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EFF's Panopticlick 2.0 Launches with Tracker Protection Tests

panopticlick.eff.org

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Re: EFF's Panopticlick 2.0 Launches with Tracker Protection Tests

#4
post #2

Is there any solid guide to preventing browser fingerprinting? Or is the only protection constantly changing your accept headers + user agent?

"For day-to-day use, the best options are to run tools like Privacy Badger or Disconnect that will block some (but unfortunately not all) of the domains that try to perform fingerprinting, and/or to use a tool like NoScript for Firefox, which greatly reduces the amount of data available to fingerprinters."

https://panopticlick.eff.org/about#defend-against

Re: EFF's Panopticlick 2.0 Launches with Tracker Protection Tests

#5
post #3

In fingerprinting, the browser plugins and user agent are the most identifying parameters as far as I'm concerned. Does anybody know workarounds to hide or standardize those parameters?

For Firefox, you can automatically spoof the UA with a tool like https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/random-agent-...

Re: EFF's Panopticlick 2.0 Launches with Tracker Protection Tests

#6
post #3

In fingerprinting, the browser plugins and user agent are the most identifying parameters as far as I'm concerned. Does anybody know workarounds to hide or standardize those parameters?

For Firefox, you can automatically spoof the UA with a tool like https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/random-agent-...

Spoofing your user agent on your own typically makes you easier to fingerprint, not harder. See footnote 3 of the Panopticlick 1.0 paper: https://panopticlick.eff.org/static/browser-uniqueness.pdf

It's more plausible for a large population of browsers to share a single spoofed user agent; all of the Tor Browsers pretend to be a single specific version of Firefox for Windows.

Re: EFF's Panopticlick 2.0 Launches with Tracker Protection Tests

#7
post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

For Firefox, you can automatically spoof the UA with a tool like https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/random-agent-...

Spoofing your user agent on your own typically makes you easier to fingerprint, not harder. See footnote 3 of the Panopticlick 1.0 paper: https://panopticlick.eff.org/static/browser-uniqueness.pdf It's more plausible for a large population of browsers to share a single spoofed user agent; all of the Tor Browsers pretend to be a single specific version of Firefox for Windows.

I used to spoof user agents, randomly mutating. Then last month I started to run into sites that refused to load/render for incorrect strings. It appears the Google and other large companies are now sending customized versions of their page based on the user agent which I can only speculate is an attempt to save bandwidth. By taking advantage of implementation specific features, they not only eliminate all of the extra JS and browser workarounds, but they also can take shortcuts.

Re: EFF's Panopticlick 2.0 Launches with Tracker Protection Tests

#8
post #4
post #2

Is there any solid guide to preventing browser fingerprinting? Or is the only protection constantly changing your accept headers + user agent?

"For day-to-day use, the best options are to run tools like Privacy Badger or Disconnect that will block some (but unfortunately not all) of the domains that try to perform fingerprinting, and/or to use a tool like NoScript for Firefox, which greatly reduces the amount of data available to fingerprinters." https://panopticlick.eff.org/about#defend-against

Will blocking them at the HOSTS file level decrease exposure as well? My gut says yes, but I wanted to check.

Also, does this test check for that and/or give points for that?

Here is the HOSTS file I use to block ads: http://winhelp2002.mvps.org/hosts.txt

Re: EFF's Panopticlick 2.0 Launches with Tracker Protection Tests

#9
post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

For Firefox, you can automatically spoof the UA with a tool like https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/random-agent-...

Spoofing your user agent on your own typically makes you easier to fingerprint, not harder. See footnote 3 of the Panopticlick 1.0 paper: https://panopticlick.eff.org/static/browser-uniqueness.pdf It's more plausible for a large population of browsers to share a single spoofed user agent; all of the Tor Browsers pretend to be a single specific version of Firefox for Windows.

How about we get together and decide on a common string that all of us can use? We can set our browsers to use that, and our friends' as well. Theoretically, the more people that use the same string, the harder we'll be to track, correct?

Re: EFF's Panopticlick 2.0 Launches with Tracker Protection Tests

#10
post #7
post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Spoofing your user agent on your own typically makes you easier to fingerprint, not harder. See footnote 3 of the Panopticlick 1.0 paper: https://panopticlick.eff.org/static/browser-uniqueness.pdf It's more plausible for a large population of browsers to share a single spoofed user agent; all of the Tor Browsers pretend to be a single specific version of Firefox for Windows.

I used to spoof user agents, randomly mutating. Then last month I started to run into sites that refused to load/render for incorrect strings. It appears the Google and other large companies are now sending customized versions of their page based on the user agent which I can only speculate is an attempt to save bandwidth. By taking advantage of implementation specific features, they not only eliminate all of the ext…

I've been known to do something like this (rejecting unusual UAs) to avoid the added load of rogue scrapers.
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