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How not to report on the encryption ‘debate’

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Re: How not to report on the encryption ‘debate’

#21

I think this article is great, but something did stand out for me. I'm a huge supporter of universal end-to-end encryption, but Feinstein's point is making me feel some cognitive dissonance: >"I think with a court order, with good justification, all of that can be prevented." There are cases where I would want law enforcement to be able to read encrypted communications in an emergency situation, with a valid court or…

I wish that with a court order, we could read the thoughts of a suspect, too... But that's not possible, either. Remember that a police force doesn't need infinite, perfect access to all of a target's communications to catch them. Think about the case we're describing: we have enough information to convince a judge that this person is a suspect. In order to get evidence to convict, you can: * hack into their devices…

> I wish that with a court order, we could read the thoughts of a suspect, too... But that's not possible, either.

So you're happy getting rid of the Fifth Amendment then?

Re: How not to report on the encryption ‘debate’

#22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I wish that with a court order, we could read the thoughts of a suspect, too... But that's not possible, either. Remember that a police force doesn't need infinite, perfect access to all of a target's communications to catch them. Think about the case we're describing: we have enough information to convince a judge that this person is a suspect. In order to get evidence to convict, you can: * hack into their devices…

> I wish that with a court order, we could read the thoughts of a suspect, too... But that's not possible, either. So you're happy getting rid of the Fifth Amendment then?

ohthehugemanate might be an unAmerican, for whom there is no Fifth in the first place.

Re: How not to report on the encryption ‘debate’

#23
post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Most of us who read Hacker News already know this, but it is important to keep publishing and reinforcing the message for everyone else!

But is anyone hearing the message other than us?

Have you tried using ALL CAPS?

Re: How not to report on the encryption ‘debate’

#24

I think this article is great, but something did stand out for me. I'm a huge supporter of universal end-to-end encryption, but Feinstein's point is making me feel some cognitive dissonance: >"I think with a court order, with good justification, all of that can be prevented." There are cases where I would want law enforcement to be able to read encrypted communications in an emergency situation, with a valid court or…

I think universal end-to-end encryption is an all-or-nothing proposition. You can't sell it by saying, "It's secure, except when it isn't." It's also a slippery slope to establish a key escrow for the government; will it be a crime to encrypt using a key that isn't in escrow?

Encryption can facilitate evil, but it also protects against evil. Universal adoption is hampered by obstacles including:

1. It's hard to do.

2. It's hard to understand, even if the tools become more user-friendly.

3. Most people will share a private key with a stranger when asked.

The right way to handle this is to encourage people to use strong encryption and acknowledge that it can be safe from eavesdropping, but still subject to weaknesses or participants revealing the information in other ways.

Re: How not to report on the encryption ‘debate’

#25
post #2

OK, so we have another well written article explaining how attempts to demonize encryption and put it back in the bottle are misguided, and the spokespeople for the authoritarians and intelligence community are being disingenuous on cable TV. But most of us already knew this. So what I'm asking is: * Are these well reasoned words affecting/effecting policy? * How will we know?

We'll know when having a secret is a criminal offense.

Re: How not to report on the encryption ‘debate’

#26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I wish that with a court order, we could read the thoughts of a suspect, too... But that's not possible, either. Remember that a police force doesn't need infinite, perfect access to all of a target's communications to catch them. Think about the case we're describing: we have enough information to convince a judge that this person is a suspect. In order to get evidence to convict, you can: * hack into their devices…

> I wish that with a court order, we could read the thoughts of a suspect, too... But that's not possible, either. So you're happy getting rid of the Fifth Amendment then?

Given that its original purpose was to discourage the authorities from torturing or jailing you in order to compel you to give evidence against yourself, one could argue that the Fifth would need new justification in a future where thoughts were easily read.

Re: How not to report on the encryption ‘debate’

#27

I think this article is great, but something did stand out for me. I'm a huge supporter of universal end-to-end encryption, but Feinstein's point is making me feel some cognitive dissonance: >"I think with a court order, with good justification, all of that can be prevented." There are cases where I would want law enforcement to be able to read encrypted communications in an emergency situation, with a valid court or…

The right way to handle it is to enforce laws in meatspace. To create CP, for example, you need to abduct and exploit children, and produce content. This leaves a trail of money, places, and witnesses. Bear down on that instead of snooping.

It could improve the effectiveness of law enforcement to force them to focus on meatspace crime rather than playing with their shiny computer toys.

Re: How not to report on the encryption ‘debate’

#28
post #9

"We kill people based on metadata." - former head of the National Security Agency Gen. Michael Hayden “metadata absolutely tells you everything about somebody’s life. If you have enough metadata, you don’t really need content.” - NSA General Counsel Stewart Baker

Could you post a citation, please?

Re: How not to report on the encryption ‘debate’

#29
post #9

"We kill people based on metadata." - former head of the National Security Agency Gen. Michael Hayden “metadata absolutely tells you everything about somebody’s life. If you have enough metadata, you don’t really need content.” - NSA General Counsel Stewart Baker

Coming soon: "We kill people who use encryption."

If you have something to hide from us, you are the enemy.

Re: How not to report on the encryption ‘debate’

#30
post #28
post #9

"We kill people based on metadata." - former head of the National Security Agency Gen. Michael Hayden “metadata absolutely tells you everything about somebody’s life. If you have enough metadata, you don’t really need content.” - NSA General Counsel Stewart Baker

Could you post a citation, please?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UdQiz0Vavmc

That was an easy google search.

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