Mailpile – taking e-mail back
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Mailpile – taking e-mail back
1–10 of 157 posts
Re: Mailpile – taking e-mail back
#2I'm surprised how fast it happened! With 22 days left it may get high enough for them to bring on another developer.
Re: Mailpile – taking e-mail back
#3So will this bypass prism-like surveillance methods?
Re: Mailpile – taking e-mail back
#4How many times do people have to say this:
There is no such thing as secure email. Assume everything is being read.
You can't bolt security on (SSL, mailbox encryption, PKI). You have to design it in from the start. SMTP/IMAP etc have crudely hacked on TLS implementations which aren't even guaranteed to be operational site to site. PGP is just an encapsulation which is rarely used.
It's a mess.
This is just a repackaging of the pile of hacks.
We need to start again and do it properly and consider: encryption, modern content encapsulation (better than mime), authentication, PKI, secure storage, mandatory authentication/authorisation and SPAM control.
Re: Mailpile – taking e-mail back
#5Why even bother with S/MIME? How long until the government corrupts the certificate for it if Mailpipe becomes as important to them as Lavabit was, in the future? And I hope their PGP implementation is really user-friendly.
This sounds like more of the same of what we've had so far, perhaps with the ability to become a little more mainstream, but I don't see any breakthroughs in terms of encryption here, like say the way Bitmessage is. I think that if we want NSA-proof secure messaging we'll need to come up with new stuff, and not just use the same old PGP with centralized email databases.
This could definitely be a (very short-term) win against NSA if say Gmail implemented PGP in a very user-friendly way, but for something starting from scratch, I'd rather it was a breakthrough in security.
Re: Mailpile – taking e-mail back
#6How many times do people have to say this: There is no such thing as secure email. Assume everything is being read. You can't bolt security on (SSL, mailbox encryption, PKI). You have to design it in from the start. SMTP/IMAP etc have crudely hacked on TLS implementations which aren't even guaranteed to be operational site to site. PGP is just an encapsulation which is rarely used. It's a mess. This is just a repacka…
To downvoters: do the honour of explaining yourselves.
Re: Mailpile – taking e-mail back
#7How many times do people have to say this: There is no such thing as secure email. Assume everything is being read. You can't bolt security on (SSL, mailbox encryption, PKI). You have to design it in from the start. SMTP/IMAP etc have crudely hacked on TLS implementations which aren't even guaranteed to be operational site to site. PGP is just an encapsulation which is rarely used. It's a mess. This is just a repacka…
Did you read what Mailpile is doing? Basically making PGP easy to use which solves the lions share of the issues at stake here with the NSA and your complaints.
Re: Mailpile – taking e-mail back
#8How many times do people have to say this: There is no such thing as secure email. Assume everything is being read. You can't bolt security on (SSL, mailbox encryption, PKI). You have to design it in from the start. SMTP/IMAP etc have crudely hacked on TLS implementations which aren't even guaranteed to be operational site to site. PGP is just an encapsulation which is rarely used. It's a mess. This is just a repacka…
Did you read what Mailpile is doing? Basically making PGP easy to use which solves the lions share of the issues at stake here with the NSA and your complaints.
Except it doesn't solve the traffic analysis problem. It doesn't because it can't. Out of the list posted by the GP the following aren't fixed by mailpile and can't be because it has to use SMTP:
modern content encapsulation / PKI / mandatory authentication / SPAM control.
Re: Mailpile – taking e-mail back
#9How many times do people have to say this: There is no such thing as secure email. Assume everything is being read. You can't bolt security on (SSL, mailbox encryption, PKI). You have to design it in from the start. SMTP/IMAP etc have crudely hacked on TLS implementations which aren't even guaranteed to be operational site to site. PGP is just an encapsulation which is rarely used. It's a mess. This is just a repacka…
Did you read what Mailpile is doing? Basically making PGP easy to use which solves the lions share of the issues at stake here with the NSA and your complaints.
> making PGP easy to use which solves the lions share of the issues
Does it encrypt the "from" and "to" headers?
Re: Mailpile – taking e-mail back
#10How many times do people have to say this: There is no such thing as secure email. Assume everything is being read. You can't bolt security on (SSL, mailbox encryption, PKI). You have to design it in from the start. SMTP/IMAP etc have crudely hacked on TLS implementations which aren't even guaranteed to be operational site to site. PGP is just an encapsulation which is rarely used. It's a mess. This is just a repacka…
Did you read what Mailpile is doing? Basically making PGP easy to use which solves the lions share of the issues at stake here with the NSA and your complaints.
The NSA doesn't care what's in my message. They care who sent it, who received it, and when it was sent. None of those things are protected by PGP.
Heck, they often get the source IP address and subject line, which is just a bonus.