Earlier quoted context omitted.
> None of which we get from HFT. No but we do get it from market makers. HFT has led to a dramatic decrease in the price of market making. Unless your claim is that market making is not something that should be allowed? > And risk management? Please. They're only managing their own risks. My point about risk management was about the aggregate benefits of the markets, not about HFT providing someone risk management. I…
>No but we do get it from market makers. HFT has led to a dramatic decrease in the price of market making. Unless your claim is that market making is not something that should be allowed? No, my claim is that market making was made significantly cheaper by electronic trading in the 90s-00s but HFT had very little effect on that. HFTs do a lot of market making, make almost no profit from it and mainly use it as cover…
Levine is explaining how you can get a 95+% cancellation rate simply by running the most brain-dead simple possible market maker strategy: because you're required to post orders at multiple exchanges, and because every price change involves order cancellations (potentially lots of order cancellations, even on a single exchange, because of pairs trading and price ladders), and because adjusting prices on exchanges in near-real-time is the basic job of a market maker, virtually anyone running an electronic market maker is going to have a huge cancellation rate.
Levine brings this up to illustrate the silliness of proposals to regulate HFT by targeting entities with huge cancellation rates.
Comes now 'cdroconnor. You're playing a semantic game. You're defining "HFT" as "bad HFT", and everything else as simple "electronic trading". FINE. Nobody disagrees with you, except on the very boring point of what labels to attach to things.
But your argument here doesn't make any sense for the thread, because the good simple electronic trading you're condoning is also targeted by the cancellation regulation Clinton proposed. Which is the whole point of the article.