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Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

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Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#441
post #362
post #235

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think the root cause of the problem is the unclear policy by FB. Privilege escalation can be hard to catch, and can be a separate bug in and of itself, even if it requires a separate exploit to get the initial privileges. The published policy didn't say anything about not doing what he did. I'm not going to argue that what he did should or shouldn't be ok, but FB has no control over what other people do. Yeah, mayb…

Usually serious security issues requires some kind of escalation, and escalation probably requires, at some point, exfiltration of (non personal) data. If the rules of the program are that restrictive I don't know how many serious bugs will be found by "ethical" hackers...

That might not be the point. The point might be to allow the intersection between what is palatable for the company and what serious exploits white hat hackers can come up with.

No company wants to include in their privacy policy that anyone can legally access and download your data if they are trying to perform exploits on the system.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#442
@secalex I believe that the researcher clearly fulfilled the primary objective of bug bounty programs by exposing a weakness of yours which you, inspite of having large and competent teams, weren't aware of and had not sealed yet. And he did nothing to use that information with a malicious intent.

Your actions are detrimental to your relations to such good mannered external security researchers who are helping you keeping you infrastructure safe from the bad guys. You should have been a little more sensitive and a lot more generous that you have been.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#443
post #340

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I told Jay that we couldn't allow Wes to set a precedent that anybody can exfiltrate unnecessary amounts of data and call it a part of legitimate bug research, and that I wanted to keep this out of the hands of the lawyers on both sides. I did not threaten legal action against Synack or Wes.... In case it isn't clear, most people will interpret "I want to keep this out of the hands of lawyers" exactly as a threat to…

"I want to keep this out of the hands of lawyers" is almost universally understood to mean "please do what I say so that I don't have to sue you, which is what I will do if you do not comply".

Maybe someday the response to this sort of threat will be "In the interests of sharing, I already passed on this information to your favorite class action law firm and the media. It's already in the hands of lawyers and your company is already being sued."

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#444

Thank you to everybody who cautioned against judgment before hearing the whole story. Here is my response: https://www.facebook.com/notes/alex-stamos/bug-bounty-ethics...

> The fact that AWS keys can be used to access S3 is expected behavior and would not be considered a security flaw in itself.

Isn't it a security flaw that a single AWS key was able to access all of Instagram's data?

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#445

Thank you to everybody who cautioned against judgment before hearing the whole story. Here is my response: https://www.facebook.com/notes/alex-stamos/bug-bounty-ethics...

Let's take a step back here: Facebook threatened to have a security analyst arrested for demonstrating and promptly disclosing the full extent of a serious exploit in a non-destructive manner. Whatever other behavior he engaged in that was unnecessary or ineligible for the bug bounty program, that's incredibly unethical on your part. Especially so, because you clearly didn't believe he was going to do any damage to your system or you would've actually called the FBI instead of someone he worked with.

So, you just wanted to cause him reputational damage and personal problems as an act of petty retaliation. You're right on some of the technical issues here, but in terms of ethics, your behavior has been far worse than his. I don't think you realize how much long-term damage you're doing to your relationship with the wider security community by threatening to jail people who were at no point acting maliciously and at no point caused any damage.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#446

Earlier quoted context omitted.

$ echo | openssl s_client -connect www.instagram.com:443 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -dates notBefore=Apr 14 00:00:00 2015 GMT notAfter=Dec 31 12:00:00 2015 GMT AWS bucket creds are not the same thing as SSL certs and were most likely specific to only relevant s3 buckets which are totally separate from any load balancers.

I never claimed that AWS bucket creds were the same thing as SSL certs.

Then rotating their SSL keys shouldn't be relevant.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#447
post #263

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not quite sure I understand your point? Of course he got paid, that's how bug bounties work... that doesn't detract in any way from the point I made above.

And I don't understand yours. You were concerned about other people other than Wes accessing the same data via the same flaw, Alex said that did not happen.

But until Wes told them, they had no evidence that Wes was accessing the data! Or are you saying that they did have evidence, but chose to take a "wait and see" approach to someone gaining control of their entire platform?

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#448
post #20

In stories like this, try first to remember that Facebook isn't a single entity with a single set of opinions, but rather a huge collection of people who came to the company at different times and different points in their career. Alex Stamos is a good person† who has been doing vulnerability research since the 1990s. He's built a reputation for understanding and defending vulnerability researchers. He hasn't been at…

> 5. Fb nukes the server, confirms the RCE, pays out $2500 for it, declines to pay for the second finding, and asks the tester not to use RCEs to explore their systems.

The issue here is that, in hindsight, FB failed at this step.

They nuked the server, but they didn't determine what sensitive information was available on that server, and take steps to mitigate those risks.

I think that's an understandable mistake - cleaning up after a server intrusion is hard. Knowing how much to do after a possible intrusion is even harder. But it is still a mistake and it happened on Alex's watch.

If the purpose of the bounty program is to find out about your security mistakes, then the program did its job here, and Alex should be pleased that the problem was reported so that they could fix it.

That the researcher found the mistake by overstepping what is considered ethical (and I have no doubt that they did overstep) creates a very difficult situation - you don't want to reward that behaviour, but you do want to know about security problems and this one was only discovered/reported because of that bad behaviour.

In that difficult situation it is all the more important to tread carefully. The easy cases where you're paying out a $10k bounty typically don't require much finesse. It's the tricky cases where you need to make sure your actions are well considered and above-board at every step.

From Alex's own summary it's evident that he didn't handle it as well as he could have.

Two of the longest paragraphs in Alex's write up cover what he said to the CEO of Synack, even though Synack had nothing to do with this. Even if we accept that Alex thought it likely the Wes was acting on behalf of Synack (personally, I don't think that was a reasonable conclusion to draw, thought I assume Alex is sincere in his view that it was), he should have determined that up front, and then, once he knew it was not work related, he should have avoided:

- making accusations about Wes's ethics to his boss ("Wes ... had acted unethically")

- suggesting that his external behaviour has implications for his employment ("Wes's behavior reflected poorly ... on Synack")

- bringing in the threat of lawyers ("keep this out of the hands of the lawyers")

When faced with the difficult situation of legitimate security research that has (well) overstepped the ethical boundaries, all the evidence is that Alex jumped to the position of protect yourself, protect the company, intimidate and control the researcher and though that is a common and understandable reaction, it's not the way you turn a bad situation like this into a good one.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#449
post #392

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Guy discloses vulnerability. Facebook is not as impressed as guy would have hoped. Maybe it's because he's one of several people to disclose the same vulnerability. Maybe there are just a lot of vulnerabilities (they've paid out 4.3m in bounties). Guy's reaction to rejection: take hostages and threaten Facebook. Facebook moves to defense and cuts guy off. You are not a good neighbor for kidnapping someone's family to…

This is, of course, Facebook's narrative which conflict's with Wes's. One obvious hole I can see in Facebook's story is that they insinuate that Wes broke back into the server after they disputed the bounty. If this were true, they did nothing in response to the problems Wes found for over a month. If you look at Wes's timeline, he says access to the server was no longer possible a few days after he filed the second…

This whole thing is silly. Facebook (or any other tech company) have a lot of flexibility and hardly any accountability in defining what a "million dollar bug" is. You really can't believe they are going to just hand you over 1m because you think it is a 1m bug. It very well may be but in the end facebook will be the one deciding the value of said bug and you will have nothing to do with their decision so assume they just won't do that.
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