I think highlighting risks in systems we might eventually change, but can't change yet, is also part of sensible policy.
We're not going to change the DNS registrar system overnight. But by drawing attention to the issue, we might, eventually, make it a bit more robust with regards to things like registrars becoming unresponsive to small players, or losing data.
For example if people could register with two or three independent registrars in order to have robust control and ownership in the event any one registrar fails them, that might help as a technical solution for robustness. No doubt there are other non-technical things that may help as well.
Separate from changing DNS, I think it's sensible to recognise that risks with cloud hosting or using SaaS, as happened to OP with their GitHub account, also exist with DNS, so for anyone who would find that a problem, they should evaluate whether relying on a single domain, or even on DNS itself, is the right thing to do. For example, high-value IoT devices in the field that can't be updated easily might look for their server at more than one DNS name, and specifically on separate domains (not subdomains) held by distinct registrars, and validate the server's identity. Or they might keep track of IP addresses that have worked recently (in addition to DNS) and fall back to those. (I have worked on devices where this was helpful because DNS on some deployed sites turned out to be unreliable.)