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The Government Uses Zero Days for “Offense”

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Re: The Government Uses Zero Days for “Offense”

#91
post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That point is so important that I hesitated to add a distraction but I think it's also worth remembering that the NSA has a defensive role, too. It's been much neglected in recent decades but the entire country would be better off if the NSA helped patch things. They're hoping some suspected bad guy doesn't get patched but odds are high that many Americans, particularly important IP-heavy businesses, are going to get…

Are you seriously suggesting you don't think the security services have decades of experience in weighing the pros and cons of information release?

Yes. Pretty much everyone I know in such an industry has tunnel-vision on their area and overestimates its importance. They'd end up plastic-wrapping(/suffocating) us to prevent [malware, terrorism, power-grid collapse, etc] if they could - that's their only metric because they spend all day thinking about it.

If you step back and look at terrorism and hacking and traffic fatalities on the same level you can make rational plans to actually help the most people - then assign tasks to the agencies. They certainly can't set their own goals.

So no, I really don't think the NSA has a rational (ie, cost/benefit) balance of attack/defense from our (citizens who want to live long wealthy lives) PoV. It's our job to regulate that.

Re: The Government Uses Zero Days for “Offense”

#92
post #64

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm glad you brought this up. I know people who benefit from secure software today (they actually exist) and they are all customers . I don't know many users who can say the same. For example, I've heard rumours about a formally-verified and usable replacement for PGP. Great... until the conversation turns to price: PGP sucks! Would you pay $10 for something better? Heck no! PGP is free. I think of security in terms…

Personally I would pay $10 (or $50) for something better. But for a communication tool, I would not want to force that payment on everyone I interact with, and I would most definitely not accept a closed source security tool at any price.

What about a closed-source tool whose source and compiled binary had been vetted by mutually-distrusting, qualified parties who themselves used the tool? And provided the binaries and signatures to tools' customers?

Because as I outline here...

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/05/friday_squid_...

...both proprietary and FOSS really come down to you taking other people's word that they reviewed it and they were qualified to do so. So, review and trust in the reviewer(s) are the truly important points. The many eyes argument hasn't held for security for over a decade while a number of closed-source systems survived rigorous evaluation due to good design.

So, would you trusted a rigorously built and evaluated system with closed source if you trusted the reviewers and could verify you had same thing? And, if not, why do you trust/use OSS that's made by people with varying competence with no proof of qualified review?

Re: The Government Uses Zero Days for “Offense”

#93

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I believe the parent may have been referring to Stuxnet. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet It is indeed possible that if the NSA used a very different strategy with vulnerabilities, Iran might be further along with its nuclear weapons development.

Iran was using out of date software and hardware IIRC, so Stuxnet would still have been possible.

Stuxnet will always be possible. The vulns/trojans just replace having to get someone to knowingly install it.

Or rather, will always be possible until we move to doing protocol and behavior analysis of SCADA commands (as they enter the machine). And that'll just mean it has to get more subtle. If there's a way to do it right, there're more ways to do it wrong.

Re: The Government Uses Zero Days for “Offense”

#94
post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We have repeated proof of the opposite – Congress had to rush to retroactively legalize the mass surveillance programs, and much of what's been disclosed since is clearly unconstitutional. What they are extremely good at is using security claims to avoid ever having to see a real court. Most of the cases have been thrown out for lack of standing because it's hard to prove that you've been spied on when all of the det…

Clearly unconstitutional according to whom? It is valid to criticize the state secrets defense which keeps the NSA out of court – it's not valid to unilaterally decide what is and is not clearly unconstitutional.

Actually, unilaterally deciding what the constitution means is actually how it works. You don't vote to see if you feel it's unfair - you feel it's fair/unfair and so you vote to express that.

The constitution isn't a promise we-the-people made to government, it's how we-the-people define government.

Now it's okay that the NSA employees had different opinions, but what's not okay is that when called on their actions they used their interpretation of the constitution not just as a defense, but as a reason to continue. As if we owe the government its rights instead of the other way around.

Clearly unconstitutional according to anyone who cares about the will of the people they serve as opposed to the letter of the law.

Re: The Government Uses Zero Days for “Offense”

#95

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"Nick, our programming ecosystem barely satisfies the basic principles of software fault tolerance, much less self-healing systems. High assurance? Multiple independent levels of security (MILS)? Covert channel resistance? Completely out of the question!" Original high assurance systems were done with Pascal, etc. Not much required in terms of programming past type and memory safety, esp strong interface checks. Plus…

The language's direct effect on fault tolerance is not always easily measurable. Even in C you could add compile-time instrumentation to discard invalid writes and redirect invalid reads to fixed-size buffers (failure-oblivious computing) and that's just a proactive measure. Recursive restartability, microrebooting, state transfer to stable storage, event logs for fault recovery and piecewise determinism via replay o…

"The language's direct effect on fault tolerance is not always easily measurable. Even in C you could add compile-time instrumentation to discard invalid writes and redirect invalid reads to fixed-size buffers (failure-oblivious computing) and that's just a proactive measure."

I think you're going too far with it. Stuff like that is covered in fault-tolerant and immunity-aware computing. Most straight-forward approach is a NonStop-style system or TMR with voting. However, getting that far for fault-tolerance and security is way, way beyond standard practice. I'm just asking that standard practice move beyond the same old, same old problems. The baseline would be so much better and we could then work on the next leap. Not to mention the infusion of money and effort into tool support for that would greatly benefit high assurance work that tries to address what you're talking about.

"ince we can't get that, but instead mostly rely on cargo culting like "Haskell is magic pixie dust because math" for our software safety and availability, I find the prospects of careful HA research (which is more mathematically rigorous) to be daunting."

Best to think of it as several processes or systems working in lock-step one function or major state change at a time. That's been deployed in academia and commercially in many ways. There's even tools to draw on to help. Treating the system as a whole black box with restarts at failure simplifies things. This way, they can keep their pixie dust.

Meanwhile, we make the pixie dust better. Memory-safety, type-safety, and concurrency safety by themselves knock out most of what does damage. Hardware enforcement of these for CPU and I/O interactions make attacker's job daunting. A great exception system will help, too. The next steps are Design-by-Contract, automated test generation from those specs, static analysis with no false positives, information flow labels a la Cornell's SIF/JIF, and continued use of cookbooks like OWASP tools. Combining the above leaves very little room for bugs to hide. At the least, attacks become so expensive and valuable that only nation-states have them. Progress, eh? ;)

"Getting that deployed is going to be an uphill battle given fault tolerance's neglect"

It's happening a lot in mobile and safety-critical embedded. Virtualization, esp security-centric, has already taken off. I think modifying one to work with cloud-stacks and piggybacking off them might help. Might drop it to medium assurance due to complexity but would be improvement. Can structure it and assure it like VAX VMM Security Kernel did with modern tools/analysis. I doubt we see mass market uptake but a niche market might pick it up if cost/benefit still looks good.

"I think you overestimate public resistance to surveillance. The Church Committee came and went quickly, and was forgotten and dismissed over the legislative band-aids that people blindly believed were as effective as that."

It was more about major abuses than surveillance. I have little faith in public on the latter. We at least got to see a lot of details on things like COINTELPRO that are important in countering the propaganda. Point was that action was taken, some kind of result happened, and their level of domestic abuse appeared to drop a bit. Another good example was increases of FOIA power at different points, which helped us many times in the past. We didn't really need major results from Snowden leaks to deal with NSA, etc. Might have been as simple as eliminating bulk, forcing FISA warrants for targeted collection on Americans (not collection criteria), ability to challenge that in court (no parallel construction), and a clear indicator that no company/individual can be compelled into backdoors. Just four points could go a long way to knock out biggest legal risk with private sector and nonprofits handling the rest.

What we got instead was no response on... anything. I was less bummed about NSA than 2008 financial crisis. Over here, Wall St gets $1+ trillion, no questions asked, and immunity. Over in Iceland, they overthrew the corrupt machine, seized the assets, eliminated questionable debts, and (given Wikileaks was source) later passed some of best press protections in the world. That is how democracy is supposed to work when facing that level of corruption. The American approach was BOHICA: Bend Over, Here It Comes Again. Has been consistently since with few exceptions. Disgusting...

I want to see Americans pull an Iceland on one of these core issues.

Re: The Government Uses Zero Days for “Offense”

#96
post #90
post #84

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Of course I am. That's by design. The textual literalists of the Constitution are as bad as Biblical ones. Written law informs the interpretation of the judiciary. That's how it's been literally-literally since day one.

On some points interpretation may be needed. On other points it's a stretch. At still other points maybe a stretch to breaking and beyond. You may not care for literal text, but a lawful society depends on it. Governments just doing whatever they feel is best at the moment aren't generally very robust. There has to be restraint over a judiciary. A limit to how far they can stretch things. Opinions vary on what this l…

Er, there is restraint over the judiciary. Justices can be removed by the legislative branch.

It's hard. But that's intentional, too.

Re: The Government Uses Zero Days for “Offense”

#97
post #89

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's plenty vague about those things; by what rules shall the house and senate operate... unspecified and left to the house and senate to figure out just as a thousand other things are. Most of the document is open to interpretation, as is all written word by man anywhere. Even today people can't agree on the meaning of the second amendment. Just because you can find a few things that seems specific is in no way a…

Many of the rules for the house and senate are specified, very clearly, as well. Sorry, it isn't a "vague document" nor a "rough guideline". It is very specific on many points. Also, the idea that no one but trained professionals can read or understand if the document is being followed is not only wrong but abhorrent. Certainly, legally the judiciary is to interpret the law for implementation, I don't disagree. But a…

I agree that we as voters vote our interests; I don't, and won't agree that the average joe can read and correctly interpret the constitution and they never will. It is a legal document and understanding it requires more than just the words on the page.

Re: The Government Uses Zero Days for “Offense”

#98
post #50
post #40

Earlier quoted context omitted.

At least one issue is perception of the NSA by the talented people that the NSA needs to recruit. At the time I graduated CS undergrad in 2010, the NSA was still seen as "Sketchy, but good (and reliable) on the balance." Post-Snowden, views have changed. If the NSA can't do a better job of public relations, nobody is going to want to work for them, and then this defensive work won't be done as well.

Conscription neatly solves that problem... Given the proper motivation (neé, "a carrot-shaped stick"), a potential prospect will be inclined to accept the offer of employment.

Forcing people to work for you is a surefire way to ensure they do a terrible or half-arsed job.

Worse, they may even actively do a bad job in the hope of doing damage.

Plus, the whole idea of conscription is absurd.

Re: The Government Uses Zero Days for “Offense”

#99
post #96
post #90

Earlier quoted context omitted.

On some points interpretation may be needed. On other points it's a stretch. At still other points maybe a stretch to breaking and beyond. You may not care for literal text, but a lawful society depends on it. Governments just doing whatever they feel is best at the moment aren't generally very robust. There has to be restraint over a judiciary. A limit to how far they can stretch things. Opinions vary on what this l…

Er, there is restraint over the judiciary. Justices can be removed by the legislative branch. It's hard. But that's intentional, too.

Yep. And a constitution.

Re: The Government Uses Zero Days for “Offense”

#100
post #89

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Many of the rules for the house and senate are specified, very clearly, as well. Sorry, it isn't a "vague document" nor a "rough guideline". It is very specific on many points. Also, the idea that no one but trained professionals can read or understand if the document is being followed is not only wrong but abhorrent. Certainly, legally the judiciary is to interpret the law for implementation, I don't disagree. But a…

I agree that we as voters vote our interests; I don't, and won't agree that the average joe can read and correctly interpret the constitution and they never will. It is a legal document and understanding it requires more than just the words on the page.

That's a common line from some sectors. It gets repeated a lot. There is probably a reason for that but I don't believe it's objective.
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