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Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

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Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#541

Earlier quoted context omitted.

apologies - didn't notice you weren't OP. IMO, the "no true Scotsman" is implied (might be unintentional)

The general theme of the thread seems to be security industry people, like tptacek (or commenters self-identifying as being in the industry), expressing concern with the researcher's actions (while still admitting Facebook didn't handle it well). The primarily negative comments don't seem to have a specific affiliation tied to them. And given HN's demographic, odds are much more of them are developers than are infose…

I disagree; this is non customer, non-financial data which is often considered fair game because downloading data is useful to locate many security bugs. Source code or config data is a prime target, but so is network diagrams etc.

Defense in depth means every defense needs to be validated not just the outer layers.

PS: Further, if FB says they know about a bug then anything he downloaded could easily be in the wild and should be investigated.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#542

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The policy reads clear enough to me to warrant a huge reward. Adding additional conditions after the fact is dealing in bad faith.

most RCE bugs can be compounded into major data dumps. That doesn't make each individual RCE a million dollar bug.

Every RCE that could have been sold on the black market for a million dollars is worth almost the same reward (modulo the advantage of being legal).

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#543
post #20

In stories like this, try first to remember that Facebook isn't a single entity with a single set of opinions, but rather a huge collection of people who came to the company at different times and different points in their career. Alex Stamos is a good person† who has been doing vulnerability research since the 1990s. He's built a reputation for understanding and defending vulnerability researchers. He hasn't been at…

If the researcher didn't try to find what he could do with those AWS keys, they would likely be still valid. It's conceivable that some other people have found them too and did the same the researcher did, only kept everything to themselves. Thus, if the researcher didn't do the thing you consider bad, users of instagram would currently be more vulnerable. Why is then the thing the researcher did bad?

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#544

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The problem that Alex is skimming over here is that if Wes got access to this data, you have to ask yourself - WHO ELSE GOT THE DATA? If Alex knows anything about his job he should know that he has to refresh all those keys even if Wes didn't report it or say anything. The diff between Wes and everyone else is Wes just explained to Facebook how completely screwed they are. Alex is just pissed because Wes made it blun…

Or... one could actually read the response article: "This bug has been fixed, the affected keys have been rotated, and we have no evidence that Wes or anybody else accessed any user data. "

'We DO NOT have evidence that X happened' is evidence of incompetence.

The competent responses would be:

"We DO have evidence that X DID NOT happen", or

"We DO have evidence that X DID happen".

A bag of rocks also has "no evidence that Wes or anybody else accessed any user data". Would you trust a bag of rocks with your computer security?

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#545

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You make "downloading" sound more sinister than it is. Downloading something from the network is the only way to see that it's there or know what it is. There is no substantial difference between downloading and viewing in this case.

He kept it for a month. That is different than looking at it.

And how long does your browser cache the pages and assets you've looked at?

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#546

Thank you to everybody who cautioned against judgment before hearing the whole story. Here is my response: https://www.facebook.com/notes/alex-stamos/bug-bounty-ethics...

Quite frankly I'm not surprised Wes is sour about how this was handled and the amount granted as bounty.

It's very rare for a single vulnerability to grant you keys to the kingdom. If you check pwn2own vast majority of the hacks leverage more than one. Most major attacks start with a small bug.

The real severity of the vulnerability is how far can it be pushed to broaden the scope. In this case that admin panel was just an entry point to a whole chain of security SNAFUs (aws keys in files at a multi-billion-dollar internet company, seriously?).

To reiterate, he got access to: - source code - aws keys - plethora of 3rd party platform keys - a bunch of private keys - user data

This might not be the million dollar bug, but close.

Just thing about what an actual attacker could have done with it: - login as / impersonate ANY instagram account - impersonate whole instagram (code + ssl keys!) - inject malware into instagram app and sign it with your keys - download tons of user data - wreck havoc in aws (possibly expanding what he has access to - we don't know what else he would have been able to access had he spent weeks not hours exploring).

This is not a missing permission check allowing you to delete other peoples photos. This is huge and based of that credit and significantly higher bounty is due.

Aside from that the handling of the whole matter was not good: - if your policy is not precise interpret it to your disadvantage. you screwed up not making it clear - contacting his boss should only happen (if at all) after he has been asked the same account - the post about "bug bounty ethics" misses the point. Following your logic heartbleed investigation should have ended when someone discovered a buffer over-read without exploring where that leads.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#547
post #410

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Downloading data is where he crossed the line and what I meant by hostage: "Wes was not happy with the amount we offered him, and responded with a message explaining that he had downloaded data from S3 using the AWS key..."

You make "downloading" sound more sinister than it is. Downloading something from the network is the only way to see that it's there or know what it is. There is no substantial difference between downloading and viewing in this case.

> "With the newly obtained AWS key... I queued up several buckets to download, and went to bed for the night."

This isn't about whether viewing files on an internet is technically downloading them; this is about retrieving files of enough size and quantity that you have to queue them up for an overnight download.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#548

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is, of course, Facebook's narrative which conflict's with Wes's. One obvious hole I can see in Facebook's story is that they insinuate that Wes broke back into the server after they disputed the bounty. If this were true, they did nothing in response to the problems Wes found for over a month. If you look at Wes's timeline, he says access to the server was no longer possible a few days after he filed the second…

This whole thing is silly. Facebook (or any other tech company) have a lot of flexibility and hardly any accountability in defining what a "million dollar bug" is. You really can't believe they are going to just hand you over 1m because you think it is a 1m bug. It very well may be but in the end facebook will be the one deciding the value of said bug and you will have nothing to do with their decision so assume they…

No, the free market decides the value of the bug. You can either pay that value to a white hat to find it or wait til a black hat sells it.

Facebook has now demonstrated that they will not only not pay you, but they will attacking you publicly, slander you, and threaten you. Now what does that mean for the next hacker coming along? Someone who is clean and wants to stay clean will avoid Facebook. Someone who isn't will realize that Facebook is now an easier target because of the clean guys staying away.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#549

Earlier quoted context omitted.

apologies - didn't notice you weren't OP. IMO, the "no true Scotsman" is implied (might be unintentional)

The general theme of the thread seems to be security industry people, like tptacek (or commenters self-identifying as being in the industry), expressing concern with the researcher's actions (while still admitting Facebook didn't handle it well). The primarily negative comments don't seem to have a specific affiliation tied to them. And given HN's demographic, odds are much more of them are developers than are infose…

This. Literally every single person who identified themselves as in the security fields that I saw said the researcher went too far.

What's really getting to me is the overwhelming number of responses containing idea that everything that isn't explicitly banned is permitted, despite the recipient saying "No" (even indirectly/without justification) at some point. How to deal with the grey area of consent is something that every adult should know, and it's worrying to me that so many here seem to feel entitled to whatever they can take as long as it wasn't explicitly forbidden.

Obviously FB should update their policy, but at the same time it's important that we as the community use this as an opportunity to learn and discuss where the implicit boundaries are, where one needs clear-cut agreement to proceed.

Consent is sexy.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#550
post #152

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Surely a competent technology company would realize the using creds that were stored on a known-compromised server is bad and change them immediately, right?

Without having a position in this debate myself: I think that's not quite fair. My understanding is this: They got a report that a server can be compromised and fixed that vulnerability. Unbeknownst the reporter grabbed a huge amount of (remote! not on that server, btw) data to play with. Later the reporter returns to Facebook and says 'Btw, I got all these valuable pieces of information and have those for quite a wh…

That's fair, but it implies that at no point did FB ask themselves "what would someone who exploited this vulnerability have access to?" If they had, they would have realized they were completely owned before the researcher pointed it out to them and taken steps to fix it (changing keys, etc.) At that point the researcher would be the least of their worries, and they would have tried to figure out if anyone else had completely owned them.

However, since they were unable to figure out that the friendly researcher owned them until he told them we now know that FB itself doesn't know who has their data.

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