I wonder if the study is able to make a distinction between solution aversion and what could be called "proponent aversion". That is, it is normal to be skeptical of a statement when it comes from somebody we don't trust. And our level of trust can be dependent from another statement coming (or perceived to be coming) from the same source. In this case, the proposed solution to the problem. I've concocted an example:…
I wonder if we can make that distinction either. It would be solution aversion if you denied that the rate of suicides has been growing because you perceive that the main use of citing an increasing suicide rate is to push homeopathic education. If your aversion to certain proponents relates back to what it is they are proposing, it is not really an aversion to those proponents but to their proposals. Maybe proponent…
Another example might be gun/crime statistics from the NRA vs gun/crime statistics from gun-control advocates.
There's the inherent suspicion that the statistics had been twisted to fit an agenda, because you've caught that proponent or someone from the same ideological group doing it before, and that therefore the statistics themselves are untrustworthy.
I apply a mental correction factor when dealing with a group I think lies for agenda purposes -- I figure they're spinning things maximally in their favor, so what they claim forms one end of my error bars. Sometimes my expectations regarding the size of the error bars in that field lead me to believe that it's likely the data is actually centered all the way on the other side. In that sense, their statements can imply their own contradiction in some circumstances.