I'm glad to see that this information has now been publicly disclosed. In July 2015, we suffered a compromise at PagerDuty via the Linode Manager. I hope that we can provide a bit more of an official in-depth post-mortem of our compromise, but I'd be happy to disclose some of the details here. Using the access gained within the Linode Manager, the attacker reset the root password on a few systems, and used Lish to ga…
Security Notification and Linode Manager Password Reset
51–60 of 173 posts
Re: Security Notification and Linode Manager Password Reset
#52Earlier quoted context omitted.
If the Linode Manager database only stores the hash, how would they know the password? How did you find out about the illicit login?
> If the Linode Manager database only stores the hash, how would they know the password? Hashes can be turned back into plain text, it is just computationally expensive to do so. Hashing only slows down an attack (and or increases the cost), it doesn't not mitigate one. In particular if the hashes aren't salted then a rainbow table is an extremely effective way of breaking all of the hashes concurrently. The main met…
Re: Security Notification and Linode Manager Password Reset
#53Re: Security Notification and Linode Manager Password Reset
#54Re: Security Notification and Linode Manager Password Reset
#55Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yeah.
How exactly did you get caught? opsec/comsec violation?
The only evidence the prosecution had against me were a list of compromised sites and several coldfusion 0days I had in my possession.
They could never prove that I generated the list of compromised sites, but the judges felt that the possession of said list was enough evidence to convict me.
We would've appealed but there was no point as the sentence was essentially nothing.
Re: Security Notification and Linode Manager Password Reset
#56Why the hell have they not emailed their customers about this! This is not the kind of thing I want to learn from HN.
Re: Security Notification and Linode Manager Password Reset
#57The page was slashdotted for me, here's a copy: "Effective immediately, Linode Manager passwords have been expired. You will be prompted to set a new password on your next login. We regret this inconvenience, however this is a necessary precaution. "A security investigation into the unauthorized login of three accounts has led us to the discovery of two Linode.com user credentials on an external machine. This implies…
Sadly I trust them as far as I can throw them, and we moved everything important from them to AWS a few years back. We had left a few static sites there but after the shenanigans over the holidays, we're moving our remaining stuff. Sad. We spent >$10k/month with them for a while, before their shit started falling apart. They didn't appear to care at all when we left, so I suppose they have an awful lot of large custo…
At what point should Linode start thinking damage control? DDoS, breaches, lack of transparency...
Re: Security Notification and Linode Manager Password Reset
#58I'm glad to see that this information has now been publicly disclosed. In July 2015, we suffered a compromise at PagerDuty via the Linode Manager. I hope that we can provide a bit more of an official in-depth post-mortem of our compromise, but I'd be happy to disclose some of the details here. Using the access gained within the Linode Manager, the attacker reset the root password on a few systems, and used Lish to ga…
Keeping logins of ex-employees on 3rd party systems is a no-no though I admit full removal might pose some hurdles.
Re: Security Notification and Linode Manager Password Reset
#59I'm glad to see that this information has now been publicly disclosed. In July 2015, we suffered a compromise at PagerDuty via the Linode Manager. I hope that we can provide a bit more of an official in-depth post-mortem of our compromise, but I'd be happy to disclose some of the details here. Using the access gained within the Linode Manager, the attacker reset the root password on a few systems, and used Lish to ga…
Nice writeup. Keeping logins of ex-employees on 3rd party systems is a no-no though I admit full removal might pose some hurdles.
The honeypot user would not have been able to access the account had the credentials been valid, but based on the information given by Linode we did see someone attempt to log in as that user only once around the time of the compromise.
Re: Security Notification and Linode Manager Password Reset
#60Earlier quoted context omitted.
> If the Linode Manager database only stores the hash, how would they know the password? Hashes can be turned back into plain text, it is just computationally expensive to do so. Hashing only slows down an attack (and or increases the cost), it doesn't not mitigate one. In particular if the hashes aren't salted then a rainbow table is an extremely effective way of breaking all of the hashes concurrently. The main met…
This only works if the input password has low entropy. You would think that people using Linode are savvy enough to be using long, randomly generated passwords.
If you're generating every single possible password up to e.g. 8 characters the password's quality doesn't matter, only the length does.