Live data from Hacker News

British nukes were only protected by bike locks

bbc.co.uk

11–20 of 32 posts

Re: British nukes were only protected by bike locks

#11

It's been known widely for some time that on every British nuclear-armed sub, there's a safe, and in that safe another safe, and in that second safe a note from the Prime Minister commanding the sub on what to do in the event that the motherland should be wiped out in an attack while they were away. That would mean it is impossible that they need some sort of special code, as if they did, that code would have to be a…

Ira Glass did an insert on this bizarre 007-esque practice in last week's This American Life podcast.

Re: British nukes were only protected by bike locks

#12
post #11

It's been known widely for some time that on every British nuclear-armed sub, there's a safe, and in that safe another safe, and in that second safe a note from the Prime Minister commanding the sub on what to do in the event that the motherland should be wiped out in an attack while they were away. That would mean it is impossible that they need some sort of special code, as if they did, that code would have to be a…

Ira Glass did an insert on this bizarre 007-esque practice in last week's This American Life podcast.

The "007" thing makes sense from the standpoint of preventing rogue launches. It's not intended to prevent the missiles from being launched without command authorization. Instead, no single person has all the information needed to launch, so there must be at least two people in on it.

Re: British nukes were only protected by bike locks

#13
post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Ira Glass did an insert on this bizarre 007-esque practice in last week's This American Life podcast.

The "007" thing makes sense from the standpoint of preventing rogue launches. It's not intended to prevent the missiles from being launched without command authorization. Instead, no single person has all the information needed to launch, so there must be at least two people in on it.

It is bizarre because what is the point in having a secret instruction to a submarine captain when his home country is completely and utterly destroyed by nukes. Consider that everyone that could possibly benefit from such an instruction are no longer in existence.

Re: British nukes were only protected by bike locks

#14
post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The "007" thing makes sense from the standpoint of preventing rogue launches. It's not intended to prevent the missiles from being launched without command authorization. Instead, no single person has all the information needed to launch, so there must be at least two people in on it.

It is bizarre because what is the point in having a secret instruction to a submarine captain when his home country is completely and utterly destroyed by nukes. Consider that everyone that could possibly benefit from such an instruction are no longer in existence.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutual_assured_destruction

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fail-deadly

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead_Hand_(nuclear_war)

Re: British nukes were only protected by bike locks

#15
post #14
post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is bizarre because what is the point in having a secret instruction to a submarine captain when his home country is completely and utterly destroyed by nukes. Consider that everyone that could possibly benefit from such an instruction are no longer in existence.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutual_assured_destruction http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fail-deadly http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead_Hand_(nuclear_war)

Right, but the actual mechanism of the secret-message-in-a-safe-in-a-safe makes no difference to the well-known game theory of nuclear retaliation. That is what makes it an odd practice. No other country does this because it serves no purpose.

Re: British nukes were only protected by bike locks

#16
post #15
post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutual_assured_destruction http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fail-deadly http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead_Hand_(nuclear_war)

Right, but the actual mechanism of the secret-message-in-a-safe-in-a-safe makes no difference to the well-known game theory of nuclear retaliation. That is what makes it an odd practice. No other country does this because it serves no purpose.

Perhaps not - but I rather like the idea of four personal hand written notes in our four missile subs, which are hopefully never opened and destroyed when the PM changes.

I rather hope they say "Don't fire your missiles at anyone, you will just make things worse".

Re: British nukes were only protected by bike locks

#18

It's been known widely for some time that on every British nuclear-armed sub, there's a safe, and in that safe another safe, and in that second safe a note from the Prime Minister commanding the sub on what to do in the event that the motherland should be wiped out in an attack while they were away. That would mean it is impossible that they need some sort of special code, as if they did, that code would have to be a…

The thing that people don't seem to grasp here is that a single Trident missile is capable of carrying 10 warheads and is capable of striking 13,000 km away. This means that with a full compliment of missiles, a Vanguard submarine surfacing in Anchorage Alaska would be capable of striking any location in the US (and I believe possibly even Puerto Rico).

A false launch would essentially be capable of ending the world. It was estimated that a small-scale nuclear war of ~50 'Little Boy' air-bursts would have serious global complications. Being that a single warhead on the Trident can detonate at 500KT (25 times a 'little boy'), a single missile launch is equivalent to 5 megatons, all of which could be ground-burst and force more dust into the atmosphere. At 160 warheads and 80 megatons of destruction, the world is essentially over (as we know it) long before a retaliation has ever been launched.

People's response to this never grabs the situation. It always seems to be that people think a false launch could destroy a city like New York, when in reality a false launch from a ballistic missile submarine could easily end the world.

I realize the risks inherent in a lack of safeguards in the Trident program. However, being from the UK and knowing full well that in the event of a nuclear war, my entire homeland will be a nuclear wasteland (too many primary targets in a small area, I know for a fact I lived in between 3 primaries when I was growing up: major harbor, major RAF base, Army training base). So the UK has little chance to approve a nuclear launch after the attack, unless the authorization can be approved by a UK overseas base, fail-safes are just failures in the face of an attack. Fail-safes are intended to prevent unauthorized launches, however for the UK they're also going to prevent authorized launches.

I'm unsure what troubles me more, a poor ability to safeguard the system or the inability for justice if some psycho warlord decides to destroy my homeland.

The UK isn't in the US's situation where a nuclear launch can mean authorization can be granted by a chief of staff or high ranking general before everyone has been obliterated. The US would take potentially hours for a complete destruction, the UK on the other hand can easily be nuked into non-existence inside of a half-hour. A surprise attack doesn't leave much reaction time for the UK like it does the US.

Re: British nukes were only protected by bike locks

#19
> However, the Royal Navy argued that its officers could be trusted and: "It would be invidious to suggest... that senior Service officers may, in difficult circumstances, act in defiance of their clear orders."

Even by the standards of a world gone mad, these people are #@!%ing lunatics.

Re: British nukes were only protected by bike locks

#20

Comments here http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/british_nuclea... suggest the US just used 111111 as their code. (citation needed)

Actually 00000000, according to Bruce Blair's first-hand account. He has been one of the go-to authors on nuclear weapons control issues for many years. (Received a MacArthur Prize for it, in fact.)

See http://www.cdi.org/blair/permissive-action-links.cfm.

Post reply on HN