory to an external device and then brute force that shit using super computers until it cries.

If you can break AES... then the NSA would love to have a word with you :P

The FBI is going after the lowest hanging fruit, the users password that was used to create the crypto key.

Re: Apple ordered to bypass auto-erase on San Bernadino shooter's iPhone

#57

Post by X-Istence »

peeters wrote: post #40
Myrmornis wrote: post #36

Why the worry about auto-wiping? Is it not possible to make a copy of the encrypted data and then play around with it as much as you want?

Yeah I've got the same question. Is there some hardware safeguard that prevents copying the memory itself? You'd think the first rule of crypto forensics is to work on a copy.

Even if there were no such safeguard, you'd still have to break AES encryption...
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