Testing the ssh client config workaround: ssh -v user@localhost 2>&1 >/dev/null | grep -i 'roaming' returns "debug1: Roaming not allowed by server" when vulnerable, and nothing when not. YMMV, only tested on a few machines, etc.
OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
101–110 of 226 posts
Re: OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
#102Use the workaround immediately and patch ASAP, both on your workstation and across your infrastructure where SSH is used, which can be in surprising places. SSH is designed so that, even if you connect to an evil host, the host only learns your public key, not your private key. This leaks your private key to an evil host. You might think "I only SSH into boxes that I own, so I'm good, right?", but if you in the futur…
Re: OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
#103Earlier quoted context omitted.
The second one. There is no /etc/ssh on a stock Mac. (Although there is a /private/etc/ssh_config on mine, without the intervening ssh dir)
Hue? There is one on mine. Maybe mine's different because I upgraded from 10.9 to 10.10 to 10.11 whereas you might have started with a later version (or an earlier one)?
FWIW I am on 10.10.5 not 10.11. Maybe there's a change in 10.11. (The article the grandparent links is focused on 10.10 so I assumed that was in the scope of this discussion.)
PS are you on homebrew? maybe homebrew adds it.
Re: OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
#104Use the workaround immediately and patch ASAP, both on your workstation and across your infrastructure where SSH is used, which can be in surprising places. SSH is designed so that, even if you connect to an evil host, the host only learns your public key, not your private key. This leaks your private key to an evil host. You might think "I only SSH into boxes that I own, so I'm good, right?", but if you in the futur…
This may be a start: Host * IdentityFile ~/.ssh/%h Comment: One key per host, named after the host you connect to
Re: OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
#105Re: OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
#106Use the workaround immediately and patch ASAP, both on your workstation and across your infrastructure where SSH is used, which can be in surprising places. SSH is designed so that, even if you connect to an evil host, the host only learns your public key, not your private key. This leaks your private key to an evil host. You might think "I only SSH into boxes that I own, so I'm good, right?", but if you in the futur…
I really hope that sysadmins/people are not using the same private key for work and pleasure. And for that matter, the same key at work for DEV/TEST/PROD. But you're probably right that a lot of them are.
Re: OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
#107Use the workaround immediately and patch ASAP, both on your workstation and across your infrastructure where SSH is used, which can be in surprising places. SSH is designed so that, even if you connect to an evil host, the host only learns your public key, not your private key. This leaks your private key to an evil host. You might think "I only SSH into boxes that I own, so I'm good, right?", but if you in the futur…
This may be a start: Host * IdentityFile ~/.ssh/%h Comment: One key per host, named after the host you connect to
IdentitiesOnly yes
if I remember the config setting correct. Note however that this only limits the offered keys during the authentication phase. If you use AgentForwarding, this still has the entire keyring available afterwards.Re: OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
#108Re: OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
#109Re: OpenSSH: client bug CVE-2016-0777
#110printf 'Host *\nUseRoaming no\n' >> /etc/ssh/ssh_config