Looks amazing. Would love to try this if anybody has any invites.
Introducing the Keybase filesystem
241–250 of 501 posts
Re: Introducing the Keybase filesystem
#242Re: Introducing the Keybase filesystem
#243Earlier quoted context omitted.
Came here to say pretty much the same thing. It's slick and easy to use. It's actually the 'dropbox' I've always wanted and if they introduce a storage limit I'd pay. https://keybase.io/jgrahamc
Hi John, mind sharing an invitation?
here's another shameless coder begging for an invitation
Re: Introducing the Keybase filesystem
#244Re: Introducing the Keybase filesystem
#245Is there any difference between this and http://tresorit.com/ ?
Re: Introducing the Keybase filesystem
#246Re: Introducing the Keybase filesystem
#247Earlier quoted context omitted.
Came here to say pretty much the same thing. It's slick and easy to use. It's actually the 'dropbox' I've always wanted and if they introduce a storage limit I'd pay. https://keybase.io/jgrahamc
Hi John, mind sharing an invitation?
Another shameless request from me if any are floating around :) Happy Friday!
Re: Introducing the Keybase filesystem
#248> Your app will encrypt just for you and then awake and rekey in the background when that Twitter user joins and announces a key. Isn't this the weak link in the chain? If you can convince the client that you're the person the data was encrypted for, it will re-encrypt it with a new key and send it to you, thus making the encryption useless. What's the protection against this, other than "don't worry, we won't introd…
I'm not sure about that either. The weakest link seems to be a national security letter to Keybase where they distribute a backdoored version of the FS driver to Alice, and adds the key of Eve to all messages also encrypted to Bob. However, Keybase can't just broadcast "Eve on twitter is Bob!" - the client gets that announcement and links you to the tweet that claims it, where you audit the twitter handle, key finger…
Anybody who's worried about being the target of a National Security Letter can just compile from source instead of using a binary distribution.
Re: Introducing the Keybase filesystem
#249Earlier quoted context omitted.
what confused me was how they say they are not a sync service. I am still confused.
Dropbox synchronizes files between your computer and their servers. Keybase stores the files on their servers and only downloads/uploads them "on demand". Think of your web browser accessing gmail.com versus running something like Thunderbird that downloads your mail locally. As a benefit, it's much simpler to implement - you don't need to work as hard to handle conflicts where two people made incompatible changes wh…
The gmail metaphor is a good one.
Unfortunately the FUSE model isn't as simple to implement as it might seem. For performance reasons we're going to have to accept writes locally and push to the server in the background, which means all the same conflict resolution logic needs to be there. (In our case "there" means the client; the server can't help us, because it doesn't have any keys.) It's not clear exactly how much we'll be able to do for you without an internet connection, but the files you've read recently at least will need to stay in cache somehow. Fun times :)
Re: Introducing the Keybase filesystem
#250I'm a little confused, where are the files hosted?