Earlier quoted context omitted.
Keylogger, perhaps. The multiplexing just makes it trivial to connect to everything with no logging and no authentication. I don't even have to modify the PATH or install a keylogger. I am already several steps beyond that in one move. In other words, no audit trail for the FBI to look into, no need to upload some new application, no need to exploit a vulnerable application (beyond the vulnerability of OpenSSH itself…
If this were a game of chess, checkmate is getting arbitrary code to run in the context of the user. If you have an existing ssh process running as the same user then you can attach it with a debugger and inject code into it.
SSH: Best practices
51–60 of 123 posts
Re: SSH: Best practices
#52Earlier quoted context omitted.
If this were a game of chess, checkmate is getting arbitrary code to run in the context of the user. If you have an existing ssh process running as the same user then you can attach it with a debugger and inject code into it.
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The vulnerability is the attacker being able to run arbitrary code as the user.
Re: SSH: Best practices
#53Earlier quoted context omitted.
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A debugger injecting code into a process under the same context isn't a vulnerability. It's supposed to be able to do that. And OpenSSH is supposed to allow you to multiplex sessions. It's a feature. The vulnerability is the attacker being able to run arbitrary code as the user.
Re: SSH: Best practices
#54Earlier quoted context omitted.
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A debugger injecting code into a process under the same context isn't a vulnerability. It's supposed to be able to do that. And OpenSSH is supposed to allow you to multiplex sessions. It's a feature. The vulnerability is the attacker being able to run arbitrary code as the user.
Re: SSH: Best practices
#55Weird, where I work we're not allowed to use key auth. They claim it's for PCI since they can't enforce that the keys are passworded/encrypted.
Re: SSH: Best practices
#56Weird, where I work we're not allowed to use key auth. They claim it's for PCI since they can't enforce that the keys are passworded/encrypted.
Ironically, things done for PCI/ISO27K compliance very often decrease security. Maybe not always, maybe not everywhere, but at least that's my experience with the companies I worked at and is also in line with the stories I heard about other companies. Quite recently: Security was concerned about enforcing ssh key rotation and was pushing for sysops to generate and store (obviously - unencrypted) private keys for all…
That is slowly starting to change however. PCI DSS 3.0 gets a bit more specific and starts to go down some technical rabbit holes. PCI DSS 4.0 will be even more specific and have more technical requirements (vs. checkboxes)
Re: SSH: Best practices
#57Earlier quoted context omitted.
Public keys being exposed isn't something I think needs to be mitigated. That's the whole point, they're public.
Security is not binary. In this case it depends on whether disclosing your identity to the servers you connect to is a problem in your threat model. Saying "they are public so it's ok" is technical oversimplification.
It's not. The whole idea of the scheme is that you can publish them everywhere with no risk.
Re: SSH: Best practices
#58Here's a brief guide for setting up SSH with YubiKey as a smartcard which complements this article nicely - https://github.com/drduh/YubiKey-Guide
One of the main uses of smartcards is to use it on other machines (eg: not mine). What's the added benefit of adding one if I'm logging in from my local machine?
Re: SSH: Best practices
#59Re: SSH: Best practices
#60Earlier quoted context omitted.
A debugger injecting code into a process under the same context isn't a vulnerability. It's supposed to be able to do that. And OpenSSH is supposed to allow you to multiplex sessions. It's a feature. The vulnerability is the attacker being able to run arbitrary code as the user.
OpenSSH allowing this behavior by default is in itself the vulnerability.