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Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

exfiltrated.com

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Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#381

Thank you to everybody who cautioned against judgment before hearing the whole story. Here is my response: https://www.facebook.com/notes/alex-stamos/bug-bounty-ethics...

This response deepens my concern about the situation, rather than alleviating it. In this response, you make it sound like calling this security researcher's employer's CEO was a reasonable escalation of the situation, and that is deeply concerning to me, especially given the actual text of the post Wes published here.

It also appears, based on your post, that you think that stating, approximately, "I hope we don't need to contact our legal teams or law enforcement about this," does not constitute a threat of legal or law-enforcement action, and I also find that deeply troubling. While I think you could make a legal distinction that these weren't technically threats of such action, any reasonable person in the researcher's position would by positively idiotic if he/she failed to feel threatened in that way by such statements.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#382

I'd like to see a service where a company's source code/database/confidential info is placed in escrow pending the payout from a bug bounty. Or, perhaps more likely, some sort of 3rd-party arbitration.

Good luck finding an escrow to not only trust, but would be willing to take the heat for that one.

To be a trustworthy escrow, you must have a good reputation or track-record.

There's near no anonymous escrows that could provide a service trustworthy enough to handle this. And going the non-anonymous route would be near impossible, Facebook would litigate an entire country over this.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#383
post #235

Thank you to everybody who cautioned against judgment before hearing the whole story. Here is my response: https://www.facebook.com/notes/alex-stamos/bug-bounty-ethics...

I think the root cause of the problem is the unclear policy by FB. Privilege escalation can be hard to catch, and can be a separate bug in and of itself, even if it requires a separate exploit to get the initial privileges. The published policy didn't say anything about not doing what he did. I'm not going to argue that what he did should or shouldn't be ok, but FB has no control over what other people do. Yeah, mayb…

Correct, the policy isn't clear and needs improvement. The bug bounty's policy definitely falls under the CSO's purview. So even if you approve of Alex's handling of the matter, you can't forgive him for running a sloppy bug bounty program. It's one thing if he claims mea culpa and says we could do better. But there's not one iota of regret, remorse, or apology on not making things more clear in Alex's response.

If you're going to persecute someone on details, you had better make sure your policy is very detailed, not vague, and not left open to interpretation. In this regard, Mr. Stamos failed.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#384
post #235

Thank you to everybody who cautioned against judgment before hearing the whole story. Here is my response: https://www.facebook.com/notes/alex-stamos/bug-bounty-ethics...

I think the root cause of the problem is the unclear policy by FB. Privilege escalation can be hard to catch, and can be a separate bug in and of itself, even if it requires a separate exploit to get the initial privileges. The published policy didn't say anything about not doing what he did. I'm not going to argue that what he did should or shouldn't be ok, but FB has no control over what other people do. Yeah, mayb…

Why do the policy specifics matter? A blackhat won't be respecting those rules, and won't need to negotiate a reasonable payday with facebook.

The real issue here is facebook's poor infrastructure security and slow response time. If the exploit had been previously reported, why was the privilege escalation still possible? Why did a (supposedly) known-to-be-vulnerable host have access to secret information at all?

The exfiltration of data may have been unethical, but facebook has no one to blame but themselves for it even being possible.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#385

Thank you to everybody who cautioned against judgment before hearing the whole story. Here is my response: https://www.facebook.com/notes/alex-stamos/bug-bounty-ethics...

There is a definite issue with the Facebook bug bounty program in that there are many serious issues with the platform that don't fit within the relatively narrow parameters of the program. I reported an issue that enabled anyone to customize a wall post that says it goes to any site of my choosing in the post (cnn.com, whitehouse.gov, etc), completely customize both the content and photo of the post, and have the link actually go to a URL of my choosing instead of the domain it shows in the post. Examples at [1] and [2].

This issue, which enables uber-credible phishing and other attacks with the assistance of Facebook (since Facebook falsely reports to the user that the link goes to a credible domain of the attacker's choosing while actually sending them to any URL controlled by the attacker), was rejected. Not only was I told that it was not a bug that I could be paid for, but that it really wasn't a bug at all, and that they would do nothing about it.

If these kinds of serious issues are essentially ignored because they don't meet the very narrow guidelines set forth in the bug bounty program, Facebook is going to miss a massive number of problems with its platform.

[1] http://prntscr.com/9fj40t

[2] http://prntscr.com/9fj46h

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#386

Thank you to everybody who cautioned against judgment before hearing the whole story. Here is my response: https://www.facebook.com/notes/alex-stamos/bug-bounty-ethics...

Why have you not rotated your private keys? notBefore=Apr 14 00:00:00 2015 GMT notAfter=Dec 31 12:00:00 2015 GMT (Feel free to respond here if you want to pay me the bug bounty for this)

    $ echo | openssl s_client -connect www.instagram.com:443 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -dates
    notBefore=Apr 14 00:00:00 2015 GMT
    notAfter=Dec 31 12:00:00 2015 GMT
AWS bucket creds are not the same thing as SSL certs and were most likely specific to only relevant s3 buckets which are totally separate from any load balancers.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#387
post #340

Thank you to everybody who cautioned against judgment before hearing the whole story. Here is my response: https://www.facebook.com/notes/alex-stamos/bug-bounty-ethics...

I told Jay that we couldn't allow Wes to set a precedent that anybody can exfiltrate unnecessary amounts of data and call it a part of legitimate bug research, and that I wanted to keep this out of the hands of the lawyers on both sides. I did not threaten legal action against Synack or Wes.... In case it isn't clear, most people will interpret "I want to keep this out of the hands of lawyers" exactly as a threat to…

"I want to keep this out of the hands of lawyers" is almost universally understood to mean "please do what I say so that I don't have to sue you, which is what I will do if you do not comply".

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#389

In general, if you have a green handle, you shouldn't be commenting on things like this. Otherwise we'll have sock puppets galore muddying the waters.

What does a green handle indicate by the way? I checked the FAQ and there's nothing there.

green handle

New account, IIRC less than 2 weeks old. The name is colored green. But I've seen it not be consistent, where some posts are green, others aren't. All in the same thread.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#390

In general, if you have a green handle, you shouldn't be commenting on things like this. Otherwise we'll have sock puppets galore muddying the waters.

What does a green handle indicate by the way? I checked the FAQ and there's nothing there.

New account.
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