Earlier quoted context omitted.
Nope. The open recursive DNS servers, are real DNS servers, with caching and backoff logic. If, say, there are 94k [1] open DNS resolvers in the wild, each will ask you one DNS question for example.com, cache the answer and that's it. The big volume for the "fixed domain" queries indicates proper BCP-38 spoofing. [1] http://public-dns.tk/
Unless the attacker controlled the domain TTL, maybe? But good point -- I was thinking of a similar attack using random domains.
Even if you're assuming 100 qps from each of the 94k recursors, that's only 9.4M qps. And most of the recursors will notice lack of answer and will slow down / stop the queries. In practice random subdomain attacks rarely generate more than a million qps (YMMV, there are exceptions, technical nitpics, etc).