https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10722633
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https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10722633
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Based upon the amount of spam I receive from Yahoo! mail systems, I'm not confident in their ability to detect "attacks by suspected state-sponsored actors" as they apparently don't even have the ability to detect phished/compromised accounts.
Based upon the amount of spam I receive from Yahoo! mail systems, I'm not confident in their ability to detect "attacks by suspected state-sponsored actors" as they apparently don't even have the ability to detect phished/compromised accounts.
How do Yahoo, Google, Facebook, or others distinguish between state-sponsored actors and non-state-sponsored actors?
State sponsored don't do it for the money.
Just what middle-America needs, notification that the russkies are coming for their baby pictures.
How do Yahoo, Google, Facebook, or others distinguish between state-sponsored actors and non-state-sponsored actors?
I want one of these companies to define state-sponsored actors? It's great if one is a dissenter in Egypt and the authorities there go after their Yahoo! account but what about a US citizen's account being attacked by the FBI or NSA?
How do Yahoo, Google, Facebook, or others distinguish between state-sponsored actors and non-state-sponsored actors?
These TTPs may consist of known attack infrastructure, email payloads, even things as simple as an email subject line if the attacker leaves it fairly static. They may also be as complicated as artifacts of dynamic analysis of malware, software engineering techniques and tools, language use, etc.
Attribution to state actors comes via similar techniques, generally tying attacks back to infrastructure known to be owned by state agencies or companies operated by the same. The line between state actors and higher-end criminal groups can be very blurry, both in that attribution may be difficult and in that the groups actually overlap in many areas. But still, you can often make a pretty confident guess.
These attribution techniques are well-established in the security industry, and I'm not surprised to see these big providers starting to automate it where possible.
In context, and in the security industry in general, "state actor" refers to active (although often broadly cast) penetration attempts by groups thought to be operated by foreign governments. These groups do not have significant surveillance capabilities, so they're trying to build it by doing things like getting access to the email of potentially interesting people, often via credential stealing malware or plain old phishing. Their methods are often not particularly sophisticated, but they're more persistent and better funded than most other threat actors. On the other hand, their methods sometimes are very sophisticated, so it's good to detect a problem as early as possible, as Yahoo is trying to help users do.
Based upon the amount of spam I receive from Yahoo! mail systems, I'm not confident in their ability to detect "attacks by suspected state-sponsored actors" as they apparently don't even have the ability to detect phished/compromised accounts.
At the risk of stating the obvious, a From or Reply-To address of something@yahoo.com doesn't necessarily mean that Yahoo had anything to do with the message.
Receiving SPF, DKIM validated spam from Yahoo's email systems, then discovering there's absolutely no way in hell to kick it back to them, sours one rather rapidly.
Trying to send mail to Yahoo has been roughly equally annoying for about as long.
A big source of confusion on this kind of thing is that the HN crowd tends to see "state actor" and think "pervasive surveillance (by the NSA)". In context, and in the security industry in general, "state actor" refers to active (although often broadly cast) penetration attempts by groups thought to be operated by foreign governments. These groups do not have significant surveillance capabilities, so they're trying t…