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Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

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Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#221
post #95

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'll rephrase the question. Is the broader vulnerability apparent based on the first discovery OR does it only become clear the further down the rabbit hole you get?

I don't know. If we're going to speculate, I'll say: the Facebook security team didn't know this system existed (it's a 3rd party admin console on a public IP address!), and their immediate reaction to it was "nuke it from orbit, pay out the bounty for finding it, and forget about it". My guess is that they discovered the AWS credential thing on December 1.

In your experience, are there other, more careful organizations who would have taken the host offline but saved a disk dump for later investigation?

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#222
post #69

As a security researcher and engineer, I'd like to point out the following, without taking sides: 1. Facebook is not going ballistic because this is a RCE report. They have received high and critical severity reports many times before and acted peaceably, up to and including a prior RCE reported in 2013 by Reginaldo Silva (who now works there!). 2. The researcher used the vulnerability to dump data. This is well know…

I understand how dumping SENSITIVE data can make you a flight risk, but he specifically outlined that he avoided dumping anything sensitive (that is anything directly related to Users and their data). He did dump S3 buckets that had a treasure trove of other files (such as the API keys for the other services and static content), so I guess my question here is at what point does dumping of any kind become bad?

In infosec keychains are about as sensitive as private as it gets. They should probably change it to "do not pull or retain any data from any server except that which is explicitly needed to identify the vulnerability" for those who might not understand.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#223

Thank you to everybody who cautioned against judgment before hearing the whole story. Here is my response: https://www.facebook.com/notes/alex-stamos/bug-bounty-ethics...

The real question is did you rotate the keys (and do further hardening, I hope!) because of the vuln report Wes made? If so, than you should be grateful for his work pointing out your mistaken single point of failure via AWS S3 security and you should have rewarded him handsomely.

I can't work out how to not make this sound almost infinitely cynical, but their ssl key expires in 13 days - they only had to shut him up for another few weeks and they could have pretended they weren't currently MITM-able:

https://www.instagram.com

Not Valid After: Thursday, 31 December 2015 11:00:00 pm Australian Eastern Daylight Time

Maybe they'll upgrade it to something better than: Signature algorithm SHA1withRSA WEAK

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#224

Thank you to everybody who cautioned against judgment before hearing the whole story. Here is my response: https://www.facebook.com/notes/alex-stamos/bug-bounty-ethics...

Why have you not rotated your private keys?

  notBefore=Apr 14 00:00:00 2015 GMT
  notAfter=Dec 31 12:00:00 2015 GMT
(Feel free to respond here if you want to pay me the bug bounty for this)

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#225
post #65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yea I did and I realize he got paid out a little, but it was short of the $1 million. I realize a million is a bit unrealistic, but if you're going to make a public statement, at least back it up or prove to the guy why his findings don't constitute a "million-dollar bug". It's not right to just cold-shoulder the guy and hide behind vague rules that were never clearly outlined. In fact, you might even conclude Facebo…

Nobody is going to pay you a million dollars in 2015 for the 2013 Rails YAML bug in a stale server. Nobody is going to pay you a million dollars for a reliable Firefox RCE, and those take months to prove out and develop, and there's a liquid market for them.

The black market may. Having what you need to replace an app installed on pretty much everyone's iPhone with arbitrary code is a pretty big deal.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#226
I don't see how the CSO's response makes sense for Facebook's security interests. As CSO, it is in your interest to allow a researcher to exploit an RCE to its furthest. Otherwise, you would only ever allow researchers to inoculate your outest layer of protection, while leaving any inner level untested and thus less secure.

If indeed only credentials and technical information were obtained, all aimed at finding more security issues, Facebook should be thankful for finding all the vulnerabilities across all their security layers.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#227

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The real question is did you rotate the keys (and do further hardening, I hope!) because of the vuln report Wes made? If so, than you should be grateful for his work pointing out your mistaken single point of failure via AWS S3 security and you should have rewarded him handsomely.

I can't work out how to not make this sound almost infinitely cynical, but their ssl key expires in 13 days - they only had to shut him up for another few weeks and they could have pretended they weren't currently MITM-able: https://www.instagram.com Not Valid After: Thursday, 31 December 2015 11:00:00 pm Australian Eastern Daylight Time Maybe they'll upgrade it to something better than: Signature algorithm SHA1withR…

Does this have anything to do with the SHA1 sunset on 31 December?

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#228
post #160

Summarizing what I've seen here in analogy form: Researcher: "I found a way to unlock your door" Facebook: "Thanks, here's $2500. We've now fixed the problem." Researcher: "Oh, BTW when I unlocked your door I rifled through your stuff and found your passport, your banking details, and a lot of personal information. I've kept copies of these. I also found the keys to your car and looked inside, where I found a box in…

Except that for a company as big as Facebook your security provisions probably shouldn't stop right at the front door.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#229

Thank you to everybody who cautioned against judgment before hearing the whole story. Here is my response: https://www.facebook.com/notes/alex-stamos/bug-bounty-ethics...

Sounds like FB acted pretty unprofessionally both in the infrastructure department and in handling of the situation. You had some embarrassing mistakes and instead of acknowledging them you tried to scare the reporter into shutting up and leaving you alone. That part is pretty clear. Whether he violated your rules and how much you pay him I don't care.

Re: Instagram's Million Dollar Bug

#230
post #120

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Really? The article states: "To say that I had gained access to basically all of Instagram's secret key material would probably be a fair statement". How on earth would holding on to that data not be a privacy violation?

Surely they would have to revoke all the keys anyway as they would have no idea if a blackhat got their first and took the keys before the vulnerability was reported?

According to the timeline, Instagram have known about the ssl keys since 1 Dec.

My browser is currently showing an ssl cert for instagram.com that was issued in April and expires on Dec 31.

Doesn't look like they're in any hurry to revoke that one. (I guess like Alex Stamos told his employer - it's "trivial and of little value"...)

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