Someone used my open source project to phish people
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Re: Someone used my open source project to phish people
#21. You are not alone, this happens at a large scale across the board with companies of all sizes.
2. More than likely the abuser did not do it manually, more than likely they automated it
3. As a thoughtful business one may have rolled out all the authentication features/gates if the business picks up, as a starter the safe idea could have been to put it behind any openly available OAuth provider
Re: Someone used my open source project to phish people
#3Re: Someone used my open source project to phish people
#4For example -- let's say you offer $100 in free AWS credits by signing up to your platform. Expect a malicious user to eventually come to your platform, realize they can resell those $100 in credits for $50, and start using your platform for their own gain. Unless the mechanisms you add in place to reduce fraud / second sign ups / etc is greater than the value that they are receiving ($50), they will continue.
With sites where the platform is free, the math almost always makes sense for these malicious users to eventually abuse. In this case it was leveraging the email reputation of another domain at no cost to their own (along with the added value of anyone getting phished), but on other sites it's public profiles being used for backlinks / spam, etc.
Re: Someone used my open source project to phish people
#5Re: Someone used my open source project to phish people
#6[flagged]
Re: Someone used my open source project to phish people
#7[flagged]
Why do you think this is LLM-generated? Reads perfectly fine to me.
I threw part of it into pangram to get a second opinion:
https://www.pangram.com/history/8d6a7de3-86ac-4ce0-86c5-4f93...
Re: Someone used my open source project to phish people
#8Re: Someone used my open source project to phish people
#9[flagged]
Why do you think this is LLM-generated? Reads perfectly fine to me.
> There was no exploit. No vulnerability disclosure. No CVE for me to write. The attacker filled out my signup form 942 times, made 942 workspaces, sent 942 batches of about a hundred invitations each, and stopped. They used my tool exactly as designed. The design was just bad enough that the tool was good for phishing.