Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you have clean network path from your terminal to the dev vm, why need for either ProxyCommand or ForwardAgent - just ssh to the vm directly, no? Of course local, not forwarded ssh-agent on the terminal would be super-handy to avoid typing pass-phrase time and again; but that's different and independent from ForwardAgent.
I do ssh directly to the VM. It sits behind a VPN connection at aws. I need to make ssh connections from there to github. The key resides on a smartcard in my laptops usb slot. And that's where ssh-agent/ForwardAgent comes into play. I forward my local key to the remote VM.
OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
181–190 of 226 posts
Re: OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
#182 $ ssh -V
OpenSSH_5.3p1 OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013
So... not vulnerable? Posted article says: This affects OpenSSH versions 5.4 through 7.1.Re: OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
#183Earlier quoted context omitted.
It just sounds like a big code-base fuckup. They more or less admit it: "Server side was disabled/gutted for years already, but this aspect was surprisingly forgotten." Sounds like this was put in at one time, forgotten about, and the code lingered for a long time until someone pointed it out. SSH as a protocol is pretty crazy. Everyone loves it, but its a lot of things in one, which ironically goes against the unix…
Pretty sure this is OpenSSH only. PuTTY and SecureCRT, at least, are reported not to be affected.
Re: OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
#184Earlier quoted context omitted.
You can use a Yubikey NEO to handle key authentication on your computer's behalf: https://blog.habets.se/2013/02/GPG-and-SSH-with-Yubikey-NEO
Sure, but this capability isn't unique to Yubikey. The question was just worded confusingly. Really it's just "ssh key on a smart card".
Re: OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
#185Earlier quoted context omitted.
Interestingly I haven't been able to get the Roaming not allowed message to show on my client with or without the config option set.
Did you copy the whole line as "g ssh -v -T git@github.com 2>&1 | grep "Roaming debug1: Roaming not allowed by server"" ? I misread GP's command and made that mistake. The correct command is : ssh -v -T git@github.com 2>&1 | grep "Roaming"
Re: OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
#186So how does the exploit actually work? How can a malicious sshd actually use this to acquire the private key?
From what I can tell, if I accidentally SSH to the wrong server (or a compromised one), my private key can be obtained. I have no clue if that's actually the correct interpretation.
Re: OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
#187Earlier quoted context omitted.
Interestingly I haven't been able to get the Roaming not allowed message to show on my client with or without the config option set.
Did you copy the whole line as "g ssh -v -T git@github.com 2>&1 | grep "Roaming debug1: Roaming not allowed by server"" ? I misread GP's command and made that mistake. The correct command is : ssh -v -T git@github.com 2>&1 | grep "Roaming"
Re: OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
#188Someone tweeted this, the roaming code doesn't seem to be very well managed: https://twitter.com/marver/status/687644904575627264 Edit 1: Here's some relevant commits too https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-cvs&m=145278217421101&w=2 Edit 2: This mailing list post seems to discuss the vulnerable feature http://www.gossamer-threads.com/lists/openssh/dev/49018?do=p... Edit 3: Got a better description of actual impact of the bu…
So the real question is, can a MITM intercept connections to boxen you frequent to exploit this? Or is it limited to connecting to hostile honeypots?
Re: OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
#189While the bug doesn't expose a user to mitm attacks in general, am I correct in thinking that folks using "-o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no" have basically opened the door for that? https://github.com/search?q=-o+UserKnownHostsFile%3D%2Fdev%2...
Ughhh, that's insane.
Not really. This is for deploy systems which deploy to a trusted environment (for instance through VPN, network security etc.).
Re: OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
#190Earlier quoted context omitted.
What Theo (and other OpenBSD developers) have been saying all these years is that it's impossible to /not/ make mistakes, which is why sane design and exploit mitigations are important. Mad ? Maybe, I wouldn't know. On the other hand, I bet he's really glad all that effort to have ASLR by default was made, because it makes it more difficult for an attacker to exploit vulnerabilites such as this one.
ASLR makes exploits more difficult as long as you have true randomness. It is just a mitigation ... for another problem. In this case the elephant in the room is stack injection and dynamic libraries. If processes where confined to a well known address space that was self contained ASLR would be useless.. But dependency management would be hellish. Back to the case. OpenSSH has been openly criticize by 9plan teams fo…