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Bayes's Theorem: What's the Big Deal?

blogs.scientificamerican.com

151–160 of 267 posts

Re: Bayes's Theorem: What's the Big Deal?

#151
post #123

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's stuck in the reality you define - you can add the last hand, all cards seen so far, and the color of people's jackets to the model if you so please.

Your still stuck with: You observed X/Y. How accurate is your count. How accurate is your estimate of accuracy. How accurate is your estimate of accuracy of your accuracy estimate. ... recursive infinity.

Did you account for the possibility you're dreaming, or in a simulation? Or in a simulation of a simulation and so on? Yes, that's the curse of real numbers. In practice you set a limit of precision required, and a threshold of evidence you need to tell you that the precision should be more precise. You can get quite far with Newtonian physics without considering the corrections of general relativity, you can get quite far in engineering by assuming linearity by only expanding the Taylor transform of a non-linear expression by a bit instead of infinitely, and you can do a lot by assuming probabilistic independence of your card counting from what's going on on Pluto right now.

Re: Bayes's Theorem: What's the Big Deal?

#153

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not that huge advocate of LW. I used to frequent the site, I read the Sequences and generally liked what I saw. RE parts you quoted. Of course they look bad, because they've been ripped out from context. Race: http://lesswrong.com/lw/kk/why_are_individual_iq_differences... This is an article asking, to quote: "But why is it that the rest of the world seems to think that individual genetic differences are okay, wh…

I guess I just disagree with you that they're taken out of context? 1. Bond posits Yudkowski thinks that racism is mostly due to genetic difference, and not about the deliberate, mostly political disenfranchisement of minorities. You say this is a wrong because his appraisal of the situation as being caused by genetic disparities is benevolent, and that he wants to work to "fix" it. These aren't in contradiction- to…

"1. Bond posits Yudkowski thinks that racism is mostly due to genetic difference, and not about the deliberate, mostly political disenfranchisement of minorities."

You don't need to take the author's word for it. Look at the article itself.

The article is not about the question of whether race affects intelligence. It's saying that that question is much less important than the fact that individuals have different IQ levels regardless of race. At least in the context of this article, which is asking whether "God is fair".

To make it crystal clear - Yudkowsky is saying:

1. Forget race. There are clear, obvious, and gigantic genetic differences in individuals which cause differences in intelligence.

2. This is "unjust".

3. We should be upset about this, and try to fix it.

That's all he's saying in that article - it is not at all racist.

If you think otherwise, please - quote the relevant part of the article and explain yourself.

Re: Bayes's Theorem: What's the Big Deal?

#154

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But these aren't examples so much as vague caricatures. The subject matter that LessWrong considers is certainly unusual, but that alone should not be enough to call it arbitrary, questionable or outlandish.

http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Roko%27s_basilisk

That's the best you got?

Re: Bayes's Theorem: What's the Big Deal?

#155

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I've been saying this for years, and this is a large reason why I find the LessWrong folks to be almost entirely full of it. Their inability to come up with accurate priors is completely lost on many of the folks who follow this kind of thinking. I assume you're saying LessWrong folks are more prone to miscalculating priors than most. Could you give some examples of this?

The LessWrong folks aren’t obviously better or worse at calculating priors than anyone else. The “problem” is that their hobby is spending their free time considering outlandish scenarios, inventing arbitrary assumptions related to such scenarios, drawing questionable conclusions, and then convincing themselves that because they used logic and math, their analysis must be correct. Plenty of other folks who spend time…

I've been saying t forever. Thanks for putting it so succinctly. LessWrong is a cult of people who want to be smart and they've essentially found a community in which certain assumptions and hypothetical scenarios combined with mathematical concepts make them think they've found the answer to everything in the Universe.

They're no better than any other cult in my book. The problem is that it's only going to get worse with the advances in AI that are going on. Yudkowski has managed to convince some wealthy people to fund his so called research and we have OpenAI operating in the same waters which somehow gives LW people more legitimacy.

Re: Bayes's Theorem: What's the Big Deal?

#156
post #124

I think Stephen Bond did some excellent takedowns of the identity politics that has arisen around Bayes' Theorem back in the day. I wonder where he's at these days. The Cult of Bayes' Theorem http://laurencetennant.com/bonds/cultofbayes.html > One of Yudkowsky's constant refrains, appropriating language from Frank Herbert's Dune, is "Politics is the Mind-killer". Under this rallying cry, Lesswrong insiders attempt to…

This was posted on the Less Wrong Facebook page recently, where the reaction was mostly "There's no substantive criticism in this article, only mudslinging". Other reactions include "I was raised in an actual cult, and the differences I see include that LW encourages debate and EY is frequently criticized." Some commenters did agree with at least parts of the article, though. Even the ones that agreed said it seemed…

I don't want this to get too meta, but I like the style of your post. If you're bored, could you tell me what you think about this article?

http://gawker.com/on-smarm-1476594977

Re: Bayes's Theorem: What's the Big Deal?

#157

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I've been saying this for years, and this is a large reason why I find the LessWrong folks to be almost entirely full of it. Their inability to come up with accurate priors is completely lost on many of the folks who follow this kind of thinking. I assume you're saying LessWrong folks are more prone to miscalculating priors than most. Could you give some examples of this?

The LessWrong folks aren’t obviously better or worse at calculating priors than anyone else. The “problem” is that their hobby is spending their free time considering outlandish scenarios, inventing arbitrary assumptions related to such scenarios, drawing questionable conclusions, and then convincing themselves that because they used logic and math, their analysis must be correct. Plenty of other folks who spend time…

So I'm a LessWronger and know a bit about the "movement", and think you are misunderstanding what "LessWrongers think". Obviously not all LessWrongers think the same thing at all, but I'm talking about the average position of the people who believe AI safety should be worked towards.

I'd love to explain the basic position, and tell me where you disagree with it. This is the basic position:

1. Intelligence can be created, because there is nothing "special"/"magical" about humans, and our intelligence was eventually created.

2. At some point, humanity will create an "artificial general intelligence". (Since we'll just keep improving science and technology, and there's no fundamental reason why this won't eventually allow us to create an intelligence.

3. "Artificial general intelligence" basically means a machine that is capable of achieving its goals, where the goals and methods it uses to achieve them are general. I.e. not "is able to play chess really well", but rather "is able to e.g. cure cancer".

4. For various reasons, once we have an artificial intelligence, it will likely become much smarter than us. (There are many reasons and debates about this, but let's just assume that since it's a computer, we can run it much faster than a human. If you dispute this point, we can talk about it more).

5. Something being much more intelligent than us means that, in effect, it has almost absolute power over what happens in the world (like we are basically all-powerful from the vantage point of monkeys, and their fate is totally in our hands).

6. (This is, I believe, the main point): Something being "intelligent" in the sense we're talking about doesn't say anything about what its goals are, or about how its mind works. We're used to everything that's intelligent being a human being, therefore the way our mind works is basically the same across every human. With an artificial intelligence, it will work completely differently from our mind. So if we "tell it" something like "cure cancer", it won't have our intuition and background knowledge to understand that we mean "but don't turn half the world into a giant computer in order to cure it".

7. Combine the two points above, and you get the large idea - whatever the goals of the AI will be, it will achieve them. Its goals won't, by default, be ones that are good for humanity, if only because we have no idea how to program our "value system" into a computer.

8. Therefore, we need to start working on making sure that when AI does come, it's safe. Even if we create an AI, the "extra" problem of making it safe is both hard, and we have absolutely no idea how to do it right now. We have no idea how long AI will take, or how long figuring out safety will take, but since this is a humanity-threatening problem, we should devote at least some resources to working on it right now.

That's it, that's the basic idea. I'd love to hear which part you disagree with. I totally understand that not everyone will agree on some of the final details like, e.g., how many resources we should effectively devote right now (you might even claim it's 0 because anything we do now won't be useful).

But I think the overall reasoning is sound, and would love to hear an intelligent disagreement.

Re: Bayes's Theorem: What's the Big Deal?

#158
post #5

> In many cases, estimating the prior is just guesswork, allowing subjective factors to creep into your calculations. You might be guessing the probability of something that--unlike cancer—does not even exist, such as strings, multiverses, inflation or God. You might then cite dubious evidence to support your dubious belief. In this way, Bayes’ theorem can promote pseudoscience and superstition as well as reason. Oh…

> If nothing else, this provides inspiration for me to quit procrastinating on my "ASK ME ABOUT ROKO'S BASILISK" novelty t-shirt idea. Can you tell us the story about that party when you got so drunk and started yelling in anger at a poor random dude? Except you weren't drunk at all and the dude behaved like an asshole, but nobody cares about the truth since you're a nerd and you look cute when you're sad that we're…

Can you unpack that strange analogy a little, please?

Re: Bayes's Theorem: What's the Big Deal?

#159
post #81

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is a general argument against statistics . Or math, in general. Yes, dressing your bullshit in math can make people believe you more, but it doesn't change the fact that you're lying. Are we supposed to stop using math for good because evil people are using it for evil?

No, it's an argument against using statistics without first considering the strength of your data.

Then you should take the Bayesian side, because Bayesians look at the data first, and they take their data as given rather than taking a null hypothesis as given. They don't just blindly go off and run a test (which assumes a particular prior implicitly that may be wildly inappropriate) and see what it says about the likelihood of their already observed data being generated by the test's assumed data generator.

Re: Bayes's Theorem: What's the Big Deal?

#160
post #72
post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I guess a hard-line frequentist (if such a person exists) would counter that you can't assign probabilities to hypotheses or fixed parameters. Then Bayes's theorem (and every other statement about probability) is true only when applied to statements about how often a certain event will occur. But of course, most people do assign probabilities to hypotheses and fixed parameters, even if only informally. Bayesian proba…

I think it's strange this sudden comeback of a theory that was dismissed more than 70 years ago by Fisher and many others, but no one, as far as I know, cares to explain why Fisher was wrong and why the theory is right. It makes me very suspicious, to be honest.

Actually, many Bayesian textbooks cover that. Try Jaynes - Probability Theory: The Logic of Science.
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