Ca-certificates: removal of SPI CA • Hacker News Board

Re: Ca-certificates: removal of SPI CA

#11

Post by ymse » Wed, Nov 25, 2015, 9:58 PM UTC

neerdowell wrote: post #9

JoshTriplett wrote: post #5

Related to this, the Debian nss package removed the SPI CA today, in version 2:3.21-1: https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-changes/2015/11/msg025... This has been planned for a while now. Between Let's Encrypt and StartCom, Debian and SPI don't need to run a CA anymore, especially not a CA that only Debian systems trust. Several Debian sites used to use SPI certificates, back when HTTPS seemed like an optional nice…

With the practicality of something that only worked on Debian systems aside... > Between Let's Encrypt and StartCom ... What do we have? StartCom doesn't allow their free certificates to be used for commercial purposes and will hold you to ransom if you need to revoke it (eg. after a major vulnerability which exposes private keys). Let's Encrypt only issue certificates that are valid for 90 days[0] because they want…

As someone implementing the S3 API (on Ceph) for a non-profit, another missing option is wildcard certificates.

Re: Ca-certificates: removal of SPI CA

#12

Post by JoshTriplett » Wed, Nov 25, 2015, 10:01 PM UTC

neerdowell wrote: post #9

JoshTriplett wrote: post #5

Related to this, the Debian nss package removed the SPI CA today, in version 2:3.21-1: https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-changes/2015/11/msg025... This has been planned for a while now. Between Let's Encrypt and StartCom, Debian and SPI don't need to run a CA anymore, especially not a CA that only Debian systems trust. Several Debian sites used to use SPI certificates, back when HTTPS seemed like an optional nice…

With the practicality of something that only worked on Debian systems aside... > Between Let's Encrypt and StartCom ... What do we have? StartCom doesn't allow their free certificates to be used for commercial purposes and will hold you to ransom if you need to revoke it (eg. after a major vulnerability which exposes private keys). Let's Encrypt only issue certificates that are valid for 90 days[0] because they want…

> Let's Encrypt only issue certificates that are valid for 90 days[0] because they want you to automate renewal by having your server automatically run their script which needs root privileges

That script is FOSS; you can see exactly what it wants to do. And it uses a documented protocol ("ACME"), so you can write and run your own script if you want, using several different ways to prove you control the server. The script provided by Let's Encrypt mostly serves as a proof of concept and a simple implementation for some common cases; various alternatives already exist that integrate will with various server software.

> and they use Google as the gatekeeper of who is allowed a certificate[1].

> [1] https://letsencrypt.org/2015/10/29/phishing-and-malware.html

I've never once seen a report of a site finding itself on that list without actually serving malware; I don't see any obvious basis for such a complaint.

> doesn't pass every request to a corporation for approval.

Let's Encrypt is run by "Internet Security Research Group (ISRG)"; quoting https://letsencrypt.org/isrg/ : "ISRG is a California public benefit corporation". And personally, since I don't particularly want to see any trusted CA run by only one person, just about any CA will be a corporation of some kind. "corporation" is not a dirty word.

Re: Ca-certificates: removal of SPI CA

#13

Post by jepler » Wed, Nov 25, 2015, 10:07 PM UTC

neerdowell wrote: post #9

JoshTriplett wrote: post #5

Related to this, the Debian nss package removed the SPI CA today, in version 2:3.21-1: https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-changes/2015/11/msg025... This has been planned for a while now. Between Let's Encrypt and StartCom, Debian and SPI don't need to run a CA anymore, especially not a CA that only Debian systems trust. Several Debian sites used to use SPI certificates, back when HTTPS seemed like an optional nice…

With the practicality of something that only worked on Debian systems aside... > Between Let's Encrypt and StartCom ... What do we have? StartCom doesn't allow their free certificates to be used for commercial purposes and will hold you to ransom if you need to revoke it (eg. after a major vulnerability which exposes private keys). Let's Encrypt only issue certificates that are valid for 90 days[0] because they want…

You can run the letsencrypt client as non-root, but it takes a greater degree of system configuration first. letsencrypt-auto in its current incarnation sure does run as root, however. The current state of affairs is to prioritize ease over running with the lowest degree of privilege that is feasible. (and there are other ACME-protocol implementations you can choose if you prefer not to run the letsencrypt client; ISTR reading about one implemented in Ruby)

I do feel more negatively about their choice to use a third-party list of domains to blacklist, particularly since they can't offer any effective appeals process (they can't afford to have people in the loop AT ALL at a price of zero)

Re: Ca-certificates: removal of SPI CA

#14

Post by DHJSH » Wed, Nov 25, 2015, 10:20 PM UTC

JoshTriplett wrote: post #12

neerdowell wrote: post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

With the practicality of something that only worked on Debian systems aside... > Between Let's Encrypt and StartCom ... What do we have? StartCom doesn't allow their free certificates to be used for commercial purposes and will hold you to ransom if you need to revoke it (eg. after a major vulnerability which exposes private keys). Let's Encrypt only issue certificates that are valid for 90 days[0] because they want…

> Let's Encrypt only issue certificates that are valid for 90 days[0] because they want you to automate renewal by having your server automatically run their script which needs root privileges That script is FOSS; you can see exactly what it wants to do. And it uses a documented protocol ("ACME"), so you can write and run your own script if you want, using several different ways to prove you control the server. The s…

> "corporation" is not a dirty word.

It is to these Bernie Sanders cult members!

Re: Ca-certificates: removal of SPI CA

#15

Post by JoshTriplett » Wed, Nov 25, 2015, 10:27 PM UTC

jepler wrote: post #13

neerdowell wrote: post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

With the practicality of something that only worked on Debian systems aside... > Between Let's Encrypt and StartCom ... What do we have? StartCom doesn't allow their free certificates to be used for commercial purposes and will hold you to ransom if you need to revoke it (eg. after a major vulnerability which exposes private keys). Let's Encrypt only issue certificates that are valid for 90 days[0] because they want…

You can run the letsencrypt client as non-root, but it takes a greater degree of system configuration first. letsencrypt-auto in its current incarnation sure does run as root, however. The current state of affairs is to prioritize ease over running with the lowest degree of privilege that is feasible. (and there are other ACME-protocol implementations you can choose if you prefer not to run the letsencrypt client; IS…

> I do feel more negatively about their choice to use a third-party list of domains to blacklist, particularly since they can't offer any effective appeals process

If your site appears on the malware list, then both Firefox and Chrome will produce giant warnings on your site that will cause almost everyone to refuse to browse there. So you'll have much bigger problems than not getting a certificate, and you will need to get yourself removed from that list anyway. (And, for that matter, figure out what got you on that list, such as running an ad script that serves malware, or having your server compromised and serving malware you don't know about.)

Re: Ca-certificates: removal of SPI CA

#16

Post by newman314 » Wed, Nov 25, 2015, 10:30 PM UTC

neerdowell wrote: post #9

JoshTriplett wrote: post #5

Related to this, the Debian nss package removed the SPI CA today, in version 2:3.21-1: https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-changes/2015/11/msg025... This has been planned for a while now. Between Let's Encrypt and StartCom, Debian and SPI don't need to run a CA anymore, especially not a CA that only Debian systems trust. Several Debian sites used to use SPI certificates, back when HTTPS seemed like an optional nice…

With the practicality of something that only worked on Debian systems aside... > Between Let's Encrypt and StartCom ... What do we have? StartCom doesn't allow their free certificates to be used for commercial purposes and will hold you to ransom if you need to revoke it (eg. after a major vulnerability which exposes private keys). Let's Encrypt only issue certificates that are valid for 90 days[0] because they want…

Agreed. Not all uses of certs allow for easy automation. For example, ddwrt or a NAS. I would like to use proper certs but don't want to screw around in the firmware which might potentially break updates.

Re: Ca-certificates: removal of SPI CA

#17

Post by jepler » Wed, Nov 25, 2015, 10:38 PM UTC

JoshTriplett wrote: post #15

jepler wrote: post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can run the letsencrypt client as non-root, but it takes a greater degree of system configuration first. letsencrypt-auto in its current incarnation sure does run as root, however. The current state of affairs is to prioritize ease over running with the lowest degree of privilege that is feasible. (and there are other ACME-protocol implementations you can choose if you prefer not to run the letsencrypt client; IS…

> I do feel more negatively about their choice to use a third-party list of domains to blacklist, particularly since they can't offer any effective appeals process If your site appears on the malware list, then both Firefox and Chrome will produce giant warnings on your site that will cause almost everyone to refuse to browse there. So you'll have much bigger problems than not getting a certificate, and you will need…

I agree, if Google decides to blacklist your domain you basically own a pile of bitter bitter ashes. Is there an effective appeals process if this happens?

I looked into it when LetsEncrypt announced their plans to use Google's backlists. Here's what I found for myself, copied from there [https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/the-cas-role-in-fighting...]:

Google's Safe Browsing FAQ [https://developers.google.com/safe-browsing/safebrowsing_faq] lists three types of sites which receive advisories: Phishing, Malware, and Unwanted Software. Two of the three types provide an appeals/delisting process, but "Unwanted Software" does not. However, it may be that LE's proposed use of the Safe Browsing API is only looking at the first two types.

Re: Ca-certificates: removal of SPI CA

#18

Post by thesimon » Wed, Nov 25, 2015, 10:45 PM UTC

hannob wrote: post #10

neerdowell wrote: post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

With the practicality of something that only worked on Debian systems aside... > Between Let's Encrypt and StartCom ... What do we have? StartCom doesn't allow their free certificates to be used for commercial purposes and will hold you to ransom if you need to revoke it (eg. after a major vulnerability which exposes private keys). Let's Encrypt only issue certificates that are valid for 90 days[0] because they want…

I haven't yet had the need to try revocation, but Wosign is a more accessible option than startssl. No noncommercial restriction, 1 year free.

One thing to look out for though is the fact that they offer you to generate a private key for you.

You probably don't want them to have your private key :)

Re: Ca-certificates: removal of SPI CA

#19

Post by hannob » Wed, Nov 25, 2015, 10:56 PM UTC

thesimon wrote: post #18

hannob wrote: post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I haven't yet had the need to try revocation, but Wosign is a more accessible option than startssl. No noncommercial restriction, 1 year free.

One thing to look out for though is the fact that they offer you to generate a private key for you. You probably don't want them to have your private key :)

Yeah, a lot of CAs do this. I don't like it, I'd prefer a policy that forbids that. But as long as they don't force me to use that option I'm kinda okay with it.

Re: Ca-certificates: removal of SPI CA

#20

Post by ams6110 » Wed, Nov 25, 2015, 11:24 PM UTC

neerdowell wrote: post #9

JoshTriplett wrote: post #5

Related to this, the Debian nss package removed the SPI CA today, in version 2:3.21-1: https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-changes/2015/11/msg025... This has been planned for a while now. Between Let's Encrypt and StartCom, Debian and SPI don't need to run a CA anymore, especially not a CA that only Debian systems trust. Several Debian sites used to use SPI certificates, back when HTTPS seemed like an optional nice…

With the practicality of something that only worked on Debian systems aside... > Between Let's Encrypt and StartCom ... What do we have? StartCom doesn't allow their free certificates to be used for commercial purposes and will hold you to ransom if you need to revoke it (eg. after a major vulnerability which exposes private keys). Let's Encrypt only issue certificates that are valid for 90 days[0] because they want…

Does certificate revocation work better these days?

http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2013/05/13/how-certificate...