Viewing profile — ewillbefull

There's no absolute requirement for using Facebook to communicate with others over the Internet, so there's no sensible reason why they (or anyone else) should be compelled to host…

> Banks, electricity companies, railway operators These are bad examples in a discussion about speech protections... those businesses are providing services, not just engaging in s…

> The 'trapdoor' is in the protocol by design. Only due to ignorance. It is well known that the bases of a Pedersen commitment can and should be sampled randomly; a trusted setup i…

That's great! There are many issues with trusted setups that people aren't paying enough attention to.

There is nothing new about this article. The article is pointing out that in addition to the trapdoors of the proving system, it's possible to subvert the arithmetic circuit used a…

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brainfuck The HolyJit repo has a brainfuck jit example in the repository: https://github.com/nbp/holyjit/blob/master/examples/brainfuc...

In our case, the use of grsec was one of the simplest counter-measures that achieved an almost purely additive security improvement. That's even when accepting the risk that grsec …

I'm Sean from Zcash, I coordinated the MPC and wrote the software. I messaged you on twitter or emailed you or something about this last year. > it made it sound like I repeated th…

https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/602 The protocol scales linearly with respect to the number of participants, but as you can tell, each participant needs to do a lot of time-consuming …

The protocol could not scale to a large number of participants at the time. Just with six participants it took an entire weekend to perform.

> To both yourself and the person you're replying too, please don't put words in my mouth. What words did I put in your mouth? I cited the 2^80 figure in your blog post and a reaso…

> 2^80 is not very weak. That's the level of brute forcing a SHA-1 collision. It's low for a new system, but not very weak. Note that the 2^80 figure from Peter's blog post is real…

Zooko explained afterward: https://twitter.com/zooko/status/864341289374023680

Zero-knowledge proofs for a given statement, by definition, reveal nothing about its witness. zk-SNARKs (used by Zcash) are statistically zero-knowledge; there are no cryptographic…

There is a tradeoff here that keeps being missed. Ring signatures with small anonymity sets have very serious privacy drawbacks, but they have more sensible assumptions for protect…

Zcash's zk-SNARKs are totally private even if that ceremony failed and even if the cryptographic assumptions underlying zk-SNARKs fall apart. I find the comparison with Bitcoin per…

The next survey should ask which nightly-only features are keeping them on nightly. :)

I think you misread the parent comment. :)

It depends entirely on what you're doing. There are people who "save" cryptocurrency and depend on its long-term value, but there are also people who are more worried about going t…

Some people (myself included) would rather the system become worthless than anyone's privacy being at risk.

At the time, the multi-party computation protocol could not scale to a large number of participants.

> Worth adding here that it also appears Zcash stakeholders have been internally buying/selling their own ZEC at inflated prices on Poloniex to artificially increase both volume an…