I hit the page from Chrome 45.0.2454.101 and it literally did not get a single site that I regularly visit. It did make a hit on Reddit, I guess, but I have only visited the site two or three times, and you could probably say that about 2/3 of the population.
Timing attack against HSTS to sniff browser history in Chrome and Firefox
31–40 of 99 posts
Re: Timing attack against HSTS to sniff browser history in Chrome and Firefox
#32Mitigation, get your site added to the HSTS Preload list. Most of the advanced webappsec security features leak information. CSP, HPKP, HSTS, etc, which was all 100% known. This talk is excellent because it puts together the attacks into real PoCs, real attacks, and great information on how it all works. These attacks in the talk are quality too, instead of being 'mostly' theoretical. This wasn't really documented al…
So what does it mean if now UA vendors have 1 million hosts added to HSTS pre-load list? Are they all created equal? Do they share the same preload list? Is there a single form to submit to all UA vendors? What if you have internal hosts that you still want the same mitigation in place? What is UA vendors' SLA on updating preload list? Preload suffers the same problem as pinning, correct me if I am wrong.
Not all UAs share the same preload list, but they all borrow from the chrome preload list. Read here https://hstspreload.appspot.com/.
Its not a great ecosystem and I dont forsee it as one that is improving, with encryption being a big issue in some countries
Re: Timing attack against HSTS to sniff browser history in Chrome and Firefox
#33Probably a good idea to edit the title to indicate that this is an example attack site as well, not my favorite thing in general to land on without warning. No js seems to mean no worries though.
Re: Timing attack against HSTS to sniff browser history in Chrome and Firefox
#34Having disabled NoScript, Privacy Badger, HTTPS Everywhere, and AdBlock Pro, it can tell I've been to npmjs.com. I'm not immediately worried. Maybe too obvious to point out, but as far as I can tell, it looks for entries in the browser cache, rather than looking at the history per-se. If you have the browser cache empty when you close the browser (gotta watch those evercookies!), that's also not an issue.
Re: Timing attack against HSTS to sniff browser history in Chrome and Firefox
#35One nice thing is that it is quite inaccurate, I've visited a large number of the sites it tells me I haven't.
Re: Timing attack against HSTS to sniff browser history in Chrome and Firefox
#36I hit the page from Chrome 45.0.2454.101 and it literally did not get a single site that I regularly visit. It did make a hit on Reddit, I guess, but I have only visited the site two or three times, and you could probably say that about 2/3 of the population.
Re: Timing attack against HSTS to sniff browser history in Chrome and Firefox
#37One nice thing is that it is quite inaccurate, I've visited a large number of the sites it tells me I haven't.
Re: Timing attack against HSTS to sniff browser history in Chrome and Firefox
#38Thankfully, this particular attack does not work with a running µmatrix. I do see a bunch of image requests to all these domains, but it shows that I haven't visited any (except for the ones that are blocked completely by hosts files, amusingly enough).
Re: Timing attack against HSTS to sniff browser history in Chrome and Firefox
#39Re: Timing attack against HSTS to sniff browser history in Chrome and Firefox
#40One nice thing is that it is quite inaccurate, I've visited a large number of the sites it tells me I haven't.
It's accurate depending on what you're looking for. Saying you didn't visit a site means you either did, or did not, but saying you did visit a site means you 100% did for sure. In the case of a negative the results are meaningless, but in the case of a positive they are accurate. Similar to a bloom filter