The Sinking Ship of E-Mail Security
adamcaudill.com
The Sinking Ship of E-Mail Security
1–10 of 56 posts
Re: The Sinking Ship of E-Mail Security
#2Email security is really bad. We have a lot of companies trying to roll out "secure email" every week.
There are a ton of problems to solve before one of these actually works, javascript crypto being the least (since HN likes to discuss it...). Backwards compatibility with old email protocols and insecure service is clearly a weak-link in any hypothetically secure service.
It would be nice to see a more distributed protocol...where the bulk of the world's email is holed up in a few company's data centers.
Re: The Sinking Ship of E-Mail Security
#3While the spirit is laudable—I'm not sure if there's an 'e-mail security' version of https://craphound.com/spamsolutions.txt, but, if there were, then I'm pretty sure that one of the reasons for failure would be "You are a private individual announcing that you will be rolling out a new standard for e-mail in a couple of weeks".
Re: The Sinking Ship of E-Mail Security
#4Mobile - Using PGP on a mobile device can be risky, as it requires storing the private key on devices that are likely to have known security issues. Many people recommend against it, as it puts the private key at too much risk.
ARGH. The whole point of PGP keyrings --- the costliest part of the PGP UX --- is that you don't have to have a single key. If you're terrified of exposing your secret key on your mobile device (which is frankly the most secure device you own), just cut a new key for it.
Any time someone suggests a new application for PGP, people come out of the woodwork saying things like "what, you want me to put my PGP key in my browser?" No. We want you to put --> a <-- PGP key there.
Re: The Sinking Ship of E-Mail Security
#5Mobile - Using PGP on a mobile device can be risky, as it requires storing the private key on devices that are likely to have known security issues. Many people recommend against it, as it puts the private key at too much risk. ARGH. The whole point of PGP keyrings --- the costliest part of the PGP UX --- is that you don't have to have a single key. If you're terrified of exposing your secret key on your mobile devic…
Yeah, I have mixed feelings about that one; I almost didn't include it, but it's an argument that I hear often enough that I thought it was worth pointing out.
Personally, I have my key on my phone, and I'm fairly comfortable with it - though there are certainly some that aren't.
Re: The Sinking Ship of E-Mail Security
#6Mobile - Using PGP on a mobile device can be risky, as it requires storing the private key on devices that are likely to have known security issues. Many people recommend against it, as it puts the private key at too much risk. ARGH. The whole point of PGP keyrings --- the costliest part of the PGP UX --- is that you don't have to have a single key. If you're terrified of exposing your secret key on your mobile devic…
But, wouldn't that mean that if you share the same email account on your Desktop and Phone, that using a different key on your phone would mean you could not decrypt emails intended for your Desktop?
My understanding was that you can associate a key with your email address, does this just mean you would have two keys associated, one for "me@me.com Desktop" and one for "me@me.com Phone"?
Re: The Sinking Ship of E-Mail Security
#7While the spirit is laudable—I'm not sure if there's an 'e-mail security' version of https://craphound.com/spamsolutions.txt , but, if there were, then I'm pretty sure that one of the reasons for failure would be "You are a private individual announcing that you will be rolling out a new standard for e-mail in a couple of weeks".
Change has to start somewhere. Starting with a draft and getting feedback from the community before pushing it ahead for more formal standardization seems like the right place to me.
As I said in the article, my goal is to get people talking about potential solutions. I have little hope that the solution I propose will be accepted and used as is - but if it gets more people talking, and discussions going about something that will work, then it was worth the effort.
Re: The Sinking Ship of E-Mail Security
#8Mobile - Using PGP on a mobile device can be risky, as it requires storing the private key on devices that are likely to have known security issues. Many people recommend against it, as it puts the private key at too much risk. ARGH. The whole point of PGP keyrings --- the costliest part of the PGP UX --- is that you don't have to have a single key. If you're terrified of exposing your secret key on your mobile devic…
But, wouldn't that mean that if you share the same email account on your Desktop and Phone, that using a different key on your phone would mean you could not decrypt emails intended for your Desktop? My understanding was that you can associate a key with your email address, does this just mean you would have two keys associated, one for "me@me.com Desktop" and one for "me@me.com Phone"?
You can encrypt messages to more than one key. You have to be pretty fussy to begin with to even have this concern.
Re: The Sinking Ship of E-Mail Security
#9Mobile - Using PGP on a mobile device can be risky, as it requires storing the private key on devices that are likely to have known security issues. Many people recommend against it, as it puts the private key at too much risk. ARGH. The whole point of PGP keyrings --- the costliest part of the PGP UX --- is that you don't have to have a single key. If you're terrified of exposing your secret key on your mobile devic…
> If you're terrified of exposing your secret key on your mobile device (which is frankly the most secure device you own), just cut a new key for it.
The mobile device is the one most people have the least control over in terms of software (which can be both good and bad) but is also the one they are most likely to lose in a shady part of town.
I agree with the rest of your post though.
Re: The Sinking Ship of E-Mail Security
#10Mobile - Using PGP on a mobile device can be risky, as it requires storing the private key on devices that are likely to have known security issues. Many people recommend against it, as it puts the private key at too much risk. ARGH. The whole point of PGP keyrings --- the costliest part of the PGP UX --- is that you don't have to have a single key. If you're terrified of exposing your secret key on your mobile devic…
> If you're terrified of exposing your secret key on your mobile device (which is frankly the most secure device you own), just cut a new key for it. The mobile device is the one most people have the least control over in terms of software (which can be both good and bad) but is also the one they are most likely to lose in a shady part of town. I agree with the rest of your post though.
How much does it matter if you lose your encrypted PGP keyring on your fully-encrypted smartphone in a bad part of town?