Live data from Hacker News

Dear Startups: Here’s How to Stay Alive

heidiroizen.tumblr.com

151–160 of 200 posts

Re: Dear Startups: Here’s How to Stay Alive

#151
post #3

The cynical side of me wonders if all this is "helpful advice" from VCs is just designed to bring valuations down to earth.

Oh, it's decent advice for right now. Of course, you probably need that decent advice because you listened to your VCs' previous decent advice in better economic conditions - "don't worry about profit, just grow grow grow as fast as you can." The cynical side of me thinks that it's this flip-flopping between two extremes that ends up disproportionately benefitting investors, and that entrepreneurs would be better ser…

Holy shit I was about to write a comment to say - YES!!! absolutely. And then its you. Well, you are still right, and its still what I was thinking.

Re: Dear Startups: Here’s How to Stay Alive

#152

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Oh, it's decent advice for right now. Of course, you probably need that decent advice because you listened to your VCs' previous decent advice in better economic conditions - "don't worry about profit, just grow grow grow as fast as you can." The cynical side of me thinks that it's this flip-flopping between two extremes that ends up disproportionately benefitting investors, and that entrepreneurs would be better ser…

Nah, I figure that venture investors operate under conditions of extreme uncertainty, which means that they make decisions almost purely on emotion. That's what our emotional circuits are made for, after all: subconsciously aggregating a lot of signals so we can make decisions when there's not enough information to process it rationally. And yes, entrepreneurs are almost always better off ignoring everything an inves…

Kahneman and Tversky, Prospect Theory. Applies to investors, VCs, and ordinary people at the grocery store.

Re: Dear Startups: Here’s How to Stay Alive

#153

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I was watching this comment carefully as I thought I might have to delete it (due to people not understanding the arguments therein). It started rising to +2 or +3, so I stopped watching it. Now that I've checked again, I see that a few downvoters got it down to -1. Since it is too late, I am happy to explain the thoughts in the above comment. I studied this area of economics from formal sources as well as having exp…

The risk/reward profile is the foundation of all of modern finance. Risk is defined (in finance) as exposure to volatility. Volatility is measured by calculating the standard deviation of annualized returns on an investment over a given period of time. The longer the time horizon of the investment, the more exposure to unknown and unaccountable variables you face. Ultimately, this is because we do not have perfect in…

Obviously I didn't specify enough. The example considers current investment possibilities in possible startups. I asked you to imagine an entire faculty (actually two of them combined, Cal Tech and MIT) standing before you, asking for money. I then asked you to consider different versions of this same situation, corresponding to different levels of future-knowledge.

Let's further specify three groups, A, B, and a control C. A and B are asking you for $1 million to build their project. The control, C, is asking for $200K.

A is from 2 years in the future, B is from 70 years in the future, and C the control unlike A and B isn't a full cal tech + MIT faculty, it's just one guy with a youtube channel and no special knowledge, from our time. But they're all going to build their projects today if you give them funding.

A has proofs of concept and has just filed for patents but says they need funding to build prototypes, and for further patent filings. They say their patents and technology and the 2 years competitive advantage are worth $50M. But they will raise at $7M valuation, for a return of 7.14x over the investment timeframe between the current round ($7M valuation) and the next round in 2018 ($50M valuation).

B has nothing, but being from 70 years in the future, says they are presently worth $1 billion, but they understand it is difficult to raise money. So they are raising at a valuation of only $10M, selling 10% for $1M. They will use the money entirely on equipment and filing thousands of pages of patents, before their dazzling demonstrations allow them to raise their next round. It's the entire Cal Tech and MIT faculty from 2086! According to their story, after they show the dazzling new technology, they will proceed to raise a round in 2018 at a valuation of $1B ($10M valuation today, $1B valuation in 2018.)

C, the control, is some kid from today who is trying to raise some money so he can maybe raise at a valuation of $1.7M a year, or maybe 2 years, from now. Maybe. He already has some revenues from 5M youtube subscribers and he is raising a seed round to expand his channel into a whole media empire. His revenues are currently $5000 per month, or $60K per year, and he is trying to raise at a valuation of $600K or 10x earnings. He is only raising $200K. A year from now he hopes to raise a proper seed round at $1.7M, for 3x return. ($600K valuation today, $1.7M valuation in 1-2 years).

You are an investor. So, according to the traditional Risk-Reward profile, if A, B, and C are your possible investments, and A returns 7.14x (over 2 years), B returns 100x (over 2 years), and C returns 3x (over 1-2 years) and C already has an established product and established earnings, then the risk on B must be huge, whereas the risk on A is smaller and the risk on C is smallest of all.

But in fact, since 70 years is so far out, they have so much advanced knowledge, that the risk in that case is virtually 0 (there is no way that the entire faculty of both Cal Tech and MIT from 2086 with all their knowledge from them aren't worth $1B+ if they have $1M in financing and two years to spend on proofs of concepts, patent filings, etc! Yet they're raising at a valuation of only $10M. It's easy!)

Meanwhile, the group from only 2 years in the future is in a much riskier and more precarious position than the group from 70 years in the future. Their volatility is higher. This should be obvious.

While at the same time, even though the kid with the youtube followers already has a real product and real revenues, and is only trying to make a modest 3x return from a current valuation of $600k (10x earnings) to a valuation of just $1.7M -- in fact, his is the highest risk at all.

So this example shows that the least risk (essentially 0 risk) might be in a 100x return, the second-least risk might be in the 7x return. The control aiming for 3x return may be the highest risk of all.

I hope my thought experiments make it very clear to you that the risk/reward profile is flawed, and that there need be no particular risk associated with an outsize reward; likewise, the level of reward does not in any way need to match the exposure to volatility.

We are talking about the context of seed investments into startups, and I do not mean to generalize to other asset classes. The Risk/Reward profile is not an accurate statement of the situation investors are faced with in considering seed-stage startup investments.

-

Sorry about all the text, but it seems I didn't specify enough the first time around! Thanks for any thoughts and happy to hear your response.

Re: Dear Startups: Here’s How to Stay Alive

#154

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Couple of points. First, The idea of risk-reward trade-off is stupid. (This is demonstrated in my footnote.)[1] Second: startups aren't startups because they have a high risk of failure. Simply because they expect to be much bigger in 24 months than they are today. Someone making an app they want to sell on Android and iOS for $2 to all of the people who use smart phones is not a "small business", it's a startup. Why…

Risk/reward is generally measured for a specific time frame, because there is the value of time.

you may want to read my cousin comment (in response to roymurdock) in which I add rigor to the thought experiment to better explain my point. I add the time-frame that you asked for.

Re: Dear Startups: Here’s How to Stay Alive

#156

So the above is obviously written through a VC lens. Through an entrepreneur's lens - who also survived the dot-com bust (at etoys.com) and has since run several failed and now successful businesses - I'd add the following: The most valuable advice in this post reminds me of Marc A's awesome blog entry. Quote: "Companies that have a retention problem usually have a winning problem. Or rather, a "not winning" problem.…

But here is the thing: it's the same 8-14 working hours. If your product/company has the potential, why spend those same hours targeting $x million, when you could target 100x. You could be shorting yourself and your team out of several millions.

The assumption here is that the growth without revenue you're doing so you can get that 100x is going to be translatable into revenue. When you start generating actual revenue the team as a whole learns a lot. You don't just "pull the revenue lever". Business doesn't work like that. It's a gradual process of figuring out what the customer will pay for, understanding how to charge, optimizing, etc. It's a huge learning curve and a long process. Many startups don't want to hear this because if you believe it, then it's tough to pitch VC's when all you have is growth.

So really you absolutely need to generate revenue now or you won't be able to later. It's part of figuring out what business you're in and validating the model.

So just by going for revenue, you're absolutely not removing the ability to also do growth. You're just making sure that you can fund yourself and that the business you're in is a real business instead of just a fantasy one.

I should caveat this though. There are two strategies where revenue doesn't matter at all:

1. If you want to build a growth machine with no revenue purely in the hope of being a strategic threat to a big player so that they'll acquire you, then pure growth is a valid strategy. There are many success stories like that but I don't consider them real businesses.

2. If you want to be talent acquired, then you raise and make your core competency recruiting and your target market whoever is hiring engineers. You'll make some money and forever join the halls of those who have no idea how to run a real business that creates jobs.

I think the holy grail in entrepreneurship is creating a job creation machine that is self sustaining. That's what entrepreneurs were born to do and it's how we make the biggest contribution.

If you only consider Google (and there are so many more examples) - think about the effect that it has had on job creation, innovation, funding by the Google founders, the super angels it created, the angel investors, the funding projects that Google itself has and the quality of life it has created for tens of thousands of employees. That was just one success story that has had an enormous positive impact on the global economy.

When you talent acquire or strategic acquire a startup, you remove the possiblity of it ever becoming a Google or Facebook or Apple or Amazon and you remove all those positive benefits. So that's why I hate growth machines and talent shops.

Re: Dear Startups: Here’s How to Stay Alive

#157

So the above is obviously written through a VC lens. Through an entrepreneur's lens - who also survived the dot-com bust (at etoys.com) and has since run several failed and now successful businesses - I'd add the following: The most valuable advice in this post reminds me of Marc A's awesome blog entry. Quote: "Companies that have a retention problem usually have a winning problem. Or rather, a "not winning" problem.…

Giphy would have to exit for around 80 million for all investors to get their money back, seems unlikely they would be able to get that much for an acquihire even half of that amount especially if they are forced into a position where they can't raise anymore, are running out of money and need to sell so they are betting that advertising will make them into a viable business

Re: Dear Startups: Here’s How to Stay Alive

#158

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Out of every scene in those two seasons, no sentiment captured what I've witnessed in startups as precisely as this one. Straight up perfect. I wonder who was the main advisor for that speech (this was pre-Dick Costolo, I believe).

It is a ridiculous sentiment, but my startup has had revenue from early on, and I've talked to investors who have wanted to value us on revenue multiples because of that - whereas without having any revenue they would have taken a guess at our potential. (They'd have had to, they can't apply a multiple to $0!) It's stupid, $2000/month in revenue shouldn't mean you are valued at less than if you had $0/month, but I ca…

Anchoring is real.

Re: Dear Startups: Here’s How to Stay Alive

#159
post #63

> If you are in Silicon Valley and your customers are mostly well-paid consumers with no free time, or other venture-backed startups, well, I’d be worried. That's the most beautifully I've heard this thought articulated. I constantly hear people in SV talk publically talk about how they're living years in the future due to getting services from startups that haven't yet hit other markets. These people are very wealth…

I've called these the 10% startups. They typically only serve people in the top ~10% of earners in the US.

Which is not a bad market to serve when that 10% owns 75% of all wealth in the US.

Source: Credit Suisse: https://publications.credit-suisse.com/tasks/render/file/?fi...

Re: Dear Startups: Here’s How to Stay Alive

#160
The whole bit about "don't worry about morale"... Some engineers are replaceable, not all. If things get bad and you lose early/key people, there is a non-negligible hit. But, I think Ben and Mark at A2Z outlined a strategy harkening back to the last big hit -- build up the reserves in the bunker. If you think things will be bumpy for X-months out and you aren't cash flow positive, get the requisite amount in the bank ASAP.
Post reply on HN