Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'd argue that being an effective altruist actually makes you less rational. As part of your genetic fitness, your brain is optimized for survival, reproduction, and keeping your children alive. If you're in the middle class and you give your money away then it goes against those objectives.
Genes are just part of the picture. Culture is as important - cultures evolve and are selected for fitness in almost the same way as genetics. This is a mammal thing, especially vivid in humans. In fact, culture has been shaping genes far more than genes, culture. In the last 50,000 years Homo Sapiens genetic adaptation has increased manyfold, likely in response to environmental changes brought on by culture (agraria…
The ‘effective altruists’
61–70 of 96 posts
Re: The ‘effective altruists’
#62Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't get what people have against utility theory (if that's what you mean by utilitarianism). For me it's one of the few models that must be obeyed: there must be a way to create a partial order among possible choices. Whatever the reasoning behind your actions is, you are going to choose a single action (at each step) -- this forces you to choose the best. That's all utilitarianism is for me -- it tells you nothi…
The problem is there is no utility function and choices are path dependent.
-"there is no utility function" is an odd claim. A function can obviously be defined, so what's the objection? Note that in any case there is an implicit utility function for which each action you do take has the maximum utility. Of course, there's the recursive problem of choosing the "best" utility function, which just highlights that at some point we stumble upon certain fundamental principles of physics and ethics which are ultimately arbitrary in which we would guide our actions consistently.
Re: The ‘effective altruists’
#63Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't get what people have against utility theory (if that's what you mean by utilitarianism). For me it's one of the few models that must be obeyed: there must be a way to create a partial order among possible choices. Whatever the reasoning behind your actions is, you are going to choose a single action (at each step) -- this forces you to choose the best. That's all utilitarianism is for me -- it tells you nothi…
> Whatever the reasoning behind your actions is, you are going to choose a single action (at each step) -- this forces you to choose the best. This works at the level of individual choice, but it doesn't add up over multiple individuals, because you can't compare different people's utilities on the same scale. But the key claims of utilitarianism under discussion (the ones that are supposed to motivate people to dona…
Re: The ‘effective altruists’
#64Earlier quoted context omitted.
Genes are just part of the picture. Culture is as important - cultures evolve and are selected for fitness in almost the same way as genetics. This is a mammal thing, especially vivid in humans. In fact, culture has been shaping genes far more than genes, culture. In the last 50,000 years Homo Sapiens genetic adaptation has increased manyfold, likely in response to environmental changes brought on by culture (agraria…
This should go without saying but if you go against your culture, your chances of finding a life partner and having children are less likely. So genetically you are tailored to "fit in".
Re: The ‘effective altruists’
#65Earlier quoted context omitted.
This seems like a straw man, but maybe this really is how some utilitarians think. My view is: if the cost in terms of trust lost is greater than the expected benefit of an action, then the utilitarian answer is not to do it. If the only way to prevent a "race to zero trust" is to make some bright line rules and enforce them universally, then that's the utilitarian answer. It's literally impossible for another ethica…
It's only literally impossible in an abstract mathematical world where the rule is somehow manifest as a law of nature. In the real world, the rule can be nothing more than a belief that is applied by individuals in their decision making. One can easily see how this could lead to a wide range of perverse outcomes, primarily because the idea of a 'utility function' is not a real thing in the world and cannot be univer…
1. If you discover that you're so bad at predicting the consequences of your actions that always following the rules would produce better outcomes, then the good utilitarian thing to do is to give up on your own judgement and follow the rules.
2. If you discover that people you convince to follow utilitarianism end up in situation #1, then the good utilitarian thing to do is to lie to people about your beliefs and convince them to just follow the rules.
Re: The ‘effective altruists’
#66Earlier quoted context omitted.
This hits on the problem with "Effective Altruism" — it is exactly the bad form of utilitarian thinking. It seems purely about reallocating some wealth from the rich to the poor. That's nice, but it's only treating the symptoms and ignoring many other factors that influence human flourishing, such as an individual's ability to improve their own circumstances (instead of waiting for a generous benefactor to give them…
I don't understand how Effective Altruism says that you can't treat systemic causes. I think that given the large increase in utility that systemic changes would cause they would be precisely in favor of these changes most of all. I am not aware of any research that says that charity has net negative expected utility. No charity to my knowledge forces any recipients to take the charity. So you would expect any indivi…
More subtly, charity could make one person better off and others worse off. You could go around to every doctor in the world and ask them if I gave you a million dollars, what would you do?. Then you could give a million dollars only to the ones who say they would retire and spend it on bribing law enforcement officers to overlook the murder spree that they can now afford to finance.
Those are both pretty actively evil, but it's at least plausible that well-intentioned but poorly-thought-out charities could have negative effects.
Re: The ‘effective altruists’
#67Earlier quoted context omitted.
You're assuming that just giving the bed net to the person is the only way of reducing their risk of malaria. You are not even considering, or allowing the person to consider, the option of trading their own wealth production for the bed net. In other words, you're assuming they can have either independence or a reduced risk of malaria, but not both. What if having both is possible--but only if the charity is not the…
How does the charity prevent the person from buying a bed net? So you're saying that when a charity provides bed nets, it causes individuals to make the irrational and sub-optimal choice of using a bed net without purchasing it. And this happens frequently enough to significantly reduce the utility that a charity provides? This doesn't seem very intuitive to me. I am curious if you have any evidence that you could po…
If your choice is between buying a bed net, or taking one that is available for free, the rational and optimal choice for you, if we only consider that choice itself, is to take the free one. Isn't that obvious?
But this is a first-order effect, and I'm talking about second-order effects. Most people who are given bed nets by charities probably can't afford to buy them. What I'm thinking about is this: people who get bed nets from charities are probably used to thinking of valuable things like bed nets as being provided by charity. They aren't used to thinking of them as something that can be worked for. More generally, they think of wealth--not just bed nets but things of value generally--as something that is pre-existing in the world, and it's just a matter of who happens to have it and is willing to give it to those who don't happen to have it. They view wealth as a zero-sum game.
But in reality, wealth is something that gets created. Those bed nets didn't grow on trees. Somebody made them. Somebody created the wealth they represent. But in order to create wealth, people first have to understand that wealth can be created, and people who are used to getting things through charity aren't likely to think that way. So they won't even think of, for example, figuring out how bed nets are made, and starting up an operation to make them themselves. Then they wouldn't need charity. They wouldn't even need to buy the bed nets. (And even if they did choose to buy them, it would be because they are doing something else that creates even more wealth, so they have enough surplus to trade for the bed nets and still come out ahead.)
Now you could say that, if all that is true, it is irrational to accept charity, instead of choosing to learn how to create the wealth yourself. I sympathize with that impulse; I have it myself. But now we're using a different definition of "rational", according to which people in sub-Saharan Africa, with no education, are supposed to understand wealth creation and economics well enough to see that accepting bed nets from charity, even if it benefits them in the short term, is not optimal for them in the long term. This definition of rationality, while it seems attractive in the abstract, has the huge downside of being totally unreasonable. It's much more reasonable to accept that people's perceptions of the choices available to them are affected by their environment, what they see other people around them doing, and what choices have been available in the past. That's why providing charity to people who are capable of creating their own wealth is, in the long run, a bad idea; it affects their own perception of the options available to them, so they don't even think of wealth creation as an option.
> I'd be especially curious how the presence of the charity causes people to act irrationally.
I'm not saying it does. Accepting charity if it is available is a rational choice, if a person is only considering that choice in isolation. The problem is with second-order effects. See above.
Re: The ‘effective altruists’
#68Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm curious as to what are some alternate theories of how to do the most good besides a summing-like equation across individuals?
> I'm curious as to what are some alternate theories of how to do the most good besides a summing-like equation across individuals? See, as one of many alternatives, Rawls works (perhaps most particularly Justice as Fairness , but also the earlier A Theory of Justice ) which present an approach which considers the position of different individuals and groups, but does not optimize a summing-like equation (unless you…
It's an interesting though experiment but I think we subconsciously way over estimate our chances of being born into similar circumstances and way underestimate being born a poor African child in Somalia. It's also hard to imagine what it would be like to be born with cognitive issues like reduced executive function, psychopathy, or reduced grit.
But it seems to me it leads to similar conclusions as utilitarianism, such as 'Effective Altrusim'. The number of situations where these philosophies would differ seems fairly small to me.
Re: The ‘effective altruists’
#69Peter Singer's work has influenced my life in a big way. I have taken the 10% income to charity pledge and am on track this year to hit it(I calculate it every week as my income may begin varying weekly). My charity of choice is Schistomiasis Initiative, which I donate to through GiveWell. The Life You Can Save has a satisfying "Impact Calculator" that can help you visualize what good your money is capable of doing h…
I wasn't aware of Peter Singer etc., but I was actually independently considering doing the same thing (also 10%). But to be honest, I still fight with my worries - I am not sure about the local culture (Czech Republic), many people here still believe "who doesn't steal, steals from the family", and I worry that some of my friends/family will not like the idea. Although it may be completely unfounded fear or rationalization (I have a fair share of social anxiety).
Re: The ‘effective altruists’
#70Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't get what people have against utility theory (if that's what you mean by utilitarianism). For me it's one of the few models that must be obeyed: there must be a way to create a partial order among possible choices. Whatever the reasoning behind your actions is, you are going to choose a single action (at each step) -- this forces you to choose the best. That's all utilitarianism is for me -- it tells you nothi…
> Whatever the reasoning behind your actions is, you are going to choose a single action (at each step) -- this forces you to choose the best. This works at the level of individual choice, but it doesn't add up over multiple individuals, because you can't compare different people's utilities on the same scale. But the key claims of utilitarianism under discussion (the ones that are supposed to motivate people to dona…
I also think utility can makes sense when there's a set of actors looking forward to make a set of decisions. Again, this set of decisions is going to be unique. So if those actors are able to 1) achieve consensus on a utility 2) coordinate their actions according to said utility, then it also makes sense to talk in terms of a joint utility theory.