Bad Security at Evite
fnord1.blog.ca
Bad Security at Evite
1–10 of 23 posts
Re: Bad Security at Evite
#2Didn't we have this discussion about password hashing already a few weeks ago?
If someone's snooping on your email, I think you've got bigger problems than a lost password, tbh.
As for hashing, again, if someone can get on the server and download the whole database, you've got bigger problems than password hashing.
I'm not saying this is a good practice, but I just don't think it's as big a problem as this guy is making it out.
Also, there's a balance between security and usability. For some kinds of users, not being able to tell them their password is actually a problem. Sites that are able to do that will have a competitive edge in getting those users. So the question is one of balance between usability and security, not just one of security.
Re: Bad Security at Evite
#3Didn't we have this discussion about password hashing already a few weeks ago? If someone's snooping on your email, I think you've got bigger problems than a lost password, tbh. As for hashing, again, if someone can get on the server and download the whole database, you've got bigger problems than password hashing. I'm not saying this is a good practice, but I just don't think it's as big a problem as this guy is mak…
I disagree that not being able to tell someone their password is a usability problem. Having a password reset system is just as usable and significantly more secure than having to store passwords in plain text.
And both of your arguments about having bigger problems are fundamentally flawed. Sure, if someone does get your db, you have a big problem, but that doesn't mean you shouldn't take precautions so that if it somehow happens they can't read it like a book. It's kind of like you're saying cars shouldn't have airbags because it's harder to honk the horn and if you do get in an accident, you've got bigger problems.
And someone snooping on your email is as easy as you accessing your webmail on an unencrypted wifi connection. Do you think everyone in the world makes sure they use the ssl version of their webmail in public? Because if not, sniffing packets is trivially easy.
My point is that the situations you mentioned only become bigger problems when you make no effort to protect these things.
Re: Bad Security at Evite
#4Didn't we have this discussion about password hashing already a few weeks ago? If someone's snooping on your email, I think you've got bigger problems than a lost password, tbh. As for hashing, again, if someone can get on the server and download the whole database, you've got bigger problems than password hashing. I'm not saying this is a good practice, but I just don't think it's as big a problem as this guy is mak…
I disagree that not being able to tell someone their password is a usability problem. Having a password reset system is just as usable and significantly more secure than having to store passwords in plain text. And both of your arguments about having bigger problems are fundamentally flawed. Sure, if someone does get your db, you have a big problem, but that doesn't mean you shouldn't take precautions so that if it s…
> Do you think everyone in the world makes sure they use the ssl version of their webmail in public?
I know techies who don't use GMail who don't bother to explicitly using https://mail.google.com - I don't know why.
Re: Bad Security at Evite
#5Use Anyvite.
Re: Bad Security at Evite
#6Didn't we have this discussion about password hashing already a few weeks ago? If someone's snooping on your email, I think you've got bigger problems than a lost password, tbh. As for hashing, again, if someone can get on the server and download the whole database, you've got bigger problems than password hashing. I'm not saying this is a good practice, but I just don't think it's as big a problem as this guy is mak…
I disagree that not being able to tell someone their password is a usability problem. Having a password reset system is just as usable and significantly more secure than having to store passwords in plain text. And both of your arguments about having bigger problems are fundamentally flawed. Sure, if someone does get your db, you have a big problem, but that doesn't mean you shouldn't take precautions so that if it s…
I prefer 1 way hashed passwords. But why assume they are doing it in plain text? Why not a two way encryption?
Re: Bad Security at Evite
#7Earlier quoted context omitted.
I disagree that not being able to tell someone their password is a usability problem. Having a password reset system is just as usable and significantly more secure than having to store passwords in plain text. And both of your arguments about having bigger problems are fundamentally flawed. Sure, if someone does get your db, you have a big problem, but that doesn't mean you shouldn't take precautions so that if it s…
I prefer 1 way hashed passwords. But why assume they are doing it in plain text? Why not a two way encryption?
True, two way hashing is better than nothing, but it's still less secure than one way hashing (with a per-user salt) for passwords. All you need if one rogue employee and they can decrypt everyone's password. It's just difficult to justify the added risk when there usually isn't a need to retrieve the original password.
Edit: by "two way hashing" I meant encryption, not hashing. not sure where my brain was on that one...
Re: Bad Security at Evite
#8Didn't we have this discussion about password hashing already a few weeks ago? If someone's snooping on your email, I think you've got bigger problems than a lost password, tbh. As for hashing, again, if someone can get on the server and download the whole database, you've got bigger problems than password hashing. I'm not saying this is a good practice, but I just don't think it's as big a problem as this guy is mak…
It's a really big problem.
If you lose your whole database to an attacker, you have a big problem.
If you lose your whole database to an attacker, and you stored recoverable passwords in it, everyone has a big problem.
There'd be something to debate here if fixing this problem wasn't 5-10 lines of code. But that's what it is. 5-10 lines of code to keep yourself from compromising tens of thousands of (email, password) pairs. There is no debate to have here.
Re: Bad Security at Evite
#9Earlier quoted context omitted.
I prefer 1 way hashed passwords. But why assume they are doing it in plain text? Why not a two way encryption?
True, two way hashing is better than nothing, but it's still less secure than one way hashing (with a per-user salt) for passwords. All you need if one rogue employee and they can decrypt everyone's password. It's just difficult to justify the added risk when there usually isn't a need to retrieve the original password. Edit: by "two way hashing" I meant encryption, not hashing. not sure where my brain was on that on…
As a practitioner in this space, I'm going to tell you that I don't know what this "two-way hashing" is that you speak of. There's a right way to store passwords and there's a wrong way. The right way is bcrypt. The wrong way is anything other than bcrypt.
Re: Bad Security at Evite
#10Sending your password after signup doesn't necessarily mean they're storing it permanently.