Show HN: A simple “stateless” password manager for Chrome
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Show HN: A simple “stateless” password manager for Chrome
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Re: Show HN: A simple “stateless” password manager for Chrome
#2However, it might be okay if one can provide their own hashing function. Like a JS function that takes the domain and secret key as parameters.
Re: Show HN: A simple “stateless” password manager for Chrome
#3So, what's different about this from the SuperGenPass session Chrome plugin?
Re: Show HN: A simple “stateless” password manager for Chrome
#4Re: Show HN: A simple “stateless” password manager for Chrome
#5Ok, the idea in general isn't good because most people won't use a good password and also because now there's a single point of failure if someone sees your password. However, it might be okay if one can provide their own hashing function. Like a JS function that takes the domain and secret key as parameters.
But, your suggestion of a JS function that take the domain and secret key is how the GenPass and SuperGenPass bookmarklets have worked for years (and the flaw in that method has only been fixed this year, I think).
Re: Show HN: A simple “stateless” password manager for Chrome
#6Ok, the idea in general isn't good because most people won't use a good password and also because now there's a single point of failure if someone sees your password. However, it might be okay if one can provide their own hashing function. Like a JS function that takes the domain and secret key as parameters.
Re: Show HN: A simple “stateless” password manager for Chrome
#7A <$1000 bitcoin (SHA-256) mining ASIC appliance is likely to be doing 1TH/s. Makes 2^16 rounds look kinda weak.
Re: Show HN: A simple “stateless” password manager for Chrome
#8Re: Show HN: A simple “stateless” password manager for Chrome
#9Re: Show HN: A simple “stateless” password manager for Chrome
#10Please tell me I am missing something. There is no salt. The hashing algorithm is hence vulnerable to a simple dictionary attack. It does not matter if you do a gigazillion rounds. Someone can still pre-calculate a list of common passwords and then test that list against each and every user.