Would really love to see this upvoted more. This basic truth should be common knowledge for privacy-minded or security-minded technologists/developers. There are lots of reasons GSM won't/is hard to make work. What are the options? As more and more carriers in the USA provide wifi-dongles that are connected to 3G, maybe it's better to just do that, and move off making calls directly from your phone completely? For ex…
There are no secure smartphones
31–40 of 124 posts
Re: There are no secure smartphones
#32> For devices with cellular access, the baseband subsystem also utilizes its own similar process of secure booting with signed software and keys verified by the baseband processor. According to the iOS security white paper, the baseband firmware is part of the secure boot chain, and has its own secure boot chain. This allows me to assume it's very hard to inject or replace the the firmware with a malicious code. Whet…
It's very interesting to just download a baseband firmware (usually called radio.img) from a random Android forum, unpack it and run strings on the code you get. It'll usually be an ARM processor running a homebrew RTOS, which is concerning enough. When you search for NMEA and realize the baseband processor is running the GPS chip, that's when you are starting to get doubts. And when you finally realize theres a bunch of audio codecs and the baseband is controlling the microphones, that's when the full force of despair hits you. You don't own it, you don't control any part of it. Your Android doesn't either, it begs the baseband for a slice of its information.
Re: There are no secure smartphones
#33Or you can just use WIFI and turn the baseband off like I do. The cell companies are all crooks anyways (in the US), and I don't want to do business with them.
Doesn't the baseband control wifi too anyway? You should see the amount of things the SoC/baseband does.
In reality, the baseband should be connected more like a serial port (with some audio channels to the mic and speaker). In fact, it's treated very much that way in software - you interact with it by sending AT commands. But, as others have pointed out, it can send commands directly to the phone's CPU and access the phone's internal memory.
Re: There are no secure smartphones
#34The folks at http://neo900.org/ are well aware of this and that phone is designed accordingly (details at http://neo900.org/faq#privacy ). Hype-driven products like BlackPhone misrepresent their devices as being perfectly secure when this significant attack vector is completely unmitigated. On the Neo900, the modem is connected via USB (bus; there is no physical connector) which means it doesn't have DMA. There is no…
How many opportunities are there to work on secure communications software full time and still put food on the table?
Re: There are no secure smartphones
#35The folks at http://neo900.org/ are well aware of this and that phone is designed accordingly (details at http://neo900.org/faq#privacy ). Hype-driven products like BlackPhone misrepresent their devices as being perfectly secure when this significant attack vector is completely unmitigated. On the Neo900, the modem is connected via USB (bus; there is no physical connector) which means it doesn't have DMA. There is no…
> On the Neo900, the modem is connected via USB (bus; there is no physical connector) which means it doesn't have DMA. You'll find the modem on most smartphones is connected via USB - or rather its chip-to-chip version, HSIC. For SoCs where it's on-die - on the same bus/fabric - they will (if it's not an idiotic design) use an IOMMU of some sort, to prevent DMA from having access outside of its sandbox. Even if it's…
OTOH, on the device like Neo900 it is well-known what kind of device is connected to the internal bus and software stack (at least on Linux) can easily be advised to not accept anything that doesn't look and behave like the included modem should.
In a properly configured user OS, the modem would need to use some software vulnerability to exploit the USB stack, so the same principles apply there as with, say, OpenSSL, browser or the kernel. Secret zero-days aside, when some bug is found, it is patched and you upgrade the vulnerable component, just like on PC.
Re: There are no secure smartphones
#36> For devices with cellular access, the baseband subsystem also utilizes its own similar process of secure booting with signed software and keys verified by the baseband processor. According to the iOS security white paper, the baseband firmware is part of the secure boot chain, and has its own secure boot chain. This allows me to assume it's very hard to inject or replace the the firmware with a malicious code. Whet…
Re: There are no secure smartphones
#37Or you can just use WIFI and turn the baseband off like I do. The cell companies are all crooks anyways (in the US), and I don't want to do business with them.
1. Put ##4636## into the Dialer (or use any application available on the Market like 4636 — takes you to the same service screen)
2. Choose Phone Information
3. Press Turn off radio
(source) http://forum.xda-developers.com/showpost.php?s=c8b62d54e971b...
(more discussion) http://android.stackexchange.com/questions/7133/how-do-i-tur...
Re: There are no secure smartphones
#38Re: There are no secure smartphones
#39Would really love to see this upvoted more. This basic truth should be common knowledge for privacy-minded or security-minded technologists/developers. There are lots of reasons GSM won't/is hard to make work. What are the options? As more and more carriers in the USA provide wifi-dongles that are connected to 3G, maybe it's better to just do that, and move off making calls directly from your phone completely? For ex…